Moving Forward With Your Back to the Future

The Experiences of Three Values-Communities in New Zealand for Re-Orientation of Modernity towards a Sustainable Society

‘The Angel of History must look just so. His face is turned towards the past... The storm drives him irresistibly into the future, to which his back is turned, while the rubble-heap before him grows sky-high. That which we call progress, is this storm.’


‘[T]he past is in front of you and the future, “nga wa a muri”, is at the back, so you walk backwards into the future and your past opens out in front of you. It’s a paradigm shift about what you know is valuable... The only thing that is valuable is the past and that leads you into the future. The more you value the past, the more valuable the future will become.’

Maori-New Zealander, Interview with the author, 2008

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26 May 2008
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ABSTRACT
As “sustainability” has gathered more attention globally, many academics and bureaucrats have placed faith in the capacity of education to provide young people with the values to confront the problems of the 21st century. This thesis questions the underlying assumption that values can be propagated and sustained through communication alone in education. Following a Durkheimian approach to religion, it investigates the importance of community for values by comparing three contemporary values-movements in New Zealand: Political-Green Environmentalism, Tikanga Maori (Maori customary values and practices) and Fundamentalist Christianity. On the basis of analysis of twelve in-depth interviews with members from the three different groups, theory is generated which argues that “universal values” are universal precisely because they originate in the common experience of human interaction within community. The thesis is critical of values-education proponents’ lack of acknowledgement of the structural forces which have discouraged value-internalisation in mainstream New Zealand, and concludes with a suggestion that the most important role for education is to help restore Durkheimian “collective consciousness” through a post-colonial process analogous to that pioneered by Maori educational reforms since the 1980s. This would first and foremost involve a complete re-orientation of the time perspective of the education system, from one promoting a positivist belief in progress and modernist belief in future-liberation to one promoting social history, family roots and a history-focused temporal orientation.

KEY WORDS: social sustainability; values; education; modernity; community; environmentalism; fundamentalist Christianity; Tikanga Maori.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express sincere thanks to all the people who helped make this thesis happen: to the interviewees, who opened their hearts and homes to a curious stranger; to Olivia and Tom, for their encouragement and support; to my supervisor, Turaj Faran, for his generosity of time and spirit; and to all my LUMES classmates, for showing me the true meaning of “collective effervescence”.

David Gaston; May 2008

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Problem Background: Sustainability and Values-Education

“Sustainability”: it is the new buzz word in the public policy lexicon. Ever since the “Stern Review” and the documentary “An Inconvenient Truth” were released in 2006, the public discourse in New Zealand has moved on from “is it really a problem?” to “how do we solve it?” This was confirmed at the opening of New Zealand parliament for 2007, when Prime Minister Helen Clark argued that ‘the quest for sustainability has taken on a new urgency because of the scale of the environmental challenge the world faces’, and declared that New Zealand ‘can aim to be the first nation to be truly sustainable’ (Clark 2007).

The sincerity of Clark’s words may not yet be proven by action, and in rhetoric alone, sustainability requires remarkably little political capital; few political opponents are willing to assert that New Zealand should be an “unsustainable nation”. Nevertheless, the qualitative change in the nature of the public discourse is tangible. To the problem of “how do we solve it?” the government has pursued solutions in two general directions: technological fix and education. An example of the former is investment in methane-reduction technologies to combat the large proportion of New Zealand greenhouse gas emissions produced by livestock (Hodgson 2008). However, this thesis is a response to the latter “solution” of education, and more particularly, the recent efforts to promote “values” through education.

The connection between sustainability and values-education can be traced back at least as far as the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. The document it produced, “Agenda 21”, argued that: ‘Education is critical for promoting sustainable development... It is also critical for achieving environmental and ethical awareness, values and attitudes, skills and behaviour consistent with sustainable development’ (United Nations 2008). This educational-focus has been followed up by influential academics such as Andrew Dobson, who has argued that a new generation of “ecological citizens”, who give priority to environmental considerations, can be shaped by educational reform (Dobson 2003).

The “New Zealand Curriculum”, which was released by the Ministry of Education on the 6th November 2007, is a reflection of this intellectual and political climate that is increasingly tying sustainability to education. This single document, to be universally implemented from 2010, will unify the seven current curriculum documents as well as ushering in several substantive reforms. One of the most significant changes, as highlighted by the Ministry, is to include a set of common values that ‘enjoy widespread support’ and should be ‘encouraged, modelled and explored’ (Ministry of Education 2008a). These “big-tent” values have been identified as “excellence”; “innovation and inquiry”; “diversity”; “equity”; “communication and participation”; “ecological sustainability”; “integrity”; and “respect” (Ibid.).

With these reforms, the Ministry has argued that New Zealand is moving in ‘the direction for teaching and learning in the 21st century’ (Ministry of Education 2008b). Prime Minister Helen Clark also noted that, by including issues such as climate change and ecological sustainability, the new curriculum has a “future focus”; ‘It says our students have to be challenged, to be thinking about the big issues.’ (Dominion Post 2007)
Yet, such faith in education to provide students with values was criticised over 100 years ago by one of the founders of sociology, Emile Durkheim, as wishful thinking: ‘Like the savage, who by vehement declaration of his will to see some cosmic phenomenon occur, believes he can make it happen through the use of sympathetic magic, we think that if we warmly state our wish to see such a change accomplished, it will spontaneously take place. In reality, a people’s mental structure is a system of definite forces not to be disarranged or rearranged by simple injunctions’ (Durkheim 1968: 387).

The degeneration of values in modern societies has been noted since Durkheim’s day in the late 19th century. Likewise, bureaucratic efforts to re-infuse society with values through education have a long history, although the new sustainability discourse has given them renewed focus. Yet, Durkheim’s critique suggests that humans shouldn’t be viewed as rationally-acting individuals, and that educational projects based on that model of human behaviour should be approached with a degree of scepticism.

1.2 Problem Identification: Values and Community

This thesis shares the view of Dobson, David Orr and others that there is a connection between “values”, social sustainability¹, and ultimately, ecological sustainability²; a view that suggests that our current problems are not an “ecological crisis” but a political and moral crisis with ecological consequences (Orr 2003: 70). This framing of ecological un-sustainability as a consequence of political and moral failings necessarily implies that social sustainability should receive renewed attention. However, following the seminal sociological work of Durkheim and others, the author remains sceptical of the education system’s ability to fix this political and moral crisis through teaching values to individual students at school, when these values are shorn of any communal context.

In fact, Dobson himself acknowledges the difficulty in teaching values individualistically when he quotes Jonathon: ‘to develop in the young the capacity for critical reflection on values cannot in and of itself provide an adequate framework either for the development of individual commitments or for the shared social understandings that both shape and reflect those commitments. Indeed, the rationale for such reflection in individuals presupposes the existence of a surrounding framework of value that both supports and sustains and against which personal values are elaborated and modified’ (in Dobson 2003: 201).

In New Zealand, one might look at the chequered history of anti-recidivism programmes in prisons and argue that the ‘surrounding framework of value’ that prisoners face in society after their release will quickly compromise any values learned through this process (see NZ Herald 2008a). One might also question the unspoken assumptions of values-education: where do values come from? Can they be taught devoid of cultural, communal or religious context? And, how are values sustained?

¹ “Social sustainability” is understood as the maintenance of social capital: the investments and services, based on community participation and strong civil society, which create the basic framework for society. (Goodland 2008)
² “Ecological sustainability” is understood as the maintenance of natural capital: the ecological services that human beings and other living beings rely on to exist. (Ibid)
By favouring secular education as the solution to values degeneration, the Ministry of Education has implicitly excluded from “mainstream New Zealand” a role for established values-systems; as a means of disseminating values, they are backing individual education over community. Yet, as the most common way of offering holistic moral guidance to people in New Zealand today, values-systems such as Political-Green Environmentalism, Fundamentalist Christianity or Tikanga Maori (Maori customary values and practices) may offer clues to answering the above questions about values. These questions about values are highly pertinent to the broader sociological debate over the potential for education/communication or community to help resolve social problems in the modern age. In offering three such vibrant examples of community-based values-systems, and with a political climate of educational reform promoting secular values-education, New Zealand offers a fascinating case to search for important insights on how modern societies globally can be reformed to become more sustainable in the 21st century.

2.0 METHODOLOGY

2.1 Structure of the Research

2.1.1 Research Hypotheses: The hypotheses of the research were three-fold:
1. That education can lead to values; but only indirectly, by focussing on community-associational skills.
2. That values can lead to sustainability; that values-communities enhance social sustainability, which is in turn a pre-requisite for ecological sustainability.
3. That sustainability can lead to the fruition of modernity; that a focus on ecological problems can be a unifying force to resolve the internal tensions of modernity.

2.1.2 Research Questions: My research questions flow from the above hypotheses:
1. What are the relative roles of community and doctrine in values propagation and sustenance?
2. What role will these three values-communities play in creating a sustainable society in New Zealand?
3. Can the lessons from these three communities’ approaches to sustainability help resolve the internal tensions of modern society globally?

2.1.3 Analytical Framework: I identified the body of work of Emile Durkheim, as having sufficient focus on community and values to provide an appropriate analytical framework for this research. This study notes that Durkheim’s understanding of religion evolved over the course of his academic career. In his earlier study on “Suicide”, Durkheim rejected religion as a means of fostering the “organic solidarity” necessary to combat the breakdown of values in society. However, a careful reading reveals that here he was referring to Catholicism in particular as he confessed to ignorance of non-Western religions (see Durkheim 1960: 370). In the later “Elementary Forms of Religious Life”, Durkheim developed a definition of religion as

3 Although, from a Durkheimian perspective, I believe that all three values-communities qualify as “religions” in their dichotomy between the sacred and profane elements of life, I understand that most people do not associate religion with this definition and have therefore decided, in order to avoid confusion, to refer to them as values-communities, values-movements or values-systems.
characterised by a sacred/profane dichotomy, which opened up phenomena such as political movements, sports and popular culture to religious analysis. By following this later conception of religion, one is able to identify commonalities across a wide variety of values-systems, thereby re-opening the possibility of “religious” communities as agents of “organic solidarity” and enhanced social sustainability.

2.1.4 Assumptions and Broader Context: The relevance of this research to sustainability rests on an assumption that ecological sustainability can only flow from social sustainability; that a society that is alienated and apathetic will not be in a position to solve the complexities of the global “wicked problems” of the 21st century (for example, see the “15 Global Challenges” in The Millenium Project 2008). This is an assumption shared by the conventional wisdom of values-education proponents. The added emphasis of this thesis, however, is that alienation from society and apathy towards its problems are enhanced by the atomisation of its citizens. Or, to paraphrase Durkheim, collective ends will only be promoted when “collective consciousness” determines behaviour (Callinicos 2005: 128).

By framing the issue of values-education and social sustainability within the context of broader sociological debates on modernity, the research attempts to offer a more systemic approach to understanding the pressures on values in contemporary New Zealand life.

2.1.5 Research Methods: The aim of this thesis was to generate insights and theory, and its research methods are of a qualitative nature. The study begins by framing the problem of modernity as it has been identified by the three “founding fathers” of sociology: Max Weber, Karl Marx and Emile Durkheim. It also explores recent New Zealand storytelling in film and literature for more specific representations of values loss in New Zealand. The thesis then relies on interviews as a means to ‘identify order and regularity in the complexity of social life and make sense of it’ (Ragin 1994: 31). These interviews were approached as a tool for “jointly-created knowledge”, combining the personal experience of the interviewee with the theoretical framework guiding the questions of the researcher. An interview outline was created which covered three themes: pre-conversion life, post-conversion life, and relations with “mainstream” New Zealand and other values-communities (see Appendix B). Questions within each theme began in as open-ended a manner as possible to encourage the discovery of unanticipated perspectives, before progressing to the more specific questions necessary to maintain uniformity of structure.

2.2 Epistemology: Reflexive Methodology
As is emphasised by Existential Hermeneutics, one is never free from preconceptions inherited from the past: ‘Nobody proceeds from a tabula rasa and this includes the one seeking to understand’ (Alvesson and

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4 For the purpose of this thesis, “conversion” is understood more flexibly than in the traditional religious sense, as simply the act of consciously identifying with a values-system.
5 I recognise that the term “mainstream” is confusingly generic, but for the purposes of this study it is defined as anyone who does not consciously identify with either of these three values-communities
Skolberg 2000: 84). This perspective builds on the paradox inherent to Martin Heidegger’s hermeneutic circle: to understand presupposes pre-understanding, but at the same time pre-understanding is an obstacle to understanding (Ibid.).

Reflexive methodology asserts that this paradox can be partially overcome through a process of constant merging into the world of the research-object and linking back into one’s own reference system (Ibid.). This encourages an iterative approach, meaning that “data collection and analysis proceed in tandem, repeatedly referring back to each other” (Bryman 2004: 401). My research therefore alternated for two months between inhabiting the world of the interviewees for 90 to 120 minutes at a time, and linking back to the world of academic theory and personal observations.

Bohrman asserts that we also have the possibility to transcend our perspectives by consciously reflecting on them (Ibid: 85). I thus set about reflecting, before my interviews, on my own opinions, prejudices or preconceived ideas with regards to the issue of values in general, and the three values-systems in particular. I noted that the experience of living in Japan for five years as a university student has given me first-hand experience of a different, but effective values-system, and fostered in me a relativistic approach to values doctrine. I also acknowledge that I have a greater degree of personal experience with fundamentalist Christianity (through three immediate family members who have been “born-again”) and environmentalism (through one family member who has devoted her life to work on environmental issues and the experiences of socialisation in the tenets of environmentalism through my master’s programme) than I have had with Tikanga Maori.

My impression of Tikanga is partially viewed through the prism of the pre-modern community constructs and values that I experienced in Japan, as well as through contemporary New Zealand film and literature. My approach to Tikanga is not based on experience in a Maori community where Tikanga is holistically expressed. Consequently, my knowledge of Tikanga is fragmented, impressionistic and intellectual, in fact everything that reflects the ignorance and the lack of context that Maori academics rightly decry in Pakeha (New Zealander of European descent) researchers. The fact that I have, nonetheless, judged myself worthy to comment on Tikanga possibly betrays a pro-Tikanga bias in my pre-conceptions; it is entirely likely that, as a Pakeha, I would not have chosen to study Tikanga Maori as a values-system if I knew beforehand that I would have to criticise it.

Yet, I have tried to approach the doctrines of all three values-systems without imposing my own judgements of truth upon them. As explained by Karl Mannheim: ‘The non-evaluative general total conception of ideology is to be found primarily in those historical investigations, where, provisionally and for the sake of the simplification of the problem, no judgments are pronounced as to the correctness of the ideas to be treated. This approach confines itself to discovering the relations between certain mental structures and the life-situations in which they exist.’ (Mannheim 1998: 71)

This thesis attempts to discover Mannheim’s relations between the mental structures and the life-situations of the people who follow a set of values, and consequently no judgment on the ideas themselves has been made
before the relations are determined and the theory generated. These judgments have been reserved for the “Discussion” section of the paper in chapter 8.

2.3 Interviewee Selection: Which Maori, Environmentalists and Christians?

In order to learn more about values propagation and sustenance, this thesis identified Fundamentalist Christianity, Tikanga Maori, and Political-Green Environmentalism as three “values-movements” worthy of investigation due to their common process of “conversion” to a life lived on the basis of internalised values. There are undoubtedly other values-systems in New Zealand worthy of investigation, for example those nurtured by New Zealand’s Pacific Island communities and other recent migrant groups. However, in the context of New Zealand’s particular Maori-Pakeha constitutional dichotomy and the high prominence that these three communities have in mainstream New Zealand consciousness, it was assumed that they offer the most insight in their diverse approaches to values degeneration.

In the process of making interview contacts, it was important to narrow the broad labels of “Maori”, “Christian” and “Environmentalist”, down to a profile of a person who followed a coherent values-system. In the case of Maori, I chose to focus on urban Maori who had made the decision as an adult to learn the Maori language to a fluent level, and for whom Tikanga Maori had become their main source of guidance in life decisions. Through a network of friends, I found three people who fitted this profile, although it should be noted that these interviewees were from a narrow age grouping (35 – 41) relative to the other two groups.

For environmentalism, it was important to find people for whom environmentalism is first and foremost a moral issue; people for whom environmental values are a part of their core identity. I was advised by a few people, with experience in both Greenpeace and Green politics, that politically active Greens are generally more concerned with the moral aspect of environmental values than Greenpeace workers. This was articulated by one active member of both groups: ‘At a personal level, Greenpeace talk about objectives; the Green Party actually live it. People at the Greens are a lot more wholesome, they are more inclined to cycle to work and to eat organically’ (E-M-26). On the basis of this advice, I attended a “Young Greens” conference and requested interviews with four people who had been active in environmental issues (including, and beyond the Green Party) for some time.

With regards to Christianity, I was interested in “born-again” Christians for both their experiences of conversion and the greater energy, relative to members of the older churches, with which they internalise Christian values in their everyday lives. I chose to meet with five people at a “back-to-the-bible” church that teaches that the bible is not allegorical, but objective truth. The selection of this particular church was based on the literature, which suggested that churches with such “fundamentalist” doctrine have been growing the most rapidly in the last few decades. I could also have used the label “evangelical” or “born-again” for this strand of Christianity. In consultation with the pastor of this church, I was advised that all three labels are correct and acceptable. I settled on “fundamentalist” as it originated as a Christian term, is now a label used for many other non-Christian religious movements, and hints at the most important doctrinal differences
separating them from liberal churches. In this way, these particular strands of value-communities were identified on the basis of an apparent commonality: a rejection of elements of modern society in response to its values degeneration.

3.0 BACKGROUND THEORY: Values in Sociology

3.1 The Problem: Modernity and Values Degeneration

We live in an age known as modernity. It is a phase of history directly descending from the scientific revolution of Descartes, Galileo, Newton and Bacon. Their intellectual seed was sown in society through the enlightenment assumption that the principles of the natural sciences could be applied to the “moral sciences”; that the behaviour of human beings could be measured, predicted and manipulated much in the same way as the natural elements. This untested but highly significant axiom was articulated by Claude Helvetius as: ‘The passions are in morals what movement is in physics.’ (in Callinicos 2005: 16)

Modernity is characterised by the intellectual and structural heritage of the Dual Revolution: the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain of the late 18th century to early 19th century, and the French Revolution of 1789. These twin outbreaks of economic rationalisation and political rationalisation respectively, have promoted qualitatively the twin strands of modern behaviour: the self-interested, labour-dividing, efficiency maximising, individualistic, disciplined behaviour of economic-man, and the egalitarian, universalistic, and individualistic behaviour of liberal-man.

The fruits of the ongoing process of political and economic rationalisation have been the institutions of mass democracy and market capitalism. Anthony Giddens argues for a third element of modernity born of these remarkable transformations: an attitude that the world is open to human intervention. As a result, ‘modernity is vastly more dynamic than any previous type of social order. It is a society - more technically, a complex of institutions - which unlike any preceding culture lives in the future rather than the past.’ (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 94)

This future-focused temporal orientation is a direct consequence of the enlightenment promise of liberation: liberation from the shackles of tradition, or more specifically, the power held by other humans who invoked tradition to enhance their own power. However, as the “project of modernity” developed, social theorists of widely varying methodologies, objectives and opinions, reached a remarkable degree of unanimity on the new social order: it is characterised by incorrigible malaise. The words that they used to describe this phenomenon and the structural roots of the problem they identified were different; Karl Marx identified the “alienation” of workers from the fruits of their labour in a capitalist society where ‘all that is solid melts into air’ (Collins & Makowsky 1993: 45); Max Weber identified “disenchantment” as occurring due to the collapse of transcendental religion (Ibid: 137); and Emile Durkheim focused on the state of “anomie” due to the dissolving of social norms caused by rapid change (Ibid: 110); however, be it “alienation”, “disenchantment” or “anomie”, these three philosophers struggled to solve modernity’s internal tension.
Concerned as all three men were with reconstructing social order in the face of the collapse of traditional certainties, they naturally addressed the issue of religion. Marx famously called religion “the opium of the people”; a source of hope for people in miserable economic circumstances: ‘the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world’ (in Callinicos 2005: 83). It may have appeared this way in the wake of the Industrial Revolution in Victorian-era London, but a few decades later in Paris, Emile Durkheim noted that the bourgeois had found no greater happiness in their wealth; that the malaise of modernity was ‘not rooted in any particular class’ (in Parkin 1992: 68). Durkheim’s work implies that Marx’s future-oriented utopianism failed to note how the inherent future-focus of “liberating” modernity inevitably venerates the individual man (Ibid: 57), creating an ever-expanding obstacle to Marx’s collectivist path to socialism.

Nevertheless, Durkheim concurred with Marx’s central premise that human beings are fundamentally communal beings. In presenting his functionalist theory of religion in “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life”, Durkheim argued that people should forget about the manifold errors of doctrine as the primary role of religion is based on a truth: that human beings need to assemble and re-assert their shared morality through the “collective consciousness”-raising worship of “sacred objects” (Durkheim 1995: 11). Doctrine without community is just magic he argued; and a community without morals is just a mob (Parkin 1992: 46-51). Convinced of humanity’s need for community, but distrustful of the Catholic Church, Durkheim originally looked to professional guilds as a means for creating the “organic solidarity” necessary to propagate norms and resolve the state of anomic (Durkheim 1968: 383-392). However, as noted earlier, his later work on totemic religions in “The Elementary Forms of Religious Life” opens the possibility that other values-systems that were not known to Durkheim when he wrote “Suicide” might also be able to play this role.

Meanwhile, Max Weber sought to expose the direct lineage from the rise of the great world religions to the rationalised modern economic system. He noted that for an economic system to develop, it requires a degree of stability in its understanding of the world. This could only occur after the “philosophical breakthrough” that separated the idea of the natural world from the idea of the spiritual world, and therefore made nature subject to human manipulation (Collins & Mawkowsky 1993: 133). He viewed this process as part of the master trend of history: the “disenchantment of the world”, which steadily pushes back the uncertain, mythical and poetic (Ibid: 137).

As part of the process of disenchantment, Weber identified the disintegration of people’s “value-rationality”; in modernity less attention is given to equip people with the ability to determine their values or priorities in life. This is due to the modern systems of bureaucratism and capitalism giving pre-eminence to “instrumental rationality”, which was originally the tool to determine the most efficient means to achieve the ends pre-determined by value-rationality (Callinicos 2005: 160), but which now locks all modern humans in an “iron cage” of rationalisation (Ibid: 170). The only escape route from this “iron cage” offered by Weber was a religious rejection of the modern world on the basis of consciously-chosen values (Ibid: 173).

All of these highly esteemed and original thinkers were giving voice, in different ways, under different circumstances and at different times, to a trend universal to modernity: the disconnection of humans from an
emotional and spiritual source. The nature of this source was unclear, but the existential angst/alienation/disenchantment resulting from this disconnection was palpable and hinted that modernity’s promise of liberation may ultimately have Faustian consequences.

3.2 The Obstacle: Aversion to Values Discussion in Modernity
As noted above, Max Weber was the first sociologist to clearly articulate the direct connection between the problems of modern social transformation and the abandonment of “value-rationality” in favour of success-oriented, efficiency-driven “instrumental rationality”. Weber was also particularly concerned with trying to understand the role played by antagonistic values in governing human conduct. Inheriting the pluralism and perspectivism pioneered by Friedrich Nietzsche, Weber argued that there are no objective means to adjudicate between the rival systems of values that have sprung up in the wake of the collapse of transcendental religion (Callinicos 2005: 155). Values-systems in modernity are thus locked in irresoluble conflict. Analogous to the “warring gods” of Greek mythology, values are constantly competing for human affections, but ultimately no one values-system is more worthy of affiliation than any other (Ibid).

The idea that values are incompatible, and that discussion of values inevitably leads to conflict, is not just an invention of modern European sociology; it also has clear antecedents in modern history. It can be traced back to the historical trauma of the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and similarly bloody religious conflicts that led to the concept of the inalienable sovereignty of (religiously-affiliated) nation-states. In addition, the historical association of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s liberal thought with the violent imposition of the “general will” by the Jacobins in the aftermath of the French Revolution had the immediate consequence of framing freedom as individual rights from group tyranny, and further closing off all political debate on common values and communal human aspirations (Callinicos 2005: 29). Finally, the violent history associated with socialist revolutions, and the terror brought in the name of “utopian” societies which claimed to renounce narrow individual self interest, has made it significantly harder to advocate for the “mainstreaming” of alternative values-systems since the end of the Cold War (Jacoby 2005: xiii).

3.3 Potential Solutions: Communication and Community
Weber’s focus on the master-trend of “disenchantment” and modern humans’ “imprisonment” in rationalisation offered little hope for modernity living up to its promise of liberation. Consequently, after the Nazis took “scientific” solutions to “social problems” to their ultimate “rational” extreme in the holocaust, social thinkers experienced a deep crisis of faith in modernity. This opened the door for the post-modern fascination with the abandonment of reason altogether, and the celebration of instinct and emotion as the only means to human liberation. It took until Jurgen Habermas, writing in the early 1980s, for a plausible escape route from Weber’s “iron cage” to be mapped out within the confines of the project of modernity.

Building on theories of linguistics, Habermas argued that human reason emanates from the speech-act; and that the Descartian rationality, located in the mind of an individual, which has formed the model for all
modern institutions, is a more narrow rationality than that which can be achieved through interpersonal communication (Callinicos 2005: 285). In promoting this “communicative rationality”, Habermas suggested that the problems of modernity lie in the “de-linguistified media of communication”, notably money and power; which are dominant in the “system” of capitalism and bureaucracy. This has left less space for the rationality of basic human communication within the cultural traditions passed down as background knowledge, and assumed to be shared by interlocutors, which Habermas calls the “lifeworld”. Thus, modern social ills are due to the colonisation of the “lifeworld” by the “system”, ‘like colonial masters coming into a tribal society and forcing a process of assimilation’ (in Ibid: 287). The solution to the problem therefore, Habermas argued, is to strengthen the restraining barriers between the system and the lifeworld (Ibid: 287).

The point of departure of Habermas’ work is the shift from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity advocated by Durkheim (Habermas: xxii). Habermas describes the “lifeworld” as the cultural space which ‘stores the interpretive work of preceding generations. It is the conservative counterweight to the risk of disagreement that arises with every actual process of reaching understanding...’ (Habermas 1984: 70) This recalls Durkheim’s “collective consciousness”: ‘feelings, desires, and beliefs which society has worked out collectively and which are diffused through all consciences’ (Parkin 1992: 74). Habermas’ suggestion that the lifeworld needs to be protected or potentially regenerated to resolve the tensions of modernity, implies that a re-reading of Durkheim’s “collective consciousness” may be necessary.

Of particular relevance to sustainability today, Durkheim once argued that social stability is undermined by the endless stimulation of desires, and that the solution is therefore to convince people ‘that they be convinced that they have no right to more’ (Ibid: 72). If such a scaling down of expectations on a voluntary basis is necessary for social (and ecological) sustainability, then there will need to be a restoration of a broad moral consensus on the criteria of distribution of resources (Ibid). Durkheim argued that such a moral consensus once existed through a “pre-contractual solidarity”, which came from people spending most of their lives in the same social and economic roles. He called this “mechanical solidarity”. However, as a consequence of the modern drive for a more efficient division of labour, “mechanical solidarity” has been lost and needs to be replaced by a new form of solidarity (Collins & Makowsky 1993: 106). In focusing on the potential of professional guilds to fulfil this role, Durkheim conceived of this new solidarity as having two elements: the “mechanic solidarity” of people working together in the same guild, as well as the “organic solidarity” born of interdependence between guilds as they rely on each other in greater society. Durkheim called this type of solidarity “organic” because it reflected the idea of the interdependent roles performed with the system of a body (Ibid).

To summarise, Durkheim and Habermas both identified the destruction of common consciousness/lifeworld as the source of modern social malaise. Habermas’ theory of “communicative action” offers the prospect of working towards the moral consensus necessary to restore the lifeworld (and implicitly address the problems of un-sustainability) through communication. Durkheim’s (significantly earlier) solution was to promote
community association to increase social solidarity, thereby facilitating moral consensus. Together, their work helps to explain recent attempts to resolve the social tensions of modernity in New Zealand.

4.0 BACKGROUND HISTORY: Modernity in New Zealand

4.1 Historical Development until the 19th Century

New Zealand was the last major land mass outside of Antarctica to be settled by human beings. Polynesian sailors were the first to arrive, and although there is still a degree of dispute surrounding the time of their settlement, it is generally placed between 1000 A.D. and 1300 A.D (King 2003: 38-48). The descendants of these Polynesian explorers eventually developed a culture distinct from their cousins in the South Pacific, and a tribal identity based on ancestral ties to the founding canoes and the regional landscapes in which they had settled.

Abel Tasman became the first European visitor to the islands in 1642, but lasting contact was not established until the arrival of James Cook in 1769. In the next 70 years, a slow trickle of whalers, sealers, missionaries and merchants were welcomed as guests by the indigenous people. By the time a formal treaty was concluded between the British crown and many (although not all) Maori chiefs in 1840, Europeans were still a tiny minority of 2000 amongst an indigenous population estimated at 100,000 (King 2003: 150–168).

The treaty is a highly controversial document, not least because there was no one treaty, and the Maori translation was inadequate and/or misleading (Ibid: 163). Nevertheless, the net effect was for the British crown to claim sovereignty over the entirety of the land and for European settlers to arrive in numbers that would soon cause tension with Maori in the many affected regions. This tension was largely a result of the settlers' thirst for fertile land, and culminated in land wars and immense land confiscations from tribes, regardless of whether or not they had fought for or against the crown. The individualistic and adversarial institutions of the British legal system offered a less direct, but similarly effective means of breaking up tribes and parting Maori from their land (Ibid: 254-256).

By the end of the 19th century, Pakeha were firmly established as a ruling majority in New Zealand. Meanwhile, Maori had reached an historical nadir: the cumulative effect of land theft, an imposed alien legal system and introduced disease had left many stripped of their land, human capital and cultural confidence.

4.2 20th Century Maori-Pakeha Race Relations

For the first half of the 20th century, most Maori still lived in rural areas, often quite separate from Pakeha communities. To the extent that the two peoples did interact, the first struggle for Maori was to gain recognition as equals in pay, rights and general dignity. On the outbreak of World War Two, many Maori took the opportunity to prove themselves on the battlefield. Although the Maori Battalion did excel, it came at a significant cost in casualties, wiping out a whole generation of potential post-war leaders (Te Whanau o Waipareira 2001: 10).
Throughout this time of relative geographical separation, most Pakeha truly believed that, due to its historical lack of slavery, genocide or systematic apartheid, New Zealand had the best race relations in the world. Pakeha could point to choice facts such as that Maori had been able to vote from the establishment of the House of Representatives in 1852 (King 2003: 201) and had represented the New Zealand All Black rugby team from the very beginning in the late 19th century (Ibid: 387). However, race relations were tested on a whole new level by the rapid urbanisation of Maori in the post-war period. In 1945, more than 80 percent of Maori lived in rural areas; by the 1980s, less than ten percent remained (King 1997: 207).

Then, as a new generation of politically aware urban Maori emerged in the 1970s, some vocal activists suddenly renounced equality of opportunity within the Pakeha world as a goal for Maori, due to the assimilatory biases of the system (King 2003: 478). The Treaty of Waitangi received renewed attention, as Maori sought to highlight the self-determination principles of Article Two rather than the equal rights provisions of Article Three, which had received more emphasis from Pakeha. This process of Maori “decolonisation” happened to begin at almost the exact same time as the New Zealand economy was cut free from the apron strings of the preferential trading agreements with Great Britain (due to their accession to the European Community in 1973), compounding the destabilising effect for Pakeha identity (Belich 2001: 539-550). Ever since, a generation of Pakeha baby-boomers who were raised to think of Maori as racial equals, indeed no different to Pakeha at all, have struggled to understand the new dynamics of New Zealand race relations. Many Pakeha still reminisce nostalgically back to their childhood, when ‘we were all New Zealanders’. However, by placing Article Two at the centre of their discourse, Maori now set the standard one bar higher: it is no longer sufficient for Pakeha not to be racist; they have to avoid neo-colonialist, assimilatory attitudes also.

4.3 Different Levels of Modernity and Decolonisation

Many European immigrants to New Zealand in the second half of the 19th century initially settled in rural areas and ran family farms, and were therefore not exposed to the division of labour and ruthless efficiency characteristic of capitalist industrialisation in Europe at the same time. On the other hand, New Zealand’s founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi, was based on liberal principles of equality with the indigenous population (although this was understood as equality within a British institutional framework). New Zealand’s first-in-the-world status in establishing voting rights for women in 1893 also suggests that this liberal, egalitarian ethos was genuinely internalised (at least with respect to other members of the white settler population). One could therefore argue that 19th century Pakeha were already “half-modern” in that they were liberal, but the colonisation of the Pakeha lifeworld by the economic system was a more long-lasting process, which accelerated due to post-war urbanisation and the rationalisation of farming.

Egalitarianism and pragmatism formed the backbone of the settler identity, and benefiting from favourable trading relations with Britain, New Zealand was able to construct a strong agricultural economic base after

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*If, like Pakeha men, they owned property valued at £50 per year*
container refrigeration technology allowed meat shipments to Britain in the 1880s (King 2003: 236). From this time, Pakeha New Zealanders followed a similar (although possibly slightly delayed) arc of modernisation to their counterparts in the Western world, culminating in and accelerating through the neoliberal economic restructuring which occurred from 1984 onwards. In a period of less than a decade, New Zealand shifted from a cradle-to-grave welfare state to one of the most economically liberal countries in the OECD (Kelsey 1993). The social consequences of economic restructuring happened to destabilise Pakeha identity precisely at the same time that Maori were beginning to assert their self-determination. As detailed by Jane Kelsey: ‘By 1993 many Pakeha believed that, far from being liberated, they were losing or had lost control of their destiny... For Maori, such oppression had been a reality for over 150 years. Both peoples were hurting, but there were no obvious remedies’ (Ibid: 11).

Until their post-war urbanisation, Maori played a minor role in the modern commonwealth economy. For all their problems with loss of land, population and self-confidence in the nineteenth century, they maintained the cornerstones of their cultural norms until after the Second World War (Ministry of Maori Development 1999: 7). This was in spite of the New Zealand government’s conscious attempt to promote assimilation to the modern British system through the Native Schools system (Simon & Tahiwai-Smith 2001: 43).

Once Maori did begin to search for work in the urban centres in greater numbers from the 1950s, they discovered that they were at a large structural disadvantage to Pakeha who had been operating within the frameworks of a modern economy for at least three, if not more, generations. Moreover, the education that some had received in the Native Schools limited them to a working-class status (Ibid: 113). Thus, the jobs that were available to urban Maori were low-skilled, low-paying, and the first to go in times of economic difficulty (King 1997: 105).

With the end of full employment in the 1970s, Maori found themselves economically vulnerable, alienated from their land and tribal identity, and losing their language and other cultural treasures. In 1975, Anne Salmond wrote: ‘The rising generation of urban Maoris who speak no Maori and have little experience of the marae (traditional meeting house), are in the most part a disenchanted generation who bitterly resent their cultural losses. Gang violence and the radicalisation of groups such as Nga Tamatoa (the “Young Warriors”) are only the more drastic reflections of this crisis’ (Salmond 2004: 212).

In 1997, a longitudinal study showed that less than one-third of Maori had a secure identity (defined as competent Maori speakers, regular contact with Maori cultural institutions and networks, and shares in Maori land) (Durie 2003: 61). In response to this cultural loss, Maori elders have advocated a return to the marae as the only way for Maori to find relief from the modern social ills of individualism, shifting mores and crime. Although rural Maori have also struggled with the realities of the ever-shifting modern world, they have retained a sense of community, cultural continuity and (depending on historical circumstances of confiscation) connection with their ancestral land (King 1988: 233).

Thus, in the 21st century, both Maori and Pakeha participate in a modern economy with all the accompanying material wealth, convenience and social tension that it entails. With increased economic independence, both
Pakeha and Maori have begun separate journeys of cultural “decolonisation” (Belich 2001). These journeys, and the associated sense of alienation and anomie, have found expression in recent New Zealand literature.

4.4 Cultural Context: Alienation and Anomie in New Zealand Film and Literature

The alienation of Maori from Tikanga is the theme of New Zealand’s two most successful feature-length films (NZ Film Commission 2008). “Once Were Warriors”, released in 1994, is the story of the Heke family, living in the economically depressed suburbs of South Auckland. It depicts the harsh reality for urban Maori who have lost connection with their tribal lands, their language and their family support networks. The film is particularly noted for its harrowing scenes of domestic violence, which provoked significant debate in the media, and arguably contributed to a change in how openly such problems are addressed in the public discourse. The re-introduction of urban Maori to Tikanga Maori is also depicted in the film through a Youth Court-backed Kaupapa Maori (applied-Maori philosophy) rehabilitation programme attended by the middle brother; and the film closes on the hopeful note of the battered wife, Beth, returning to her ancestral land in the countryside with her children: ‘Beth’s decision to return to the healing balm of papa kainga (ancestral land) revives hope for renewal through Maori identity’ (Fleras & Spoonley 1999: 71).

‘Whale Rider’, released in 2002, is the story of Paikea Apirana, her chiefly family, and their small rural village on the east coast of New Zealand’s North Island. The storyline revolves around Paikea’s grandfather’s quest to find a male heir to reinvigorate the hapu (sub-tribe). The domestic violence of “Once Were Warriors” is absent, but the village is losing interest in Tikanga. Paikea is a born leader who inspires everyone around her, but is deemed unsuitable for leadership due to her sex. The underlying theme is the need for Tikanga to evolve for it to retain relevance and power; and that this evolution can occur through departure from Tikanga by charismatic leaders who can transcend protocol to the core spiritual connection with Maori ancestors and mythology (See Ra 2002: 81 on the general principle).

Both these films were based on novels that were written in the late 1980s. Another novel, published in the same period of neo-liberal economic restructuring, Keri Hulme’s “The Bone People”, received the Commonwealth-wide “Man Booker Prize” for 1985. Like “Once Were Warriors”, it depicts severe domestic violence in a Maori family, while also addressing themes of the exploitation of the land and the regeneration of Maori spirituality (Robinson & Wattie 1998: 62-63).

The international critical recognition of “The Bone People” and the outstanding critical and commercial success of the film versions of “Whale Rider” and “Once Were Warriors” reveal how central the theme of Maori cultural loss and regeneration has been to the most iconic works of recent New Zealand storytelling. Indeed, Fleras & Spoonley argue that New Zealand has entered a third age of indigenous film (an age that

7 The concept of Pakeha “decolonisation” was advanced by James Belich in the context of a broader thesis which suggested that Pakeha culture was re-colonised between 1880 and 1970 due to the New Zealand economy’s dependence on the UK as an export market (Belich 2001).

8 As measured by the New Zealand Film Commission, when adjusted for inflation and total population at the time of release.
they label “Aotearoa”) where Maori culture is depicted as superior, following an intermediate age when Maori were depicted as the same and equal (“New Zealandia”) and an initial age when Maori were depicted as different and inferior (“Maoriland”) (Fleras & Spoonley 1999: 68-69).

Meanwhile, Pakeha literature has a long history of exploring colonial alienation. John Mulgan’s seminal novel, “Man Alone”, first published in 1939, is the story of an isolated and spiritually impoverished character called “Johnson”. It depicts New Zealand as a narrow, materialistic, puritanical society with a great deal of latent animosity and violence (Sturm 1998: 158). Near the end of the book, Johnson reflects directly on the forces that have manifested themselves in his life-decisions; he admits, in words that echo Marx, that he has been haunted by ‘a restlessness that would not leave him in peace’ (Mulgan 1960: 196).

“Man Alone” is considered a classic in the New Zealand literary canon, to the extent that the “Man Alone ideal” is an oft-used short-hand to explain elements of the collective psyche of New Zealand Pakeha culture. Ironically, given the bleakness of the novel itself, this is usually understood in the more positive sense of a pragmatic willingness to “do-it-yourself” (Robinson & Wattie 1998: 386).

In more recent times, the transition from a provincial to a post-provincial society (since 1973) has informed the work of many Pakeha authors (Sturm 1998: 184-185). Provincial fiction, such as “Man Alone”, often focused on the restrictions imposed by puritanical social mores, while post-provincial fiction has often targeted the destructive power of a puritanical pursuit of “freedom” (Ibid). These tensions were articulated in Maurice Gee’s novel, “In My Father’s Den”, by the rebel “Man Alone” character, Paul Prior, who recognised that his ‘libertarian beliefs… were Presbyterian after all, by simple inversion. Everything took its tone from Mother’ (Ibid: 185).

In summary, “alienation” has been a core theme of New Zealand literature for many decades, but has become particularly relevant as both Maori and Pakeha “decolonise” from British cultural influence while simultaneously confronting the new reality of efficiency-maximising economic reforms. The influence of “Once Were Warriors” and “Whale Rider” on the public understanding of Maori social change is hard to over-state. In the case of Pakeha however, similarly alienated characters tend to be glorified as fitting the “Man Alone ideal”, allowing less public dissection of the themes explored therein.

5.0 BACKGROUND TO THE VALUES-MOVEMENTS

5.1 Tikanga Maori

‘Tikanga are tools of thought and understanding. They are packages of ideas which help to organise behaviour and provide some predictability in how certain activities are carried out… They help us to differentiate between right and wrong in everything we do and in all of the activities that we engage in’ (Mead 2003: 12).

Efforts to encourage Maori to reconnect with Tikanga Maori can be dated back as far as Sir Apirana Ngata’s whare whakairo (carved house) restoration programme in the 1930s (Ibid: 234). However, perhaps the

9 The Maori name for New Zealand
biggest turning point came in the late 1960s when greater awareness of the effects of colonisation inspired a new generation of young, politically assertive Maori, to form protest movements for social change (King 2003: 481).

In the 1970s, the initial target on the pathway to tino rangatiratanga (self-determination) was the return of those ancestral lands which had been taken unjustly by the government. This was both a question of mana (authority; prestige) and an acknowledgement that in losing their land Maori had also lost their economic base. A result of this pressure was the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, to hear these land claims. Later, in the early 1980s, organised efforts were also made to revitalise Te Reo, the Maori language. Many Maori leaders feared that Maori customs, norms and values would be rendered meaningless if the language went extinct. Revitalisation began with the establishment of Kohanga Reo pre-school “language nests”, which were run by whanau (extended family) completely in Maori and stressing community values of aroha (love), cooperation, collective responsibility and consensus decision-making (Metge 1995: 25). Research suggests that children felt much more comfortable discussing values in this environment than in multi-cultural Pakeha schools (Te Whaiti et al. 1997: 55). Higher-level education (Kura Kaupapa and Wananga) was soon offered in the same cultural mould, and by 2001, 14 percent of Maori students were enrolled in Maori-medium institutions (Ministry of Education 2008c).

At a broader level this process of revitalisation of Maori knowledge and customs in the education system, the penal system and the health system has been guided by the principles of “Kaupapa Maori theory”, which conceptualises Tikanga as well as other sources of Maori knowledge (Mc-Murchy-Pilkington 2001: 173-174). In more substantive terms, the Kaupapa Maori reforms have encouraged the internalisation of Tikanga Maori values in acts of conversion comparable to “born-again” Christianity.

5.2 Fundamentalist Christianity

Fundamentalist Christianity can be traced back to the Protestant Reformation’s espousal of the sanctity of the word of the Christian bible and denouncement of the non-biblical dogma of the Catholic Church. The term “fundamentalism” itself dates back to 1910, when the first of ten volumes in a series called “The Fundamentals” was published by a group of American conservative evangelical theologians (Castells 1997: 21). In response to the theology-modernisation efforts by liberal Christians, fundamentalism affirmed that the bible, being divinely inspired, could not possibly be in error. Its arrival to New Zealand can be dated to around the time of the founding of the Evangelical Union in 1930 (Geering 2005: 5). However, it wasn’t until the 1960s, after splits over efforts to unify the Protestant Church, that fundamentalism in New Zealand gained traction (Roxborogh 2000: 321).

The fundamentalist Christian movement accelerated globally in the 1980s and 1990s, and some sociologists argue that this acceleration was largely a reaction against the challenge to patriarchalism issued by the advances made by the women’s liberation and homosexual liberation movements (Castells 1997: 26). Others have tied the renewed energy of fundamentalism to the upheaval caused by neo-liberal economic reform and
globalisation, asserting that fundamentalism ‘promises transcendence, peace and security in a world of upheaval, dissolving ties, loosening bonds and contingent relationships’ (Schick et al. 2004: 12).

Essential to fundamentalist Christianity is the reconstruction of the personality experienced when “born-again”, ‘the act of faith and forgiveness through which sinners are brought from sin into a state of everlasting salvation’ (Castells 1997: 22). This conversion process has been described by William James as ‘a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong, inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right, superior and happy, in consequence of its further hold upon religious realities’ (in Harding 1987: 168).

Liberal Modernist Theologians have been arguing since as early as 1925 that the greater energy of the fundamentalist Christians would eventually triumph over the older “institutionalist” Christians and the modernising “experimentalist” Christians (Geering 2005: 15). Indeed, this prophecy may have been fulfilled to a greater extent in New Zealand than even in the United States of America (Ibid.).

5.3 Political-Green Environmentalism

The roots of modern environmentalism can be traced back at least as far to the resource preservation and conservationist movements of the 19th century. Conservationism in New Zealand has a particularly proud history, with Maori chief Te Heuheu Tukino IV’s gift to the nation of the Tongariro volcanoes leading to the establishment of the world’s fourth earliest national park, in 1887 (King 2003: 260).

Modern environmentalism achieved political relevance as a result of scientific studies in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which inspired seminal texts on chemical pollution (Rachel Carson’s “Silent Spring”) as well as resource scarcity (The Club of Rome’s “Limits to Growth”) among others. The flowering of environmental literature at this time coincided with the release of the first photos of the planet as seen from space, possibly opening the minds of many to see the Earth as constrained by natural limits. Thus, like fundamentalist Christianity, the current energy driving environmental movements can be linked to globalisation. As noted by Beyer: ‘because global environmental problems are a result of the power of the globalising functional social systems, they also point to the globalisation of society and the problem of conceiving that society. This again is a religious task: the meaning of the whole as immanence profiled by positing transcendence’ (Beyer 1999: 209).

In New Zealand, the growth of environmental knowledge as well as opposition to plans for a first nuclear reactor led to the establishment of the Values Party in 1972: the world’s first national–level Green political party. Internationally and in New Zealand, Green doctrine quickly evolved beyond purely environmental issues to issues of international development and social justice. This ‘new vision uniting ecological concerns with disarmament, social justice and human rights’ won German Green Party founder, Petra Kelly, the Right Livelihood Award (also known as the Alternative Nobel Prize) in 1982 (Right Livelihood 2008). The Values Party eventually evolved into the New Zealand Green Party, which was formally established in 1990.

The Greens focus on four core principles in their charter: Ecological Wisdom, Social Responsibility, Appropriate (Democratic) Decision-Making, and Non-Violence (Green Party of Aotearoa-New Zealand
2008). However, Green doctrine is not limited to abstract decisions about political policy; it is also fundamentally about individual life choices based on values. As argued by Petra Kelly, ‘the primary goal of Green politics is an inner revolution, “the greening of the self”’ (in Castells 1997: 110). Yet, in its very essence as ‘collective behaviour aimed at correcting destructive forms of relationship between human action and its natural environment’ (Ibid: 112), environmentalism also requires an extension of empathy, a commitment to a community, and a decision to work for something higher than oneself. For many people this work relies on a spiritual element also. As Kelly explained, ‘We must learn to think and act from our hearts; to recognise the interconnectedness of all living creatures; and to respect the value of each thread in the vast web of life. This is a spiritual perspective, and it is the foundation of all Green politics... Green politics requires us to be both teacher and subversive’ (in Ibid: 127).

In this way, all three movements can be viewed as reactions to the social tension and values degradation inherent to modernity. The literature also suggests that all three have grown considerably over the last three decades, during the period of economic globalisation through neo-liberal policy.

6.0 INTERVIEW ANALYSIS

Note on interviewee references: Interviewees are identified by their values-system affiliation (T: Tikanga; E: Environmentalism; C: Christianity), then their sex (F: Female; M: Male), and then their age.

6.1 The Background: Attitudes towards “Mainstream” New Zealand

‘I wonder if [mainstream New Zealanders] are feeling lost...a lot of people look like they are searching for that fulfilment in other cultures because they have forgotten about their own.’ (T-F-36)

‘I think [mainstream New Zealanders] are looking for something...I think pretty much everyone my age is confused about what they are doing here, and why they are here, and who they should listen to; and so many people are depressed.’(E-F-22)

‘[Mainstream New Zealanders] are searching whether they know it or not. Every time I meet them they are doing something different... I think everyone is just trying to find fulfilment or joy in whatever way possible.’ (C-F-24)

In interviews across all three groups, there was remarkable uniformity in diagnosis of mainstream New Zealand society: its instability is disorientating and leaves people lost and searching for a higher purpose. Their attitude towards modern life was often reminiscent of Marx’s famed passage, written in 1848: ‘All fixed, fast frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air; all which is holy is profaned... ’ (in Callinicos 2005: 90)
It is perhaps not remarkable that people, who have made a conscious decision to remove themselves from the “mainstream”, are critical of the lifestyles that they have disowned. However the choice of vocabulary common to respondents from all three groups, and in particular the recurring motif of “searching” people, suggests not only a strong disillusionment with modern life, but also potential wide-ranging inter-doctrinal support for an infusion of values in the public discourse. Fundamental agreement on the existence of the problem is an important base for constructing an appropriate environment for action. It also suggests that these groups should be motivated to talk with each other. Yet, this has often not been the case. Clearly, there must be some disagreement over the source of the problem or the most appropriate solution.

6.2 The Context of Conversion: The Direct Stimulus

After establishing that interviewees from all three groups had experienced deep dissatisfaction with mainstream life, the question remains: in what circumstances are people motivated to act on their dissatisfaction and re-orientate their lives to an established set of values?

This question has been addressed a lot in social scientific literature regarding Christian conversions, and has produced three clear streams of religious conversion theory (Heirich 1977: 656). The first theory is that conversion is an attempt to rearrange the power balance in one’s life through supernatural intervention due to deep personal stress. The second theory is that converts often have elements of previous conditioning through parental education or schooling in a particular values-system, which makes them susceptible to seeking solutions through the paradigm of that values-system. The third theory is that interactions with converts that result in mutually consistent input, or “encapsulation”, give the potential convert a new frame of reference through which to approach problems. More sophisticated theories have attempted to show how conversions result in a process of all three circumstances combining to powerful effect (Ibid).

This thesis has neither a control group nor a significant number of respondents to produce quantitative data that could test the explanatory worth of these theories. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that whereas all three theories did have some explanatory potential for Christian conversions neither Maori nor environmentalists mentioned circumstances of particular personal distress. In fact, when explaining the context of their conversion, all three groups focused on problems at different levels of social organisation. Christians tended to focus on personal problems: ‘I had a hungry heart to be loved but I didn’t know it. I was blowing around out there in the wind.’ (C-M-45)

Also: ‘I was in a very desolate, despairing place [after a relationship break-up] and said to God: “If you are who you say you are, then you’d better jolly well prove it and show me. I’m counting on you on being real because there’s nothing else.” ’ (C-F-24)

Another Christian also mentioned a meeting with Christians that left a positive impression: ‘Maybe it was a sense of being intrigued, because they seemed so different to my nightclub social scene…Before that, it was this sense of emptiness in me, and these people seemed not to have it so that seemed to offer some hope.’ (C-M-25)
Contrary to Christians’ highly personal circumstances of conversion, environmentalists tended to refer to a growing awareness of problems at a global level: ‘It was an epiphany that developed. [Greenpeace] planted a seed almost, that grew into fruition about 6 months later. I just started doing my own research through the internet; finding out how [screwed] up things were, and that we need to change it.’ (E-M-26)

Also: ‘When I was 18, just turning 19, then I remember being really, really angry about the state of the world and how the environment was being treated and thinking that almost everybody didn’t care enough and didn’t do enough…That was when I started volunteering for Greenpeace and got involved in the environmental movement…It’s hard to think seriously [about the problems of the world] and not feel a moral duty to do things about them.’ (E-F-25)

For Maori, the problem was more often located at the family/whanau level and the disconnection from that community due to not being able to speak the language: ‘[The turning point was] when my grandfather died, because you realise how much was lost with him; and all the things that your ancestors could have passed on; but because they were so set in their colonised ways, they didn’t feel that their knowledge was important and didn’t pass it on.’ (T-F-36)

Also: ‘The actual reason that I wanted to learn Maori is that I wanted to learn magic… I thought that if I learn the language I might learn the shamanistic thing… it’s a recently broken link to a past that all of us share – pre-industrial, or at least in terms of Europe, pre-Roman, tribal, stone-age thing.’ (T-M-41)

Yet, no matter at which level the problem was located, respondents from all three groups seemed to experience a similar process: an awareness of alienation from core human values and a transcendental journey to a life based on consciously-chosen values. This journey out of alienation appears to be dialectical in its ‘negation of the negation’ through which one becomes more and more aware of something greater than oneself and achieves, as Hegel once said: ‘the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject is personal and free’ (in Callinicos 2005: 52).

On the other hand, a difference was noticeable in the perceived intensity of the conversion process. It appeared that the perceived intensity of conversion may be inversely proportional to the abstraction in the perceived alienation. Thus, as environmentalists generally describe their alienation from mainstream society in macro-level structural terms, they generally intellectualise their awakening and may not even know for sure when they first self-identified as an “environmentalist” (see E-F-63). Conversely, Christians’ deeply personal descriptions of emotional alienation appear to be connected to their ascribing of supernatural power to the process of conversion. The intensity of the Maori experience, affected by greater connection to family genealogy than environmentalism but less introspection than Christianity, seems to lie in between the two.

The particular intensity of the Christian conversion experience may also be enhanced by their doctrinal value for exclusive belief. An example of such exclusivity was: ‘I won’t just say “oh, that’s my view and you’ve got yours”…I have a persuasion that you can’t be a Christian and think you come from an evolved cell in a swamp. Because the biblical revelation is that God created man in his image, from the dust of the earth, God created man.’ (C-M-45)
This exclusivity also manifests itself in a distrust of the value of “tolerance”: ‘To the outside world I guess Christians can seem bigoted. At classes at university on psychology speaking about homosexual relationships, if I ever assert that I believe a bit differently and don’t buy into the idea that homosexuals have a genetic reason for homosexuality [it seems bigoted]… We live in a tolerant world where anything is right if it is right for you… But Jesus said: “No one comes to the Father except through me.”… Tolerance makes me not that popular in that sense.’ (C-M-25)

As is discussed later in section 6.5, this exclusivity and intolerance is central to the concerns of environmentalists and Maori towards fundamentalist Christianity.

6.3 The Result of Conversion: A Sense of Connection and Authenticity

‘It’s about plugging into ancient learning... and being aware.’ (T-F-35)

‘I felt more grounded in myself. I felt that there was more meaning, in that I was actually contributing to something bigger than myself.’ (E-M-26)

‘That’s the big change in me, I guess: I feel like I’m attached to something bigger and better. And it’s not just evolved monkeys going to a grave.’ (C-M-45)

In the process of negating the “negation” that was their cultural, societal, environmental, or emotional alienation, interviewees generally found a sense of connection to an esteemed source of truth. The metaphysical aspect to the conversion to this “truth” was hinted at in respondents’ common theme of a greater sense of “authentic self”; a state of existence explored in the work of Martin Heidegger (Callinicos 2005: 220). To use Heidegger’s terms, most respondents distinguished between their former “they-self”, which acted according to the expectations of others in mainstream life, and their new post-conversion “authentic” self. For example: ‘I had so much more purpose about what did. I began to learn that it’s not about outward appearances and trying to fit in... And it just set me free to learn who I was and where I came from and where I was going and I could do it all without fear and without panicking about approval. It was very freeing, very relaxing.’ (C-F-45)

For one respondent, this even developed to the point of the Heideggerian way of being, “being-towards-death”: ‘I think it gives you a... security and a grounding; and...I wasn’t afraid of death any more... because Maori, we’ve got our ancestors around us all the time, and in our carvings, and we talk to them; so that perspective of still living with the dead made me all of a sudden not afraid of dying any more.’ (T-F-36)

For Maori, a connection to ancient knowledge was gained by learning the Maori language and the cultural framework of Tikanga Maori, and from there a connection was established with both departed ancestors and a stronger, culturally-dynamic, living Maori community: ‘You need your reo (language) — it makes you stronger in your self identity... It links you. It connects you. It allows you to partake. Language is everything.
Once you have your language you have the world... It's so old and so ancient and it really connects up to the
land, to the birds, the trees, the things of the land.' (T-F-35)

This experience of connectedness was mirrored by environmentalists: '[Environmentalists] have a holistic
understanding of the world – so I don’t think people are ever just environmentalists – it’s not something that
just concerns our relationship with nature, but also with each other and with the spiritual aspects of the
world as well. So I think that [environmentalists] are interesting people because I think they are trying to be
really aware of all the different relationships that are going on in the world.' (E-F-22)

Environmentalists also discussed the excitement, direction and energy they felt by connecting to a macro-
level movement for positive change: 'I guess I am proud because I figured out my means – how I am going
to act in my life... even if I am not sure of the ends. I figured out what my criteria are for making decisions.
So that’s quite cool; quite exciting... It’s cool to be part of something you believe in' (E-F-22). This purpose
could have tangible benefits in self-confidence: 'From then on it became much less scary to talk in public
because there was something that I really wanted to say. So it did that for me' (E-F-63).

For some environmentalists, connection to environmentalism had a definite religious element: 'Just coming
across Gaia Theory and Deep Ecology definitely had an influence on me... So from a spiritual point of view,
it was] just that feeling of interconnectedness with the world around us and the wider universe; and how we
fit into this puzzle. I guess that was a part of the process as well.' (E-M-26)

For Christians, this religious connection was described as a feeling of absolute acceptance by a loving God,
which gave them the confidence to overcome their pre-existing emotional insecurities: '[The change was]
just in terms of honesty to others, but especially I found that as I struggled to do what was right or struggled
with anger inside me, I could just cry out to Him and say look “you've got to help me...I need your love to
fill me to do what pleases you”...I guess that the values that Christianity promotes in the bible and stuff are
put there by God, who claims to know what is best for people. It has been amazing that this set of values has
made me feel a sense of wellbeing, and joy and contentedness’ (C-M-25).

The respondents’ common sense of connection to “truth” once they entered a value community calls to mind
Durkheim’s discovery of the social relativity of time, space, God and other concepts of truth. Durkheim
argued that a belief in truth is actually the result of the collective consciousness overriding the individual
(Callinicos 2005: 143). This suggests that the sense of connection to truth reported by members of all three
groups requires an investigation of the effects of interaction within the communities themselves.

6.4 The Mechanism: Community and the Socialisation Process

As suggested in the conversion theory of “encapsulation” through inter-personal relations with believers,
community can play a role as a stimulus for conversion. However, research suggests that the most important
role of community may come after conversion, when the new convert’s conviction is strengthened by intense
socialisation in the new faith’s tenets (Heirich 1977: 676). This view of individuals internalising the
commands of the values-systems was pioneered by Talcott Parsons who first synthesised Durkheim’s “collective consciousness” with Freud’s view of socialisation (Collins & Mawkowsky 1993: 214).

For the Maori that I interviewed, the ongoing language-learning process or pre-existing family connections gave them contact to a community at a marae or through the employment that they found based on their new Maori-language proficiency. For all three, this community was essential to reinforcing their will to proceed in their new life direction: ’I suppose that was part of the whole thing that I loved about learning my language: it opened up this whole new world of people on the same journey, all Maori. And realising how strong we were, and feeling so alone before and meeting all these Maori people that I... wouldn’t have met otherwise and thinking “wow!” And my whole world just became Maori.’ (T-F-36)

This new-found community was essential to learning the values underlying the Maori language: ’I guess I felt I wasn’t being heard in my own world. I just recognised the value of the cultural system to the individual funnily enough. I just felt that people were valued’ (T-M-41).

For environmentalists, the community aspect was often more problematic: the energy of the people involved in environmental activities was a big part of the initial attraction, but retaining people in the community proved elusive: ’[When I started] it was an interesting group of people... not just activism but a support and social group. There were friends and shared meals. Now it has changed [personnel] and become less active. They have a different outlook; less meetings in trees or vegetarian potlucks. Now they meet in a bar, and talk about sponsors.’ (E-F-22)

All three of the younger environmentalists mentioned the challenges of sharing a household with non-environmentalists and the necessity of finding flatmates who shared their values. This suggests not only that ethical consumption is difficult as an individual in a household of shared commodities, but also that environmentalists need to physically cohabit because there are no institutionalised routines for environmentalists to meet on a regular basis and develop solidarity through what Durkheim called “collective effervescence”: ’I started living with a mix of cool people. We called it the “eco-flat” where we did all our own composting and had a little vege-garden and basically only ate organic food and held little workshops at our house. It was really cool, it was a big shift... it was necessary for me to grow, to help me be with people who fostered my new way of thinking and my new way of living.’ (E-M-26)

For Christians, there appeared to be much less necessity to base their career or domicile around their values-system, presumably because the established structure of Sunday worship and weekday bible study offers sufficient community interaction. In addition, community construction is at the heart of Christian doctrine: ’Jesus said that if you take a coal out of the fire, then it is not long before it is no longer a burning coal. But put it in the fire, and you might have a lot of little coals, but together they make a nice hot fire... Church is an important environment for us to connect because not only do we come alongside other people who are of a like mindset with a similar experience of God, it is a place of safety where we can share and find encouragement and support for our own struggles.’ (C-M-57)
Overall, the interviewees’ discussion of their communities reinforced the importance of community as a site for the reaffirmation of values and a source of strength and resilience to the temptations of modern life. The flipside of this however, is that they all acknowledged an insular element to their chosen community, and that one of the consequences of their conversion was, in some cases, a difficulty in engaging with people who don’t share their values: ‘I didn’t want that to change but it had to change... Christian fellowship is essential. It’s a bit like an athlete hanging out with party goers; it just doesn’t work. They need to get home to bed and get a good night’s sleep... It’s just the practical side of it. I think the public worship of God is important so I can’t be a part of a biking club on Sunday ... it just doesn’t fit.’ (C-M-45)

Also: ‘Prior to being educated [in Tikanga] it would have been a lot more easy to integrate. It changes your whole outlook and what conversations you would have with people... It’s not negative, but informed, because you have a belief system... it’s where you align yourself... and like attracts like, really eh?’ (T-F-35)

The community that comes with a values-system appears to be a double-edged sword: it offers an external focus, encouraging the individual to meditate on something more important than his or her individual self and to empathise with the needs of others. Indeed, the empathy-extension nature of community appears to be the source of the values which are common to all groups. On the other hand, as each group is defined by its doctrine, the doctrine itself can encourage particular values which erect boundaries in their minds, separating them from other communities.

6.5 The Problem: The Warring Gods of Christianity, Environmentalism and Tikanga Maori

The professed insularity of members of these communities brings us to the subject that formed the core of the last third of each interview: the presumed compatibility or incompatibility of each values-system’s values with those of the other two.

6.5.1 Environmentalism and Christianity

When questioned on their views on environmentalism, most Christian interviewees hesitated, as if asked to compare apples and oranges. This appears to be a result of their different levels of focus: Christians are focused on their immediate congregational community and its connection to the eternal world beyond planetary confines; while environmentalists’ focus on global structural problems means that they operate somewhere in between, at a level not given much attention in Christian doctrine.

Most of the Christian respondents admitted without prompting that a belief in another world and the coming destruction of this planet influences their particular values towards “Earthly” problems: ‘it doesn’t make me have an attitude of “well [the environment] doesn’t matter, so it’s not worth doing anything”, but it does sit in me as well’ (C-M-25). One respondent, (notably, the oldest of the five), went so far as to state that he did not believe that human beings have the power to affect the planet (C-M-57). A plurality also discussed their distrust of environmental science for its assumptions regarding evolution and carbon-dating (C-M-25; C-M-
45; C-M-57). The affect of this axiomatic split is to alienate many Christians from the basic mechanics of macro-level environmental problems such as climate change.

Such attitudes are a direct affront to environmentalists whose core doctrine promotes the preservation of this planet for future generations. All four articulated a problematic view of Christianity reminiscent of Nietzsche’s “slave morality”, which devalues this life in the name of the world beyond (Collins & Mawkowsky 1993: 74). For example: 'The concept that this Earth doesn’t matter, it’s a rotting corpse... you’ll find it in a lot of religions: the idea that heaven is the goal and to hell with the world... I think a lot of Christians might not set out to take the attitude, but they inadvertently do. Because they focus on the after-life instead of on this life and the issues that we need to tackle here, and basically go to church once a week and all their sins are forgiven. They don’t need to worry about their ecological carbon footprint because they have gone to church on Sunday.’ (E-M-26)

For the record, all of the Christian respondents emphasised a willingness to do their bit when it came to micro-level issues of visible community pollution, such as reducing littering, or in some cases, recycling. Likewise, they all referred to the biblical injunction that man should act as a “steward of the Earth”. If the damage was local and tangible, and the work did not distract them from the higher purpose of serving God and knowing Jesus Christ, then fundamentalist Christians seem to express the same vague, apathetical support for environmental issues as most other New Zealanders.

However, most Christians expressed their concern at the “extreme” elements of environmentalism, such as the assigning of spiritual value to an inanimate object like a tree (C-M-45; C-F-45). Some mentioned environmentalism’s alleged roots in humanism and argued that environmentalism leads people down a dangerous path towards atheism (C-F-45; C-M-57). All environmentalists, for their part, expressed a general admiration for those Christians who lived a life based on values and delayed gratification. They celebrated the shared “universal values” that Christians also promote but remained antagonistic to the values particular to Christianity.

6.5.2 Tikanga Maori and Environmentalism

As has perhaps become clear already, there is much common ground between Tikanga Maori and environmentalism. This is a view shared by both groups, but particularly emphasised by environmentalists. As one environmentalist explained with regards to the Maori Party and the Green Party, ‘I think the only major [policy] that they disagree on are marine reserves, and that’s basically Maori not wanting to be told when and where they can go and harvest their kaimoana (seafood), which is understandable’ (E-M-26). A Maori respondent noted that the Green Party is the only other party to recognise that Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi guarantees Maori self-determination (T-M-41). Another Maori interviewee suggested that if the Maori Party did not exist, then she would definitely be a Green Party supporter (T-F-35).

Nevertheless, this compatibility is partly tautological as this study consciously focuses on the political-Green thread of environmentalism. Yet, as the male Maori interviewee pointed out, for many Maori,
environmentalism is synonymous with conservationism, and the Department of Conservation is not popular amongst Maori (T-M-41). The more narrow focus of conservationism often promotes a hierarchical, bureaucratic, technological-fix approach to land management which is often at odds with both Maori interests and procedure under Tikanga. Furthermore, the perception that a significant proportion of conservation lands were taken through legislation that violated the guarantees of the Treaty of Waitangi, has given DoC the alternate nickname of “Department of Confiscation” for some Maori (T-M-41).

In addition, all members of Greenpeace that I spoke to, both Maori and Pakeha, mentioned that Maori are highly under-represented in the organisation, despite Maori women being the most generous demographic in giving donations to the organisation: ‘When I go to south Auckland, these people [Maori] are so generous. I think it’s because they don’t really fit into a white, middle-class organisation like Greenpeace... Greenpeace’s intentions are great but I just don’t think Maori people feel comfortable there’ (T-F-36). As with the Department of Conservation, the problem seems to be the hierarchical, bureaucratic nature of the organisation, and its alienating devotion to efficiency in achieving its goals. Thus despite its avowed sympathies for indigenous rights, Greenpeace remains a largely white, middle-class organisation (E-M-26).

On the other hand, a Maori interviewee, who is also works for Greenpeace, suggested that some Maori tribes may be guilty of acting no differently to any other modern corporation when it comes to over-fishing for export dollars (T-F-36). Hence, the problem is not within Tikanga Maori, but rather with Maori who are not following correct Tikanga in the administration of their natural resources; as the concept of fisheries as a cash-crop is fundamentally alien to Tikanga. This point was echoed by an environmentalist: ‘I think environmentalists and Maori customary fishers have actually got more in common than Maori customary fishers have with big Maori commercial fishers. But they [Maori] don’t see it that way, and that’s their right.’ (E-F-63)

Thus, despite the professed similarities in values, the ability of environmentalists and Maori to pool resources and work together on common goals remains limited by a mono-cultural approach on the part of some environmentalists and mono-cultural loyalties on the part of some Maori.

6.5.3 Christianity and Tikanga Maori

Tikanga Maori, as it is understood in the 21st century, retains elements of Christian heritage. One interviewee noted that karakia (prayer), as it is performed today, did not exist in pre-colonial Maori culture (T-M-41). He also noted that, in general, Maori communities have a much greater affiliation with the established Church than most Pakeha communities.

Yet many younger Maori view connections with Christianity through the historical lens of colonisation and the resultant alienation of some Maori from the culture of their ancestors (T-F-36). Nevertheless, when such charges are made, they are generally expressed in the context of 19th century historical experiences with

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10 From the interviews, I had the impression that Maori communities have had little experience with fundamentalist Christianity and therefore did not make the distinction between the established Church and fundamentalist Christianity.
missionaries. Christianity within Maoridom today is seen as less problematic; it is accepted that it is practised on Maori terms and within Maori constructs.

The Christian respondents unsurprisingly had a more positive view of the work done by 19th century missionaries on/for Maori. They argued that they offered Maori freedom from the fear of superstition and the cycle of violence perpetuated by the traditional practice of utu (reciprocation) (C-M-57; C-M-25).

Beyond utu and traditional spirituality, the Christian interviewees had surprisingly little to say about incompatibilities between Tikanga Maori values and Christianity. Indeed, a large proportion of their answers veered off into political views on Maori activism and sovereignty issues. This was particularly true for the older respondents, who expressed the view that when they were children, their Maori friends behaved exactly the same as they did, and thus, increased cultural awareness since the 1970s has damaged their ability to “fit in” (C-M-57; C-M-45).

The younger Christian respondents appeared more enthusiastic when describing the synergies between Maori and Christian values; they mentioned the care for extended family, cooperation between siblings, and intergenerational communication as values common to both communities (C-M-25; C-F-24). The generational divide in responses on Tikanga Maori values is probably not representative of Christians particularly, but of a greater Pakeha generational divide in tolerating cultural differences.

The increase of relative tolerance among younger Christians augurs well for their ability to address the main concern of Maori with regards to fundamentalist Christianity: that its absolute certainty in its own doctrines precludes acceptance of Maori cultural difference: ‘It’s the way they define truth. The denial of difference is the danger. You can have a belief and it doesn’t have to affect other people… The one-dimensional factor is my focus. It’s not Christ, it’s more cultural arrogance; Euro-centric British colonialism’ (T-M-41).

In a polytheistic culture, in which good and evil are perceived as the extremities of a continuum on which everyone inhabits the middle ground (Drake 2005: 21), such exclusivity is at best, puzzling; and at worst, threatening. Nevertheless, the detectably greater reverence given to Tikanga Maori by young Christians, relative to older Christians, suggest that young New Zealand Christians would feel much more uncomfortable than 19th century missionaries in evangelising Maori who identify with Tikanga Maori. Such reverence is an entirely secular creation, with roots in the tolerance promoted by the modern system, but it is noteworthy that the effects remain even after the life-changing process of being “born-again”.

7.0 FROM RESULTS TO THEORY: The Dichotomy of Community Values and Doctrinal Values

7.1 The Common Assumption of Doctrinal Propagation of Values

‘And on the secular side, education that teaches New Zealanders that “Uncle Monkey” is our roots… if you really follow that through and tell people that’s where they came from, then it’s a recipe for people not knowing who they are and what they are in this world. Because I think where you’re heading is just the ground; and what you do while you are here is pretty much up for grabs if that is your heritage.’ (C-M-45)
The above quote is representative of a common fundamentalist Christian argument against evolution; that the teaching that human beings are descended from chimpanzees makes people act with less morality. This reflects an assumption that values flow directly from doctrine, and thus an inferior doctrine will promote lesser values. An alternative (Durkheimian) proposition is that values are a product of community; that tight social bonds expand empathy and make people eager not to disappoint their peer group by upholding values that they approve of.

This confusion with regards to the relative roles played by doctrine and community in propagating values mirrors the tension in two core principles of modern education systems: tolerance (which is a product of both liberalism and post-modernism) and the view of humans as rational actors (which can be traced back to the enlightenment, but is perpetuated by capitalism). On the one hand, the liberal education system’s commitment to tolerance implies that doctrine can’t be directly responsible for values, as no ethnic or religious group can be endorsed as more moral than any other. On the other hand, the work of the Ministry of Education reflects the position of the Christian quoted above: that the ideas communicated to rational-acting individual students have the power propagate values.

It is important to resolve this confusion and clarify the respective roles of community and doctrine with regards to values, in order to reduce the potential for confusion in efforts to reverse values degradation.

7.2 The Case for Community as the Source of Universal Values

Consider a hypothetical observation by a non-Christian that Christians in general act in a more moral way than non-Christians. This presupposes that the non-Christian recognises some of the values observed by Christians as having a “useful” moral character. Yet, from a purely logical point of view, even if every Christian one observed appeared to be a more moral person, this would still not necessarily prove that values are a direct result of belief in Christian doctrine, as there are two variables independent of values within Christianity: doctrine and community. As shown by the interview results, a fundamentalist Christian makes two big changes when he/she is born-again: a change in friends/community and a change in worldview/doctrine as he/she accepts the bible as the word of God. Thus, if one supports the contention that societies with strong community cohesion (regardless of the exact nature of their doctrinal beliefs) display greater morality than societies without such strong-knit community (a common theme in “Once Were Warriors” and “Whale Rider”), one might place the hypothetical superior Christian morals in their more close-knit community bonds rather than in any higher truth within Christian doctrine.

The results of this study, as presented in Chapter 6, have suggested that there are many similarities in the process followed by fundamentalist Christians, environmentalists and Maori when they adopt their respective doctrines and assimilate into their communities. Given the diversity in the content of their doctrines, there appears to be a strong case for the common community element playing the more important role, relative to the diverse doctrines, in giving people this universal “sense of authentic-self” and the “useful” (from the perspective of the sceptical outsider) values that will inform their life decisions henceforth.
At this point, one must clarify the distinction made here between the values learned through community, which appear to be universal to all groups (and would be identified as a “useful” characteristic in believers by non-believers), and the values that are learned through doctrine, and are particular to different groups (and would be seen as weird, threatening, or just not “useful” by a non-believer). Examples of the former would be humility/deference to the group (or God), the sanctity of human life or respect for one’s elder. Examples of the latter would be the Christian value for exclusivity of belief, the Maori value of respecting ancestral knowledge, and the environmentalist’s value of inter-generational equity.

Thus, if one accepts the dichotomy of universal values and particular values in every values-system (as all of the interview respondents appeared to do when they identified those of their values which were compatible or incompatible with other values-systems), then one might logically try to find the best means for propagating the “useful” universal values through the education system. This is what the Ministry of Education has done in identifying its eight “big-tent” values to be taught in schools. However, if one accepts that these universal values are universal precisely because they are a result of community bonds rather than any particular doctrine, then logically it would be futile to try to teach them through an individualistic, liberal education system, shorn of all community context. Consequently, education would serve society better by focusing on socialisation rather than indoctrination; equipping students with the community-associational skills to resist the atomising pressures of the modern system and find values through community experience.

7.3 The Role of Doctrine: Particular Value Propagation and Motivation for Community Participation

The primacy assigned in section 7.2 to community does not imply that the role of doctrine is limited to the production of particular values; but rather that doctrine should first of all be credited with the indirect, but important role, of giving individuals the motivation to participate regularly in the social rituals of the community. This point was apparent in the literature describing the greater energy shown by the growing congregations of fundamentalist Christian churches relative to the stagnating liberal churches.

Additional evidence was found in the interviews. For fundamentalist Christians, the doctrine of planetary destruction came up in all interviews. For example: ‘There is an exciting future ahead in terms of what God has in store and it is something called a new heaven and a new Earth – and [the bible] says that this creation will be rolled up like a garment, which is an amazing thing to consider, but there will be a new that is even more glorious, and we will be free from all this stuff’ (C-M-25).

The connection between this millenarian doctrine and absolute faith was summed up as: ‘If you’re going to say you believe some parts of the bible then ultimately you’ve got to believe the whole lot. And the bible says that there is a point at which it is time for man to die and after that there is judgement. And I know that when I face that judgment Christ will stand next to me and say “she’s with me”‘ (C-F-45).

This need for absolute certainty was a recurring theme amongst fundamentalist Christians: ‘There are Christians who believe in evolution and say that God used that. But I struggled with that when the bible says
something different, because either the bible is true or it’s not... If I couldn’t trust the first few chapters of the bible, then for me that made me really unsure about the rest, like “why could I trust that?”’ (C-M-25)

Given the high stakes of doctrines such as the Rapture (the second coming of Jesus Christ) and the destruction of this planet, absolute faith in a clear pathway to salvation (the objective truth of the bible) becomes compelling. This absolute faith motivates Christians to become active in their Christian community, and through that activity they learn the values that they will need to follow to retain acceptance within that group (or to have a stronger relationship with God, as they would explain it).

This process calls to mind the logical approach to belief known as Pascal’s Wager. By framing the question as a high-stakes game where the prize is eternal salvation and a loss will lead to eternal damnation, Pascal managed to load the odds in Christianity’s favour by suggesting, ‘What have you got to lose through faith in your Earthly life, when the eternal consequences of disbelief could be so immense?’ (Orr 2004: 79)

The counter-point to fundamentalist Christian doctrinal certainty is political Greens’ doctrine of diversity. As noted earlier, in New Zealand, the Green movement is organised under four core principles: ecological wisdom, social responsibility, appropriate decision-making, and non-violence. The abstract nature of these principles is aimed at maintaining diversity: ‘I think that humanity is an incredibly diverse, rich range of people and communities and the Green Party shares that diversity and richness. And I certainly wouldn’t have it any other way. I don’t think there’s any value in everybody agreeing on everything. Where’s the debate then? Where’s the intellectual challenge?’ (E-F-63). To the suggestion that environmentalism might gain more adherents if it offered more moral certainty, equivalent to the Ten Commandments, in how to deal with life decisions: ‘Then it would become like fundamentalist Christianity and it might attract some people but it certainly wouldn’t attract me!’ (E-F-63)

All four Greens expressed a positive view of the diversity and flexibility of environmentalism as a values-system: ‘I think for a lot of people in the environmental movement, I don’t think that it is like a religion for them. It doesn’t come with a clear set of guidelines for behaviour like a lot of religions do. It gives you a lot of ideas for how you could change your behaviour, but I don’t think they are as clear as the Ten Commandments’ (E-F-25). However, the flipside of this is instability: ‘everything is up for debate’. (Ibid)

For environmentalists, the potential problems caused by the actions of industrialised society, and the negative consequences for future generations, is a prime motivating factor. In the face of such radical uncertainty regarding the future, environmentalists are forced to make a virtue of flexibility and diversity. To some extent, it may be inevitable that their organising doctrine mirrors the instability of the modern world where “all that is solid melts into air”. But by mimicking the instability of the mainstream, they are effectively consigning themselves to the same degree of social un-sustainability found therein. Perhaps a greater certainty in proposing a Green version of Pascal’s Wager (Orr 2004: 85), one where everyone is morally compelled by climate change to bet with the chips of their current lifestyles on the future of their grandchildren (who could potentially inherit the climatic equivalent of hell), could arguably attract more people to their cause.
Maori however, appear to find more stability than environmentalists in their doctrine, as Tikanga teaches that people should focus on their past; not the future: ‘The phrase for the past is “nga wa o mua” – “o” is the locative so that’s the “past”... the “mua” is the “front”. So the past is in front of you and the future “nga wa a muri”, is at the back, so you walk backwards into the future and your past opens out in front of you. It’s a paradigm shift about what you know is valuable. The future is not valuable because it’s not known... The only thing that is valuable is the past and that leads you into the future. The more you value the past, the more valuable the future will become’ (T-M-41). This divergence in temporal orientation is seen as the fundamental dividing line between Maori and Pakeha, hindering racial reconciliation: ‘If there’s a point of difference that’s it: Pakeha and Maori look in different directions, and I think that the Pakeha direction is sometimes not helpful. Looking forward into the future is sometimes not helpful because you won’t find answers there, because you don’t know what’s there and you can’t find an answer there until you get there’ (Ibid).

Thus for many Maori, a doctrine focusing on past injustices and their connection to the present motivates their conversion to a life guided by Tikanga: ‘If its good enough for my Irish ancestors to leave Ireland and leave the oppression of the English, it is good enough for us to work alongside Maori, because they are being oppressed by the same system that we escaped from... It’s more about the injustice that drives me. The knowledge has been a bonus.’ (Ibid)

The immediate effects of this doctrine are strongly felt, but tend to wear off over time as the individual is absorbed into the community: ‘You go through a bit of an angry stage when you find out what happened to your ancestors through that colonisation process, and you go through this angry stage of not hating white people, but it’s a combination of hurting for all your ancestors and seeing what people are like now and still so oppressed and caught up in this horrible system... But I’m over being angry and I want to be proactive and support our people.’ (T-F-36)

Hence, the doctrine of Tikanga Maori motivates Maori to learn their language and remain engaged in issues relating to injustices against their people. This motivation draws them into a circle of active Maori speakers, where their values can be reaffirmed, and their energy channelled into practical community goals.

7.4 Responding to a Possible Objection: Gang Communities and Anti-Social Doctrinal Values

To argue that community plays the largest role in the propagation and sustenance of “useful” universal values raises the question of gangs: a community that is often viewed as the embodiment of values degeneration. Gangs provide a good example of the distinction and tension between universal community values and particular doctrinal values.

Studies have shown that gangs in New Zealand have certain religious elements, particularly in their veneration of “sacred” gang patches, initiation rituals and the martyr-making of slain comrades (Callinan 2007; Andrae 2004). Andrae quotes one gang member: ‘...the “Mob” were just like iwi [tribe] to me. I’d die with them and for the patch.’ (in Andrae 2004: 154) Another gang member explained the attraction of the
patch: ‘I liked what it stood for... togetherness, brotherhood, freedom, humour and, above all, having a good time riding around the country’ (in Ibid). This leads Andrae to point to additional evidence of gangs’ highly bureaucratic structures and their lucid pursuit of goals, and conclude that New Zealand ethnic gangs and outlaw motorcycle clubs are ‘highly social within their respective circles’ (Ibid: 159).

This is not to argue against the common belief that gangs are responsible for a disproportionate share of criminal activities, but to point out that gang members themselves believe that they have found values within those communities. This is consistent with Durkheim’s argument that “pre-contractual solidarity” is produced by a sense of belonging to a community with others and consequently feeling a moral obligation to live up to its demands (Collins & Makowsky 1993: 105). The problem is therefore either that those values are not extended to people who are not members of the gang (a lack of empathy due to their disconnection from broader society) or that the gang’s doctrine promotes antisocial particular values that trump those found through the community of the gang (a problem of doctrine). The former suggests a need to increase gangs’ interdependence with other communities, thereby enhancing their “organic solidarity” and extending their empathy to non-gang members. The latter suggests that a change in their doctrines and particular values could offer some hope for reform.

Dr Pita Sharples, the Maori party co-leader and a renowned educationalist, suggests that the latter path is being pursued by some Maori gangs when he argues that established gangs are becoming part of the solution to youth violence (NZ Herald 2008b). Black Power in particular, one of the biggest and most recognised of New Zealand gangs, has made efforts to adopt Tikanga Maori as its core cultural framework, and some Chapters of the Mongrel Mob are heading in a similar direction (Andrae 2004:138-139). Meanwhile, Dr Sharples’ efforts to find a new social role for gangs can be interpreted as an attempt to enhance their organic solidarity with each other and broader New Zealand society.

Putting the argument of gang reform to one side, the nature of gangs still reinforces the points made about the relative roles of doctrine and community in this chapter. The anti-social doctrine of the “outlaw” gang may be the main appeal for the rootless misfit searching for identity, and the particular values that one may learn in such a community may well be mostly of a criminal nature, but this still only underlines that community is essential to identity and value propagation and sustenance, and that community should be the focus of efforts to impart useful, sociable and sustainable values in mainstream New Zealand life.

7.5 The Application of the Theory to Interpreting the Values-Communities

In this chapter, I have suggested that community socialisation rather than doctrine is the source of the universal values that would be acceptable to be taught in a liberal education system. This argument contradicts a growing body of literature on how values can be taught through ideas to rational-acting individuals in mainstream education. However, re-framing the role of doctrine to that of the motivating force for people to join and remain in a community, through which values are then disseminated, should not reduce
its importance; as the extent to which a person finds stability and wellbeing, and actually internalises the values offered by community, will depend on the motivational strength of the different doctrines.

In this case, and in view of recent history, the absolute assurances of fundamentalist Christianity surely trump not only the liberal Churches, but possibly Tikanga Maori and certainly environmentalism. By this measure, the uncertainty and relativity preached by political Greens is a clear disadvantage in their ability to attract people to be sufficiently active in some form of environmental community so that they can internalise environmental values in their everyday thinking and behaviour.

In effect, these results show the difficulty of forming a “Left-Hegelian” community, which aims to shape social institutions on the basis of rational ideas (this problem was also shown in the failures of socialism). The “Right-Hegelian” orientation of Christianity and Tikanga Maori offers much greater security in its assertion of the sanctity of tradition and the rationality inherent to ancestral knowledge. (This problem is further discussed in Chapter 8.2)

Meanwhile, doctrine has an important secondary role in determining the particular values that define each of these groups as different from each other. For fundamentalist Christians, a doctrine asserting the sin of individual human beings appeared to give them a particularly micro-level approach to community-focused values such as family, respect, and love for one’s neighbour. For environmentalists, a doctrine of human beings’ connectedness with the planet promotes particular values linking individual behavioural change such as waste reduction, anti-materialism and dietary change to macro-level concerns. These values tie into a self-image of integrity and humility common to Christianity, but offer less incentive for community construction. Tikanga Maori shares environmentalism’s sense of connectedness. However, by focusing on past problems rather than potential future problems, this doctrine promotes values of historical justice, cultural rediscovery and a stronger connection to communities through whanau and activities in broader Maori society.

8.0 DISCUSSION: Application of Theory to Sustainability in New Zealand

8.1 Arbitrating between the “Particular” Warring Gods of Doctrine

The contention that there are two types of values: universal and particular, and that the former are independent of doctrine, has not only sound justification in the results of the interviews, but also important practical utility. The existence and significance of “universal” or “big-tent” values is a prime assumption of recent educational literature, and the search to identify these values has received a lot of academic attention (Keown et al. 2005). Nevertheless, very few of these studies have acknowledged the communal context of universal values, and have thus been unable to remove themselves completely from the battles between the “warring gods” of doctrine. That’s to say, values-education in New Zealand has been resisted by some teachers as too controversial (Ibid: 94), or dismissed as “Christian brain-washing” by some parents (C-F-24).

The dichotomy of community and doctrinal values offers a practical escape route from such endless dispute within the context of a liberal education system, as concerned parents or teachers could be persuaded that universal values have no doctrinal bias. This acceptance can then function as a cornerstone on which to teach
children the associational skills that they will need to resist the atomising pressures of the modern system and protect their lifeworld from colonisation.

For proof that a community and tradition-oriented educational approach can be reconciled with a modern economy, one might look to Japan. Ikemoto has argued that the ‘primary purpose of moral education is to preserve and develop traditional culture’, and has demonstrated that the teaching of the relationship between the individual and the group is stressed throughout the entire school life in Japan (Ikemoto 1996). Ikemoto also notes this as a prime difference between Japanese and Western educational approaches.

Yet, to push society towards ecological sustainability, the education system may have to embrace some values which are not a function of community, and therefore do not enjoy universal support. To some extent it may still be forced to privilege some of the “warring gods”, as a parallel project to the propagation of universal values through community. Let us then consider a means by which any particular values could be judged to graduate to the position of state-sanctioned “useful” values.

First of all, it is important to acknowledge that in spite of its theoretical value-neutrality, the New Zealand Ministry of Education has a history of promoting (what it perceives to be) socially-useful values that are not universal to all doctrines but which fit comfortably within the modern system. For example, it was noted earlier that younger Christians show more tolerance towards Tikanga Maori than older Christians. This tolerance in practice directly contradicts the tolerance “ideology” that they bemoaned in mainstream New Zealand’s acceptance of “sins” such as homosexuality. Thus, “tolerance” is not a universal value; it may be consistent with the particular values of environmentalism and Tikanga Maori but not with the doctrines of fundamentalist Christianity. Nevertheless, tolerance has been disseminated through education (Keown et al. 2005) (and with possibly greater influence, the mass media), and the effects of this orientation are noticeable in the different attitudes of younger and older Christians. The apparently successful indoctrination of “tolerance” may appear to offer hope for the status quo in values-education, but it should be noted that tolerance has a functional role (or what Max Weber called an “elective affinity”) in the system of capitalism and liberalism.

Secondly, a possible metric for adjudicating between values may be found in Mannheim’s contention that all ideas are equal, provided that they are in harmony with society’s historical development: ‘In order to be transmuted into knowledge, every perception is and must be ordered and organized into categories. The extent, however, to which we can organize and express our experience in such conceptual forms is, in turn, dependent upon the frames of reference which happen to be available at a given historical moment. The concepts which we have and the universe of discourse in which we move, together with the directions in which they tend to elaborate themselves, are dependent largely upon the historical-social situation of the intellectually active and responsible members of the group.’ (Mannheim 1998: 261)

This connection of values to historical development is actually a fairly common means by which people explore the values and behaviour of other cultures. For example, a common observation by environmentally-concerned tourists when visiting developing countries with a plastic-bag waste problem is that their cultural
habits of discarding waste where it is consumed has not kept pace with the technological change of non-biodegradable products such as plastic bags. In the same way, an anti-whaling activist might express frustration with Japanese assertions of their “cultural tradition” of hunting whales, when their traditional technology no longer plays a part in whale hunts. In both cases, it is recognised that traditional values are no longer sufficient in dealing with the challenges of increased human power through technology.

It follows that if one accepts that a change in power relations due to the development of new technology requires a concurrent change in human behaviour at the micro-level of plastic littering, then one should also accept the need to change behaviour in response to such macro-level advances as global fossil fuel exploitation and combustion. Environmentalists would argue that the scientists who represent Mannheim’s ‘intelligently active and responsible members’ of global society have already reached consensus on the most pressing problems of the 21st century, but the ‘frames of reference which happen to be available’ have yet to be shared with broader society. Thus, environmentalists argue that it is necessary that environmental education form a core of all compulsory education systems. Yet, as has been argued in this thesis, the sustenance of ecologically friendly values, or any other values, is difficult without the socialisation opportunities provided by community.

Furthermore, adherents of fundamentalist Christianity or Tikanga Maori might counter that the community-associational skills promoted through their respective doctrines retain just as much relevance in confronting 21st century challenges of sustainability. Indeed, Maori do argue that the cultural constructs of Tikanga Maori encourage an empathy for the planet that most Pakeha scientists have been unable to channel through scientific rationality (T-M-41). They could also point to Western studies on the social structures necessary for sustainable behaviour (see for example Eckersley 2004) and argue that they exist in a more holistic form in Tikanga; that environmentalists are, in effect, trying to “reinvent the wheel”.

In effect, such a debate would be just another manifestation of the conflict which has dogged modernity ever since Hegel formulated his dialectic: ‘What is rational is actual; and what is actual is rational’ (in Callinicos 2005: 43). Environmentalists reflect the “Left Hegelian” view that the most rational ideas should be implemented in institutions; Maori and fundamentalist Christians subscribe to the “Right Hegelian” view that their culture reflects the accumulated wisdom of generations of ancestors (or God), and is therefore a superior form of rationality to anything dreamed up by individuals today.

The complexity of the sustainability problem is that both sides will need to play an essential part to the solution. A future-focused, Left-Hegelian, scientific approach will be necessary to recognise the ongoing problems caused by industrialisation and to fight the destructive inertia in those systems. A history-focused, Right-Hegelian, community approach remains the model of how society needs to be organised. In Habermasian terms, environmentalism is needed to run the system; and the community organisational methods of Tikanga and Christianity provide, in principle, a model for the development of a sustainable lifeworld. As Habermas demonstrated, these two can be reconciled if there are strong enough restraining barriers to stop the system from colonising the lifeworld. If Maori and Christians are given assurances that
political-Green environmentalism’s main focus is to protect them from colonisation by the capitalist system (while converting that system to a more ecologically sustainable one) then perhaps their cooperation can be ensured. In other words, the doctrinal values of environmentalism could be privileged only if it is demonstrated that they aim to make lifeworld space for the protection of communities and their values. However, for this to occur, a moral consensus on the need for change will need to be established, fostering a powerful “collective consciousness” amongst all three groups; a position from which they can then sell the need for social and ecological sustainability to mainstream New Zealand. Thus, a Habermasian values dialogue may be needed to kick-start Durkheimian organic solidarity between the three communities.

8.2 Fostering Durkheimian Organic Solidarity: Habermasian Values Dialogue on a Common Enemy

The theory generated in Chapter 7 argued that universal values are inherent to all communities, but the particular values of doctrine have acted as “warring gods” that have limited communication between different values-communities. In Section 8.1 it was also argued that some of the particular values of environmentalism are in line with technological change and will need to be encouraged to promote ecological sustainability, while the organisational models of Christianity and Tikanga offer a vision of social sustainability that will need to be rediscovered. It follows that there will need to be a degree of buy-in from all three major values-communities to understand and accept their respective areas of expertise. In other words, it will require circumstances akin to Durkheim’s “organic solidarity”, whereby communities feel mutually dependent and develop collective consciousness (Parkin 1992: 28). For this organic solidarity to develop, an awareness of common values, objectives and most importantly, a common enemy, might need to be fostered through dialogue.

This process might begin with a shared value that is seldom acknowledged. For example, when some Christian interviewees mentioned their suspicion of environmentalism for its “humanist” roots, they were denouncing the project of (Left-Hegelian) secular humanists such as Ludwig Feuerbach who called for “an inversion of the inversion” that reduces man from subject to predicate in history, and therefore man should resume the capacities ascribed to God and the absolute (Callinicos 2005: 80). Yet, many environmentalists share a deep fear of technological hubris and efforts to “play God”, by defining one of their core values as: ‘Respect for the incredibly beautiful systems that keep the world going round, and a feeling that if we interfere with those, without knowing what we are doing, then we will cause great harm’ (E-F-63).

With a greater understanding of such a shared conception of humility, environmentalists and Christians might also find a shared enemy in the doctrinal values of neo-liberal economics. Many Christians, fundamentalist or not, would share the views of environmental educationalist David Orr, who argues that modern capitalist marketing techniques have twisted Christian virtues such as restraint, charity, integrity and reverence into sins against the holy grail of economic growth; and sins such as pride, envy, sloth, gluttony and lust are now celebrated as part-and-parcel of a conspicuous-consumption society (Orr 2004: 62).

In political terms, New Zealand has so far not seen a formalised alliance between fundamentalist Christianity
and pro-business politicians to the same extent as in the United States. However, with the ongoing Americanisation of New Zealand politics, it seems increasingly likely that such ties will develop unless environmentalists learn how to relate to Christians and frame the discourse as one of the sin of consumerism. Fundamentalist Christians will often talk of man’s greed as the source of environmental problems (C-M-45). However, they have been mostly unwilling to explore a more macro-level thesis of the social consequences of money, such as that offered by Georg Simmel: ‘the more the life of society becomes dominated by monetary relationships, the more the relativistic character of existence finds its expression in conscious life’ (in Callinicos 2005: 186). Relativism is one of Christians’ chief bugbears and Simmel’s description of money as ‘the purest form of the tool’ (Ibid: 184) (in that it makes humans no longer personally dependent on others) offers a plausible explanation for the social and ecological degeneration decried by Christians and environmentalists, respectively. (It also explains succinctly the biggest obstacle to “organic solidarity”, which is predicated on a sense of interdependence).

Indeed the perception of mainstream New Zealand common to all groups: that people are “searching” for something, is affirmed by Simmel’s work, which argues that the relativism of modern money relations drives people to search for sensation and variety (Callinicos 2005: 185). In addition, Simmel notes that modernity is typified by “cynicism” (the disparagement of old values) and a “blasé attitude” (indifference to the specific qualities of things) (Ibid). The former is particularly lamented by Christians who preach family values, and the latter is a recurring theme amongst environmentalists. Together, they have a shared interest in combating the structural pressures of money in society.

The lack of esteem given to communities by neo-liberal economics was perhaps best summed up in Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement that ‘there is no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families’ (in Schick et al. 2004: 122). This perspective flows naturally from the axiom adopted by Smith, Hobbes and Montesquieu that ‘one must consider a man before the establishment of societies’ in order to apply the principles of natural science to human behaviour (in Callinicos 2005: 19). Yet this core assumption of modern economics has been criticised ever since Rousseau asked ‘how can man come to know himself as nature made him once he has undergone all the changes [of socialisation]?’ Marx was even more critical of these “Robinsonades”: ‘Production by an isolated individual outside society… is as much an absurdity as the development of language without human beings living together and talking’ (in Ibid: 85).

Meanwhile, economic restructuring has been particularly hard on Maori (Belich 2001: 474). Former Prime Minister, David Lange, who presided over the most dramatic neo-liberal economic reforms between 1984 and 1989, admitted in 1990 that Maori values were particularly vulnerable to neo-liberalism: ‘There is no doubt at all that the current economic policies of the government in this country, as in most Western countries, are competitive policies, where those who… are prepared to work collegially, and in concert with fellows and exemplify all the traditions of Polynesia are likely to get run over by a bus. But that’s the truth of economic reality in the twentieth century’ (in Kelsey 1993: 251-252).

When viewed from a Durkheimian perspective that all religions are essentially an act of venerating
community bonds, and ascribing the power of society to “God”, it becomes apparent that the neo-liberal belief in the non-existence of society is an existential threat to all values-systems and to universal values. Therefore, it appears that Tikanga, environmentalism and Christianity share a common enemy in an economic system which has systematically undermined their values.

It might be hoped that such shared interest would be discovered through the values dialogue prescribed in the New Zealand Curriculum. Yet, for this to occur, the system would need to explore its own culpability in destroying community values in the first place. As Snook argues about the period of neo-liberal economic restructuring: ‘the most cunning and effective values-education ever seen in [New Zealand] occurred during this time as the attitudes and values encouraged became those of self-centredness, acquisitiveness and a ‘survival of the fittest’ kind of competitiveness. Self interest replaced altruism and commercial models replaced community models. [Such values] fly in the face of the lessons of the past and the values of our secular and religious traditions. To those of us with humanistic and/or religious perspectives this is a tragic outcome’ (Snook 2000: 3).

Furthermore, Callinicos has argued that ‘sporadic campaigns to restore values’ are in fact a direct function of neo-liberalism’s sidelining of Marxist structural analysis (Callinicos 2005: 315); that values-education is in effect a diversionary tactic equivalent to “blaming the poor” and ignoring the role of the economic system in destroying community values in the first place. Thus, the system’s ability to engage in sufficient reform to be community-friendly, and therefore value-friendly, must be called in to question. For education to play a positive role in resolving values degeneration, it would have to go against the grain of modernity and open itself to the perspectives of New Zealand’s three major values-communities. Fortunately, it won’t have to look far to find an example of an educational philosophy developed beyond the bureaucratic reach of the modern system and underscored by a commitment to community. That is the pathway pioneered by the Kaupapa Maori educational institutions since the 1980s.

8.3 Restoring the Lifeworld: The Postcolonial Precedent of Kaupapa Maori in New Zealand

As noted in Section 3.3, Jurgen Habermas has argued that modernity’s failings are due to the colonisation of the “lifeworld” by the “system”, which he likened to ‘colonial masters coming into a tribal society and forcing a process of assimilation upon it’ (in Callinicos 2005: 287). The implication of this particular choice of language is that Western society is as much a product of colonisation as non-Western societies, except that in the West the process of “systemic colonisation” has penetrated so deeply that the West now regards capitalist individualism and the organisational discipline of bureaucratism as central elements of its culture. This is particularly evident in New Zealand, where a novel, “Man Alone”, which implicitly contrasts the modern drive to “have freedom” with the natural state of “being free” (Harris 2000), and details the misery of modern isolation, has been twisted to symbolise a virtuous national characteristic of “practicality” and “independence”. Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” has shown how societies adjust to their limited possibilities, and make a virtue out of necessity (Callinicos 2005: 293), illustrating how colonised or
oppressed people can mythologise historical trauma and twist it into a celebration of national virtue.

This perspective of the Pakeha lifeworld as being “colonised” by the modern system does not belittle the suffering of physically colonised people, such as Maori, whose negative social indicators have been described as symptoms of post-colonial trauma (Turiana 2005: 64); a trauma which has social consequences well beyond what Pakeha have experienced. Rather, by linking Pakeha alienation to that of Maori, one can argue with optimism that Pakeha can reclaim their lifeworld, just as Maori have done since the 1970s.

Historian James Belich has argued that since the end of preferential trading with the United Kingdom in 1973, Pakeha New Zealanders have indeed been engaged in “decolonisation” from cultural identification with Britain (Belich 2001). However, a process of Pakeha decolonisation from the modern system (inherited from the British), a process which rejects the invasion of the lifeworld by the system’s de-linguistified forces of capitalist money and bureaucratic power, has certainly not begun. Yet, under the philosophical underpinnings of Kaupapa Maori theory, decolonisation from the modern system has been a central part of Maori attempts to re-establish the Tikanga Maori lifeworld for the last 35 years.

As revealed in the book “A Civilising Mission”, New Zealand’s “Native Schools” system was set up in the 19th century with the explicit mission of bringing Maori into the fold of European civilisation; a mission that was resisted by Maori. Maori were then faced with the new challenge in the 1980s of regenerating the Maori language and culture through the very system that set out to destroy them (Simon & Tahiwai-Smith 2001: 309). In fact, both Kohanga Reo and Kura Kaupapa were developed beyond the Ministry of Education’s influence, effectively due to fears that an innately modern bureaucracy would not be able to undo the damages of modernity (McMurchy-Pilkington 2001: 169-181).

In a Marxist paradigm, Gyorgy Lukacs once argued that the working class have a significant role as agents for change, as class struggle disrupts the “reified structure of existence” in capitalist organisation, giving insights into the oppressive reality of modern society (Callinicos 2005: 206). Similarly, but in the context of a post-colonial nation like New Zealand, It has been argued that ‘through penetrating the prevailing hegemony, Maori have engaged in Praxis: “reflection and action upon the world in order to change it”’ (McMurchy-Pilkington 2001: 172). The Maori-language primary-schools, Kura Kaupapa Maori, not only incorporate a different language and different structures, but they also provide ‘a critique of the existing system’ (Ibid: 171). Hence, the Kaupapa Maori struggle for decolonisation from the modern system can help make Pakeha aware of the reification of the system and show the pathway to lifeworld restoration. For Maori, this “decolonisation of the mind” has been ‘a contradictory message in some respects as a move forward requires a move back. The call to move back, however, is an ideological one: a temporary point from which to reposition, relearn and restore, in order to guide us in negotiating the future’ (in Te Whaiti et al. 1997: 34).

As all New Zealanders confront the obstacles to sustainability constructed by the modern system, they too will need to ‘reposition, relearn and restore’. The outcome of this process will undoubtedly be a lifeworld distinct from Tikanga Maori, but the pathway to the necessary community ethic may have been made much
more clear and accessible by virtue of Maori having trodden it already.

8.4 The First Task for Education: Time Perspective Re-orientation

‘Education, therefore, can be reformed only if society itself is reformed. To do that, the evil from which it suffers must be attacked at its sources’. (Durkheim 1968: 373)

Durkheim’s call to attack social problems at their roots requires us to re-examine some of the most fundamental characteristics of modernity: the linear time perspective and the related belief in “progress”. As illustrated by one of the Maori interviewees, the most fundamental difference between Maori and Pakeha culture lies in their temporal orientations: modern Pakeha culture seeks legitimacy from the future; Tikanga seeks legitimacy from the past (T-M-41; See also Giddens definition of modernity in section 3.1).

Of course, the Western linear time perspective pre-dates modernity. Along with the rationality that stabilised the world for economic activities, a linear or “developmental” time perspective has been identified as an important force which drove Western modernisation. Both have been traced back to early Jewish historians and pre-Exilic prophets (Wax 1960: 452). Historically, in the course of the Jewish conflict with the cults of fertility, the cyclical conception of time in line with the seasons was suppressed and replaced with a fixed calendar schedule (Ibid: 453). Meanwhile, the Jewish doctrine of Godly creation and destruction advanced a linear notion of time that reduced the past to preparation, and saw the present as having meaning only in terms of the future.

This linear time perspective was inherited by Christianity and passed down through enlightenment philosophers such as Isaac Newton (who saw time as a container of events). However, an alternative view, that time and space are relational, has been expressed since the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence of 1715-1716 (Ibid). This particular dispute was re-litigated again in the late 18th century, as the “Querelle des anciennes et modernes” in which the anciennes rejected the notion of linear progress and infinite future improvement advanced by modernes such as Auguste Comte and Turgot (Callinicos 2005: 13). This linear conception of time and the related belief in progress has undoubtedly been the source of the remarkable energy for transformation witnessed by modernity. Indeed, Belich calls “progress” one of the three founding myths of New Zealand (along with “Britishness” and “paradise”) (Belich 2001: 21). Nevertheless, this energy has proved to be hard to control, and a lack of connection to the past has directly or indirectly (by privileging the forces of money and individualism) wrought havoc on social and ecological sustainability.

‘Progressive Colonisation’ argued Belich, was ‘a supercharged form of settlement, a frenzied crusade against nature and natives in honour of the nineteenth century god “Progress”’ (Ibid: 17).

The promise of “progress” offered by the modern system has served as a Trojan Horse in its conquest of the lifeworld. Durkheim made the connection explicit in “Suicide”: ‘As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is harder for them to accept resignation; so the number of the malcontent and disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a certain amount of anomie’ (Durkheim 1968: 364). Thus, in order to reconstruct the
lifeworld, one must first disavow oneself of unquestioning faith in this “progress”.
This more critical approach to modernity would have the immediate effect of de-legitimising the “technology fetishism” that has stymied debate on the need for community and values promotion to reach sustainability. Discouraging the future-focus of unquestioning belief in “progress” would also have significant implications for how one views a desirable society. Russell Jacoby has argued that a utopian spirit is vital to confront the problems of the 21st century, but unfortunately we live in an anti-utopian age, plagued by “End of History” triumphalism (Jacoby 2005). He notes that this is largely due to the totalitarian regimes produced by socialist revolutions, revolutions whose future-focused temporal orientation and unquestioning faith in “progress” made them particularly savage. Jacoby effectively endorses the revolutionary potential of what Walter Benjamin called a “tiger’s leap into the past” (Callinicos 2005: 252). That’s to say, a utopianism that is rooted in the past, or at least a re-assembly of the values of the past which retain universal relevance (i.e. collective values), would possess a heightened sense of patriotic legitimacy if it is understood (as it was by Maori) as reclaiming something important that has been lost in the modernisation process.
The role for fundamentalist Christianity in this process of temporal reorientation is problematic, due to the split in time perspectives which characterises that movement. On the one hand, the historical roots of “fundamentalism” lie in the reaction against the (Left-Hegelian) modernising efforts of liberal Christianity, and more recently, the advances made by the homosexual and women’s rights movements. As shown in the interviews, some cherish the memory of a homogenous, pre-1960s, imagined Christian past. On the other hand, the millenarian doctrine of fundamentalist Christianity encourages a linear time perspective and an extreme future-focus, an expectation even, with regards to Christ’s second-coming. Thus, due to these tensions, the lessons from fundamentalist Christianity’s selective “history-focus” would seem to have less practical application to structural reform than the consistent history-focus of Tikanga Maori.
But are efforts to learn from the history-oriented time perspective of Tikanga Maori guilty of what the defenders of the modern system call “romantic primitivism”? Roger Sandall has criticised the ‘moral transfiguration of the tribal world’ which ‘projects a benignly Disney-fied way of life, all flowers and contentment’ and deletes the ‘violence...domination...and exploitation’ of tribal societies (Sandall 2001: 9). Sandall notes the argument of Roger Keesing who suggested that although fictionalised pasts may be false ‘their symbolic power and political force are undeniable’ and ‘perhaps it matters only whether such political ideologies are used for just causes, whether they are instruments of liberation or oppression’ (in Ibid: 8), but argues that ‘Keesing might also have paused to notice the huge financial costs his “liberating fictions” have imposed on modern citizens in modern states’ (Ibid: 9).
Sandall’s final comment reveals the prime motivation driving his criticism, but be that as it may, the dual arguments that 1) indigenous values-movements lack legitimacy because they have eliminated their less appealing “particular” values and 2) should be opposed because they pose a threat to modern civilisation are intrinsically contradictory. As Michael King has shown in his biography of the influential Maori matriarch, Te Puea, the most successful Maori leaders have been innovators who appeal to tradition (King 2003: 340).
A celebration of the past does not lead to an unquestioning embrace of practices which are socially unsustainable. This has been shown by the very ‘deletion’ of ‘violence... domination... and exploitation’ that Sandall criticises. Rather a history-focus offers both the stable guidance of precedent and the chastening wisdom of historical failings.

To conclude, structural reform in temporal orientation and attitudes towards the idea of “progress” are necessary, in the context of encouraging values for sustainability, first and foremost, to overcome the technology fetishism that allows citizens to externalise the problem. Secondly, a history-focus is necessary to discover a collective-consciousness based on shared history and the universal values of all people’s community-focused ancestors. Thirdly, temporal reorientation is necessary to resist the individualising pressures of a “future-focused” society. A future-focused society is inherently individualistic because legitimacy no longer lies in the teaching or approval of forebears; it lies in a future that the individual is encouraged to believe that he/she can manipulate in the never-ending search for “progress”.

8.5 From Values to Sustainability: A Summary

Chapter 8 has discussed how the theory generated from the results of the research can illuminate a pathway to sustainability for New Zealand. This began by recognising the respective strengths in a sustainability paradigm of the three communities based on their Left-Hegelian and Right-Hegelian characteristics. It suggested that environmentalists could receive the support of Maori and Christians if they initiate a Habermasian dialogue and frame their movement as one which will make space for the lifeworlds of all communities from the invasive forces of the economic and bureaucratic system. This implied that Habermasian communicative action on a less complex issue like the problems of the current economic system can be used to foster Durkheimian organic solidarity; and on the basis of that organic solidarity, communicative action can move on to confront the “wicked problems” of ecological sustainability. The discussion also found a role for education to play in lifeworld regeneration: by following the pathway pioneered by Kaupapa Maori. The discussion concluded with speculation that the most important lesson mainstream education would learn from Kaupapa is to value a history-oriented temporal perspective.

9.0 VISIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH AND CONCLUSIONS

9.1 Education and Values: Lessons from the Kaupapa Maori Model of Decolonisation

The precise nature of the steps taken to re-orientate the Pakeha time perspective to a “history-focus” is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, I believe this to be an exciting area for future research, so I will make a few points, roughly in order, of the steps that might occur.

1. Mainstream education could take a first step towards structural reform by asserting the importance of genealogical roots; for students to understand how and why their forebears came to New Zealand and what cultural traditions they brought with them. This is often the very first project for new students of the Maori language. Yet, this is not simply a Maori value, but a broader Pacific value: ‘One's identity, the person that
we are, is first created, from one's papa'anga tupuna, genealogy. Our papa'anga pronounces to all others our individualised uniqueness, why each of us is special, chosen by the ancestors. We alone can hold our place within our genealogy, we alone can fulfil our destiny’ (Dr. J. Mitaera, quoted in Keown et al. 2005: 40).

2. As is consistent with a history-focused temporal orientation, Maori believe that ‘in order to know where we are going, we need to know where we have been’ (in McMurchy-Pilkington 2001: 162). For Pakeha New Zealanders, national mythology remains tied to a recent agricultural history, and the values which are still venerated in national symbology: diligence, practicality, humility, mateship, and physical prowess, are firmly rooted in that tradition. Perhaps nostalgia can be encouraged for the best of Pakeha traditions while simultaneously exploring the chequered history of race relations in New Zealand. This will involve the renunciation of some values, just as Maori have willingly discarded traditional practices that were socially destructive, such as cannibalism and the class system (Drake 2005: 23). The power of nostalgia for more simple times to work as a motivating force for sustainability remains under-researched (possibly because of taboos dating back to Nazi associations with “romantic anti-capitalism”).

3. With comprehensive historical awareness, the Treaty of Waitangi would be re-framed from a source of Pakeha guilt to the source of Pakeha legitimacy in New Zealand. Pakeha New Zealanders are on arguably a more sound legal and moral footing than any other European-descended people in the “new world”. This should be a source of celebration, because as “Tangata Tiriti” (people of the treaty) Pakeha have a place to stand next to Maori “Tangata Whenua” (the first people of the land) (King 1988). With an improved understanding of such rights, Pakeha will be more inclined to assume their responsibilities as active treaty partners.

4. After gaining a stronger historical footing, Tikanga suggests that all people must have turangawaewae: a place of their own to stand (Mead 2003: 272-273). Perhaps the local landscape could be a source of “sacred objects” that can promote collective consciousness and social solidarity development. The target of such reforms must be cultural capital: the everyday interaction that organises certain symbols and therefore defines success in that culture (Collins & Mawkowsky 1993: 277). A history-focused temporal re-orientation and the promotion of geographical and genealogical reconnection should help to realign mainstream cultural capital in a direction that defines “success” as socially and ecologically sustainable behaviour.

To conclude, while children are still in school they are still bound by the forces of “mechanical solidarity”. The true test of such structural reforms is therefore after a student graduates and enters broader society. Whether the young adult chooses to join a value community or not, it is to be hoped that an increased awareness of their mutual dependence with individual citizens, family, value communities and their local environment will have been gained from their time in the education system. This will only occur if education privileges a history-focus, challenges unquestioned faith in technology and “progress”, and teaches community-associational skills at the centre of its curriculum. If so, it is likely that young New Zealanders will feel greater “organic solidarity” and pursue life-decisions on the basis of universal values in broader society.
9.2 Values and Sustainability: Social Sustainability and Racial Reconciliation

This thesis began by noting the assumption of values-education proponents such as Andrew Dobson that ecological sustainability can be directly promoted through education. The results of the research suggested that values are a function of community, and therefore, education will have to play the indirect role of fostering social sustainability. Through the promotion of community-associational skills and a history-focused temporal orientation, education can promote the collective consciousness necessary for citizens to work together towards collective ecological ends. In such an environment of Durkheimian organic solidarity, Habermasian communicative action, to define the terms on which the system can be steered by ecological concerns, is much more likely to succeed.

It was also noted in the introduction that there have generally been two threads to the sustainability discourse in New Zealand: technological-fix and education. This thesis has not directly addressed the technological-fix approach, but it has briefly argued that the “technology-fetishism” of a future-orientated society has been one of the structural impediments to socially sustainable and responsible behaviour. In advocating a deflation of the idea of “progress” this thesis does not suggest that people should no longer strive to progress; rather, that the nature of what “progress” actually entails should be negotiated through communicative action once a solid base of “organic solidarity” has been allowed to establish itself through structural reform.

Beyond the universal problems of modern alienation and anomie, New Zealand faces its own unique circumstances of racial reconciliation. These circumstances are negotiated through the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi; principles of bicultural equality and partnership. These principles were betrayed by Pakeha bureaucracy through both extra-legal means such as confiscation as well as the legislated policy of assimilation through the Native Schools system. Yet, Maori resistance to these measures and the independently-initiated process of decolonisation from the modern system, through reconnection to Tikanga Maori and the establishment of alternative Kaupapa Maori institutions, has ensured the preservation of important elements of the traditional Maori lifeworld. The successes of this project of preservation and regeneration offer both hope and guidance for the necessary Pakeha process of “decolonisation” from the modern system and regeneration of the Pakeha lifeworld.

This thesis has not argued that all Pakeha should guide their private lives by the values of Tikanga Maori, but it does recognise that true efforts in understanding are essential for a truly equal partnership. Instead, this thesis asserts that the decolonisation model followed by Maori is the most obvious pathway to follow by Pakeha who wish to reconnect to their pre-modern roots in the lifeworld. In Habermasian terms, this will lead, as it did for Maori, to the reconstruction of the restraining barriers separating the lifeworld from the pressures of money and power asserted by the system. With a stronger place to stand in their respective lifeworlds, all New Zealanders should feel more comfortable in consenting to the macro-level restructuring of the system necessary for a more ecologically sustainable future.

This journey for Pakeha back to a lifeworld defined by community, tradition, and values-observance is
theoretically a much longer one than that made by Maori, who, in many cases could still draw on living human resources with knowledge of pre-modern community organisation. Such first-hand knowledge has all but disappeared from the Pakeha lifeworld. Fundamentalist Christianity is perhaps the closest community to this model in contemporary Pakeha society, but its bi-polar temporal orientation remains an obstacle to applying that model to mainstream New Zealand. Nevertheless, even without direct connection to pre-modern cultural capital, this thesis suggests that a history-focused temporal re-orientation, in and of itself, will naturally push people in mainstream New Zealand in the direction of a legitimacy-providing community, through which they will find that universal values are propagated and sustained.

9.3 Sustainability and Modernity: Sustainability as an Opportunity to Resolve Modern Social Tensions

Individuals in modernity are suffering from significant malaise. This thesis has made no attempt to prove this assertion with quantitative data; rather it has highlighted the perceived need for (and actions towards) educational reform, the common arguments of the greatest modern social thinkers, and the voices of people who have made a conscious-effort to set themselves apart from mainstream life in New Zealand. By focusing on New Zealand, this thesis did not suggest that this malaise in New Zealand is any more profound than in any other modernised society; rather it argued that New Zealand offers an interesting case due to its policies of educational reform and the vibrancy and diversity of its value-community responses to modernity.

This thesis has argued that mainstream New Zealand should learn from the decolonisation process of Maori. This argument has global implications for all societies with more than one ethnic tradition. Other post-colonial countries will have their own stories of indigenous oppression, resilience and, hopefully, regeneration. It is hoped that this thesis will contribute to the popularisation of the idea that these post-colonial stories have deep significance for all modern people as they are forced, by the un-sustainability of the modern system, to confront their own Habermasian “post-colonial” trauma.

Writing over 2000 years ago, Aristotle and Cicero both conceived of “virtue” as a form of moral ecology, built on an awareness of the mutual dependence of citizens. In the 21st century, as we become more aware of ecological limits on our one planet, it is hoped that our natural dependence will remind us of our social interdependence. As humans learn to meditate on the planet as the ultimate “sacred object”, a re-reading of Durkheim might suggest that a new age of social solidarity and collective consciousness could be upon us. This thesis began with the assumption that ecological sustainability flows out of social sustainability, and this was affirmed by the research and results. But the true legacy of the ecological crisis, if it leads to a new planetary identity, a sense of solidarity and a resolution of Right-Hegelian and Left-Hegelian tensions, may be to show that social sustainability flows out of ecological sustainability also.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF MAORI LANGUAGE TERMS

Aotearoa: New Zealand
Aroha: Love
Hapu: Sub-tribe
Iwi: Tribe
Kaimoana: Seafood
Karakia: Prayer
Kaupapa Maori: Applied-Maori philosophy
Kohanga Reo: Maori philosophy pre-school
Kura Kaupapa: Maori philosophy primary school
Mana: Authority; Prestige
Maori: The indigenous people of New Zealand
Marae: Meeting-house
Nga Tamatoa: “The Young Warriors”: A Maori protest group
Nga wa a muri: The future at your back
Nga wa o mua: The past which you face
Pakeha: New Zealanders of European descent
Papa Kainga: Ancestral land
Reo, [Te]: The Maori language
Tangata Tiriti: People of the treaty; Pakeha
Tangata Whenua: People of the land; Maori
Tikanga Maori: Maori customary values and practices
Turangawaewae: A place of one’s own to stand with legitimacy
Utu: Reciprocation; Revenge
Wananga: Maori philosophy tertiary education
Whakairo: Carved-house
Whanau: Extended family

APPENDIX B: SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FORMAT

Section One: Pre-Conversion Life

1. When and where were you born? What was the culture of the family you were born into?
2. What attitudes did your family have to your current values-system at that time?
3. What attitudes towards your current values-system do you think you were exposed to in education, the media or the attitudes of classmates?
4. Were you successful at school and happy in mainstream life growing up?
5. What experiences did you have meeting people affiliated with your current values-system as you were growing up? Did you have a positive or negative impression of them before conversion?
6. When did you decide to get involved with your current values-system? Was it a gradual process or an epiphany?
7. What were the first steps you made to get involved with that values-system?

Section Two: Post-Conversion Life

1. What changes did you make at a day-to-day behavioural level?
2. What changes did you make at an abstract, world-view level?
3. Did your mental health, self-confidence or self-esteem change?
4. Did you meet more people in this process? Did you find a sense of community?
5. How were the people you met in your new life different to people you had known before?
6. What were the biggest obstacles you faced in this process? Were there any negative aspects of moving out of “mainstream” New Zealand?
7. Did you find it easier or harder to make life decisions with your new set of values?

Section Three: Other Values-Systems

1. How would you diagnose the lives of “mainstream” New Zealanders? What are they thinking?
2. How do you feel about fundamentalist Christianity/environmentalism/Traditional Maori values?
3. What values does your values-system have in common with the other two values-systems?
4. What values does your values-system not have in common with the other two values-systems?
5. Would you feel more comfortable talking or associating with a “mainstream” New Zealander or members of one of the other two values-systems?