Neither true, nor useful

The problem with framing climate change as a security threat

Helena Gonzales Lindberg
helenagonzaleslindberg@gmail.com
16 May 2011

Supervised by Turaj Faran
turaj.faran@lucsus.lu.se

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements of Lund University International Master’s Programme in Environmental Studies and Sustainability Science (LUMES) for the degree of Master of Science
Abstract

Climate change can disrupt not only our natural habitat but also our social arrangements; it may thus increase the likelihood of violent conflicts. While the scientific debate of this connection is yet to be settled, authorities and environmental movements push this “threat” onto the agenda, with the hope that climate change will gain increased attention. Pointing to conflict and war may be a “clever move”; however this thesis advocates caution and critically explores how framing of climate change as a “security threat” came about. Is this frame valid and useful for communicating the urgency and severity of climate change? Looking at causal, definitional and instrumental arguments this thesis analyses the climate change/security connection. An initial “security threat” frame is identified and its presence exemplified in the presentation speech at the ceremony of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. This framing is problematic because its premise is neither necessarily true nor particularly useful to motivate people to address climate change. Putting security first also undermines the pursuit of sustainability. The thesis concludes that the “security threat” frame should be resisted as it is counterproductive and possibly self-fulfilling, suggesting that the environmental movement should employ a more optimistic and positive motivation strategy.

Keywords: climate change, security, “security threat” framing, Nobel Peace Prize
Acknowledgements

Big thanks to Turaj Faran who encouraged me from the very beginning to the very end - thank you for making me listen and think!

Thanks to Halvard Buhaug for an interesting and useful conversation, and the library man at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo for letting me use their resources. Thanks to Amsale Temesgen for an insightful conversation and good follow-ups.

Last, to my dear friends in LUMES - because of you this roller-coaster ride has been mind-evolving in so many ways - Tusen hjertelig takk!

Helena Gonzales Lindberg, 16 May 2011
Table of Contents

1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................... 1
  1.1 Thesis Rational .................................................................................................................................. 2
  1.2 Aims and Research Questions .......................................................................................................... 3
  1.3 Methodological Approach .................................................................................................................. 4
  1.4 Limitations .......................................................................................................................................... 5
  1.5 Two key definitions ............................................................................................................................ 6
    1.5.1 Climate change .............................................................................................................................. 6
    1.5.2 Security .......................................................................................................................................... 6
  1.6 The structure ...................................................................................................................................... 7

2 The Climate Change/Security Connection ............................................................................................. 8
  2.1 Classification of arguments ................................................................................................................. 8
  2.2 Causal arguments ............................................................................................................................... 9
    2.2.1 Conflicts over scarce resources ................................................................................................... 9
    2.2.2 Migration leading to conflict ....................................................................................................... 12
  2.3 Critique of the deterministic causal connection .................................................................................. 12
  2.4 Definitional arguments: Redefining (national) security ..................................................................... 15
    2.4.1 Security threat vacuum after the Cold War ............................................................................... 15
  2.5 Instrumental arguments ....................................................................................................................... 17
    2.5.1 “Security first”? .......................................................................................................................... 18
  2.6 Short sum-up ....................................................................................................................................... 20

3 The “Climate Change as a Security Threat” Frame ............................................................................. 21
  3.1 “Security threat” as an initial frame .................................................................................................... 22
  3.2 The possibility of “securitization” ....................................................................................................... 22
1 Introduction

Climate change will help produce the kind of military challenges that are difficult for today’s conventional forces to handle: insurgencies, genocide, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare and global terrorism.

Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, 2007

This is a prize that goes straight to the heart of the Peace Prize’s purpose. No problem will create so much conflict, poverty and war than the climate problem if we fail to solve it.

Frederic Hauge, 2007

There is wide agreement within the scientific community that climate change is happening and that human activity is the primary cause of this change (Hulme 2009; IPCC 2007a). While climate change has achieved a high degree of scientific consensus, it has yet to achieve social consensus. As a result, environmental activists often work to bring environmental issues to the forefront of the political agenda in order to increase its prominence in decision-making processes and to mobilize people into action; sometimes by sensationalizing the problems thus stressing its importance. Pointing to a possible connection between climate change and violent conflict can create a salient message of the urgency and seriousness of climate change. Lately, this linkage has been welcomed by both traditional security actors such as the president of the United States (Obama 2009), the European Union (Solana 2008) and Ban Ki-moon (2007) who see climate change as a possible “threat multiplier”, and also environmental and the peace actors, for example the Nobel Peace Prize Committee (2004, 2007b), International Alert (Smith and Vivekanada 2009), Al Gore (2007) and Wangari Maathai². Connecting these phenomena, a tendency of understanding environmental changes and especially climate change as a matter of international security seems to grow.

For environmentalists it is tempting to point to threats and security implications due to its initial, dramatic appeal, however, as this thesis will argue, there are several pit-falls by employing a security threat framing of climate change. While this may raise the issue higher on the political agenda there is a danger of shifting the focus away from the environmental problems to security

---

¹ Frederic Hauge, Lars Halbreczen and Bård Lahn (prominent members of three Norwegian environmental groups) stated their fears of climate change being a threat to peace in their appraisal of the Nobel Peace Prize announcement in October 2007: http://www.vg.no/nyheter/utenriks/klimatrusselen/artikkel.php?artid=174294 (Accessed 14 May 2011)

² Resources and Conflict: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dA0qGmnc-30 (Accessed 15 April 2011)
concerns. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998) had earlier warned that processes of securitization\(^3\) can open up Pandora’s box of possible security and military means, when what is needed is for difficult, political decisions to be made and enforced. It is important to remember that how we choose to frame a phenomenon like climate change affects and forms our understanding of it. Quoting the current foreign minister of Norway Jonas Gahr Støre\(^4\), there is always a danger that the label we use to define something becomes more powerful than reality.

1.1 Thesis Rational

The ongoing debate on whether or not climate change will increase the likelihood of violent conflict and war lies at the basis of this thesis. The intention is not to prove or disprove a causal linkage between climate change and conflict, or to broaden the environmental aspects to add-on security concerns or vice versa. Instead, the thesis aims to question the truths and facts regarding this causality between climate and conflict, as they can be considered socially constructed. The rational is that how we understand an issue also determines our actions towards it. According to Mike Hulme (2009), climate change is today as much a social as a natural phenomenon, being produced and constructed through social interaction. Powerful actors on local, state and international levels profoundly shape the processes of climate change politics (Pettenger 2007), while also influencing each other. I will argue that there are certain aspects of climate change continually being strategically framed by different actors.

Those who advocate for the connection of climate change with conflict and security are often informed by the Realist paradigm\(^5\) within international relations, where competition over resources is viewed inevitable. Instead of this dominant understanding of a competitive human nature, this thesis takes a more cooperative approach and instead supports Lipschutz’ (2004) idea of “cooperative ontology”, in which human evolution is seen as more social than individualistic. This choice is substantiated by examples from empirical research showing how environmental degradation is often solved by cooperation rather than violent competition (Conca 2002; Hauge and Ellingsen 1998; Sadoff and Grey 2002). While history has repeatedly emphasized the tales of war, stories from peacetime have received less space in the history books. Media are also influential as sensational news finds the headlines more so than our daily lives. The point is that frames in communication matters, as they affect our attitudes and behaviours (Chong and Druckman 2007). The future depends a great deal on how we choose to understand the challenges we are faced with and what we do about them.

---

\(^3\) Securitization is a process which moves an issue away from the realm of normal politics, thus legitimizing the use of extraordinary, possibly non-democratic means (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998).


\(^5\) ‘Realists’ in this respect means the thinking from the Realist school of International Relations primarily concerned with power politics (Buzan 1991:2): “[S]ecurity as a derivative of power: an actor with enough power to reach a dominating position would acquire security as a result”. This is in contrast to those who see security as a consequence of peace.
1.2 Aims and Research Questions

Often, political discourses drive policy more than the academic research does (Dalby 2010). However, sometimes political discussions can ‘run away’ from their scientific basis and it is important that academia pays close attention and speaks up when they do. The linking of climate change and conflict can be considered as such an occasion. Despite the fact that we do not know enough about the effects of future climate change on the likelihood of violent conflict, a connection between the two can arguably be said to be framed in political debates and statements, by traditional security actors, non-traditional security actors and environmental groups.

The research questions of this thesis are:

- How did the security framing of climate change come about?
- Is the connection between climate change and security valid?
- Is the security framing of climate change useful as an environmentalists’ motivational strategy?

The difficulty with the challenges of environmental changes is that behaviour needs to be influenced, as Susanne Moser (2010:38) puts it, “not just situationally but fundamentally”. Understandably, one’s attitude to the urgency of climate change depends on its perceived consequences on the economy, our way of life, security and other values. Indeed, it should be acknowledged that framing issues in order to appeal to people’s emotions is important. However, political activism with the pursuit of fundamentally changing people’s behaviour should also be grounded in and informed by scientific knowledge – as activists like Susan George and others would say: a good activist is an informed activist. Emphasizing potential “climate wars” and “resource conflicts” can be viewed as uninformed activism which may do little more than legitimize the existence of the activists. The sustainability cause needs convincing actors, and even though climate change is difficult to convey to the general public (especially those not directly affected), it is important and just to explain scientific facts as they are, also if they are lacking, not as they would be sensationalized in any Hollywood blockbuster. It is also important to bear in mind what Fischhoff (in Maibach and Priest 2009:300) says about communicating the science of climate change: “[C]limate scientists should not compromise their credibility by resorting to public advocacy, as it “runs the risk of winning battles over what science says, while losing the war over what science is”. Instigating public discussion may be more important than engineering public opinion.”

---

6 Science-fiction-movies like “Wall-E”, “The Day After Tomorrow” and “Avatar”, despite their insufficient scientific basis, are appealing to people as illustrated by their huge popular and economic successes (Persson 2010). Actualization of an “action-movie” genre to perceive the future consequences of climate change can create an understanding which opens up for certain forms of rhetoric, policy and military action (Kjeldsen 2006).
1.3 Methodological Approach

This is a qualitative exploratory study based on academic and popular literature, peer reviewed articles and books, complemented with a few quotations from informal conversations, and organized according to the framing method. Framing is the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization or reorient their thinking of an issue, for example climate change (Chong and Druckman 2007). A standard definition of framing is “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (Entman 2004:5). In the analysis I follow the steps suggested by Dennis Chong and James Druckman (2007:106) for identifying frames in communication. These steps are:

a. Identify issue: Climate change being seen as a security threat

b. Isolate arguments/attitudes: Why climate change is seen a security threat

c. Identify initial set of frames: Security threat framing of climate change

d. Select source of analysis: The Nobel Committee Presentation Speech in 2007

(a) In identifying issues depicting climate change as being of security concern the thesis take an interdisciplinary approach and goes through relevant literature from several fields. Reference is drawn from security studies, peace studies, environmental studies, communication studies and behaviour science. (b) Three attitudes found present in the literature are classified as Causal, Definitional and Instrumental. They emphasize different aspects of the debate, while not mutually exclusive as they do build on each other. After isolating these arguments, (c) a “security threat” frame is identified and then exemplified by a present framing of the climate change/security connection. Instead of selecting a typical mass media source, (d) I look at the presentation speech by the Norwegian Nobel Committee from 2007 as a unit of framing analysis, to understand the efficiency of message framing in communicating with the general public and decision makers the urgency of climate change (Reber and Berger 2005). The Nobel Peace Prize is one of the world’s most prestigious prizes, every year drawing massive publicity and attention worldwide. Instead of formal coding of the short speech I have chosen to discuss it in detail and look at its’ references, not with the intention to criticise the work of the laureates in 2007, but to analyse and identify attitudes that can be traced to a security threat-framing of climate change.

I acknowledge that a social researcher always provide her own interpretation of the text that is analysed (Bryman 2008). Atkinson and Coffey (in Bryman 2008:527) argue that a document should not be taken to be a representation of an underlying organizational or social reality; being “written with distinctive purposes in mind, and not as simple reflecting reality”. However, I find the annual presentation speech to be what Bryman (2008) calls a “window” onto the reality of the Nobel Peace Prize Committee, since this is one of two occasions a year (the other being the prior announcement of the winners) when they present their intentions and argumentation to the general public. Two
other documents from the same year are seen as forming part of the context and background to the Nobel speech; a CNA Corporation report (2007) and a hearing in the UN Security Council (2007). By referring to these documents the Nobel speech is seen as linked to them, forming an interconnectedness of documents (Atkinson and Coffey in Bryman 2008).

1.4 Limitations

There are two important aspects which I have chosen to disregard in the discussion and analysis sections of this thesis: The environmental impact of military activity and war, and the role of media in framing climate change. Military activity does not only represent a possible redirection in focus and resources away from environmental tasks but is also a major environmental degrader and polluter. Ecological destruction has also intentionally been used as means of warfare, as described by Westing (1989), and “greening” of military efforts are important (Elliott 2004). However, while I recognize these aspects, they are not taken into special consideration7. I acknowledge that the military may have an important role in both preventing and handling the effects of climate change, but, I consent with Richard Matthew (1999b:296) that, “the general project of negotiating a more satisfactory relationship between nature and civilization requires more than simply the greening of traditional categories of behaviour.” Likewise, it is not sufficient to “green” the military efforts to address their affects on climate change.

The global media, which broadcasts certain aspects while leaving out others, are critical in the processes of social construction (Carvalho 2007; Cottle 2009). Media visualizations and dramatization of certain issues, like climate change as a “global crisis”, affects framing, communication, legitimation, mobilization and political action; “they also help to constitute them, and in so doing, can powerfully shape their course and conduct” (Cottle 2009:508). I have chosen not to consider the role of news media here, but acknowledge its’ importance as the media are central arenas and play parts in shaping public and political opinions. This not only by determining what is selected as news but also by representing climate change and scientific knowledge according to their news value with the goal of attracting readers (Carvalho 2007). An exploration of the role of the global media would be complementary to this thesis however I have chosen to look at an authoritative institution, the Nobel Peace Prize, as an important opinion maker and not a diffused, broadcasted message but the speech text itself.

7 For more on the environmental impacts of war I give reference to a LUMES-thesis from 2007 by Nicoletta Tranquillo: “Green Casualties of War. The need for international protection of the environment during armed conflicts and the case of the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006”, available at www.lumes.lu.se
1.5 Two key definitions

1.5.1 Climate change

*Environmental change*, including *decline, stress and degradation* are in this thesis understood as the processes by which life-sustaining, interdependent functions of the biosphere and our planet are altered (Barnett 2001:14), often to a non-reversible extent. *Climate change* is seen as a part of environmental changes, created dominantly by human activity and emissions of greenhouse gasses into the atmosphere which increases the global temperature; making it warmer in some areas, while colder in others. Climate change has many definitions and it means different things to different people as it has come understood beyond merely natural sciences (Hulme 2009). Pettenger (2007:4) argues that “the perceived material reality of climate change is defined in social settings by scientists and policymakers.”

The research on environmental degradation in connection to security implications has a longer tradition than the more recentness of contemporary climate change would suggest. Even though the initial studies were concerned with environmental degradation, not addressing climate change specifically, they still referred to changes, such as resource scarcity which I see corresponding to the current impacts exacerbated by climate change and factors exacerbated by climate change. Thomas Homer-Dixon (2007) for example, uses his earlier empirical research on environmental degradation having a connection to conflict to argue for climate change constituting the same threat in 2007.

1.5.2 Security

The definition of security has been changing with time (Floyd 2008). However, whether individual, national, or international, security ranks prominently among the problems facing humanity (Buzan 1991). Jon Barnett (2001:23) finds that historically, “the concept of security has been concerned with safety, certainty and, by implication, maintenance of the status quo.” Security can be approached both objectively; there is a *real* threat, and subjectively; there is a *perceived* threat (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). The construction of security is thus present: “[I]t is not (only) the actual severity of (these) impacts that decides whether or not they become security issues, but rather if they are treated as such within a political discourse” (Stripple 2002:120).

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:21) make a distinction between international security; firmly rooted in the traditions of power politics, and social security, which is more connected to entitlement and social justice. International security has a distinctive agenda: Security is about survival which justifies the use of extraordinary means to handle existential threats. Usually, the traditional Realist understanding of security considers “threats” to state and national interest as the mere reason for security concern (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). More inclusive understandings of security have moved beyond merely the security of the existence of state to include security of the individual and society, thus combining several levels of security. However, this thesis focuses on *national security* as I see this understanding still central since states dominate
many of the conditions that determine security at both the individual and international levels. Furthermore, according to Daniel Deudney (1999:188) there is “a natural tendency for people to think about environmental problems in terms of national security” due to the hegemony of the nation-state and interstate conflicts in world politics and international relations theory.

1.6 The structure

This thesis starts with a presentation and discussion of the research that has been done on the connection between environmental change (later been applied also to climate change), and conflict and security. As the next step in the framing method, chapter 2 single out three attitudes concerning the debate, divided into causal, definitional and instrumental arguments, to look at why climate change is seen as a security concern. In chapter 3 the “security threat” framing of climate change is identified as particularly problematic. The Nobel Peace Prize Presentation Speech from 2007 is selected as the source of framing analysis to look at the presence of a security framing of climate change in practice and its consequences in chapter 4. An appraisal of overall security framing is discussed in chapter 5, while the last chapter suggests alternative frames of how to understand climate change and how to motivate for sustainability.

---

8 Climate change may undermine human security which can increase the risk of violent conflict; “Yet environmental change rarely undermines human security in isolation from a broader range of social factors” (Barnett and Adger 2005:3). When actors talk of “conflict” and “security” I see an immediate connection to the question of national security as opposed to human security (Beebe and Kaldor 2010).
2 The Climate Change/Security Connection

2007 was the year when concerns about the security implications of climate change surfaced in many international authoritative institutions: the United Nations Security Council (UNSC 2007) addressed for the first time climate change in connection to conflict and security; eleven retired US Generals published a report on "National Security and the Threat of Climate Change" (CNA Corporation 2007) which received wide attention - even from the anti-environmentalist Bush administration (Dalby 2009). It was also in 2007 that the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and former US vice-president Al Gore for their work on raising international awareness and knowledge about the dangers of global warming. This chapter critically analyses the literature basis for the climate change/security connection which became prominent in 2007. It isolates attitudes for why environmental change, and later climate change, is being considered as a security threat.

2.1 Classification of arguments

There are many reasons why environmental change could be linked to security. I have chosen to classify the arguments as causal, definitional and instrumental, shown in figure 1 on page 9. These arguments are not mutually exclusive and do overlap. The purpose here is not to come up with a particular typology for further research but to guide the reader through the arguments which will be central in the later discussion of the consequences of framing climate change as a security threat.

The notion that conflict, both within and between states, is a possible or even a likely outcome of environmental degradation lies at the basis of linking environment with security (Barnett 2001; Elliott 1996). This causality is perceived by some as significant. I see the causal attitudes going back to Malthus and social-Darwinism, and therefore place the definitional and instrumental arguments as building upon the premise of the causal argument (while for example Rønnefeldt (1997) would place the definitional first chronologically). The definitional arguments are concerned with what security is or should be, and see environmental threats to present an opportunity to re-examine the definition of (national) security. This was especially prominent after the end of the Cold War when the block system of USSR and USA broke down (Floyd 2008). This definitional debate and broadening of the security concept has been instrumental for national security establishments through definition, as an argument for continuation of "old means to new challenges" (Kaldor 2006). On the other hand, the instrumental arguments described in this thesis focus on how the linkages
between climate change, conflict and security can be instrumental for environmentalists to motivate people and policy makers to address climate change, in what Deudney (1999:194) calls a “motivational strategy”.

**Figure 1** - Overview of arguments for linking environmental change and security

### 2.2 Causal arguments

The causal connections between environmental change and violent conflict are emphasized and most elaborated on in this chapter because, as argued in the previous section, this causality gives the background for the definitional and instrumental arguments. An understanding of causality between the effects of environmental change and violent conflict is found among those who argue that when the severity of environmental stress increases so does conflicts (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999; Myers 1986). Often one looks at how instability and insecurity brought about by environmental degradation increases the likelihood of conflicts relating to environmental variables. Scarcities of water, arable land and other resources due to overexploitation, and increased pressure by migrating populations are examples of the broad trends of instability and insecurity associated with the likelihood of environmentally induced conflicts (Barnett 2001; Myers 1986).

#### 2.2.1 Conflicts over scarce resources

Malthus’ over-population hypothesis\(^9\) from the late 1700s continues to nourish the perspective that competition for (scarce) resources can escalate into (violent) conflicts and/or continued environmental degradation (Dalby 2009; Urdal 2008). Malthus saw tension between population and resources as “a major cause of misery for much of humanity” (in Johnston et al. 2000:470).

---

\(^9\) *The Malthusian model*: Economist Thomas R. Malthus wrote an essay in 1798 on the principle of population, an economic approach to demography: Unless controlled and checked, population tended increase at a geometric rate (i.e. 1, 2, 4, 8, 16 ...) while means of subsistence increased at an arithmetic rate (1, 2, 3, 4, 5 ...) (Johnston et al. 2000:470). What follows is a “competitive ontology” (Lipschutz 2004:42).
Most studies highlighting the causal links between environmental change and conflict refer to neo-Malthusian grievance. It can for example be found among the more contemporary and popular writers like Jared Diamond (2005) and his theory of “collapse”; on how societies, like those historically present on Easter Island in the Pacific ocean, “failed” due to the over-extraction of natural resources available to them. Benjaminsen (2008) argues that popular writes like Diamond have been instrumental in spreading the scarcity-message to politicians and the public.

On the theoretical grounds, a research team from Toronto University lead by Thomas Homer-Dixon (1991, 1994), the Toronto school, has been among the most prominent in providing empirical examples of scarcity induced conflicts in developing regions of the world. Their work is often referenced when presenting the causal arguments for a connection between environmental problems and conflicts (Dalby 2010; Floyd 2008; Gleditsch and Nordås 2009; Stripple 2002). In the Toronto school’s case studies from the 1990s, the focus was on whether environmental scarcity would cause conflict, and, if that was the case, how it would operate (Homer-Dixon 1994). The main sources of environmental scarcity were identified to be environmental degradation, population growth and unequal resource distribution, as shown in figure 2 below.

![Figure 2 - Casual arguments based on Homer-Dixon (1994, 1999)](image)

The Toronto school concluded that environmental scarcity did cause violent conflict, and that the found cases in poor countries of the world probably were early signs of scarcity induced or aggravated violence which there would be more of in the future (Homer-Dixon 1991, 1994, 1999; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). However, they did not argue for interstate simple-scarcity conflicts and resource wars, and acknowledged that also resource abundance could cause violent conflict.

---

10 Similar attitudes of zero-sum struggles for survival are found in books such as Michael Klare’s “Resource Wars” (2001) and Gwynne Dyer’s “Climate Wars” (2008).

11 The referred to as Swiss Peace Foundation and Günther Baechler have been influential in driving the debate (see Benjaminsen 2008). However, here I focus on Homer-Dixon and the Toronto school as found most often in the literature.
Only environmental scarcity in interaction with other economic, social and political factors could generate conflict and instability (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998).

Economic deprivation caused by environmental scarcity may cause civil strife, lowering the adaptation capacity of some societies and weakening the state capacity (Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). These effects increase the risk of creating fragmented or possibly more authoritarian regimes. The latter could become a source of large out-migration while the former could lead to launching attacks against neighbouring countries to divert attention away from internal problems (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999; Homer-Dixon and Blitt 1998). Either outcome could seriously disrupt international and national security: “If a number of developing countries evolve in this direction, they could eventually threaten the military and economic interests of rich countries” (Homer-Dixon 1999:84). This attitude is more recently also found in writings of for example the EU (Solana 2008) and the CNA Corporation (2007) which will be discussed later.

Even though the Toronto school did not find empirical evidence to support a hypothesis of simple-scarcity conflicts between states, they did suggest that the renewable resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource wars was river water (Homer-Dixon 1994, 1999), referring to Peter Gleick (1993). Gleick argued that water had a long history of being both an objective and an instrument of violent conflict, and that competition over limited water supplies would result due to population growth and climate changes. This would represent a particular troublesome geopolitical reality in areas where two or more countries share water resources, whether it be rivers, lakes or ground-water aquifers. Negotiations and non-violent resolutions were possible, but Gleick (1993:80) suggested that certain regions are more prone to see water issues as “high politics” which increases the likelihood for violence, due to the increasing importance of water for economic and agricultural development, seen for example in the Middle East.

Recent studies by Henrik Urdal (2008) on population, resources and political violence in India, found support of a resource scarcity perspective that fulfils some of Homer-Dixon’s expectations (see figure 2, page 10), but no or little relationship between unequal distribution and armed conflict. His main conclusion is that disaggregated studies best capture a possible resource scarcity perspective than cross-national case studies. Local knowledge and context specificity is thus important when proclaiming the resource scarcity connection to violent conflict.

The Toronto school’s immediate concern did not include atmospheric changes such as global warming and climate change, which they saw mainly interacting with already existing scarcities. In more recent years Homer-Dixon (2007) has stated his perceived linkage between environment and conflict, repeating some of the causal arguments from the 1990s, however, now also linking them to climate change: “Climate change will help produce the kind of military challenges that are difficult for today’s conventional forces to handle: insurgencies, genocide, guerrilla attacks, gang warfare and global terrorism.”
2.2.2 Migration leading to conflict

Migration\textsuperscript{12} often has initial associations with negative phenomena, and research on the linkage between migration and security concerns often have the premise that migration presents a potential danger to security (Glebova 2008). Homer-Dixon (1994) also identified population movement as an effect of environmental scarcity, which in turn could cause conflicts: for example, in the Ganges delta, the mass emigration of Bangladeshi people to North East India, in response to population pressure on the land, had caused group-identity conflicts and social changes in the receiving Indian communities. While Homer-Dixon (1994:23) mentioned that special inheritance practices, limiting water regulations, higher living standard in India compared to Bangladesh, absent local understanding of the nation-state concept and the colonial history in the region as important conceptual factors, he argued that “they cannot obscure the fact that land scarcity in Bangladesh, arising largely from population growth, has been a powerful force behind migration to neighbouring regions and communal conflict there.” This is largely a neo-Malthusian attitude.

Norman Myers (1986, 2002) has argued that if a nation’s environmental foundations are depleted, the outcome is likely to be conflict: In 1986 he wrote about the emerging phenomenon of “environmental refugees”\textsuperscript{13} who have had to flee their homelands on a semi-permanent if not permanent basis due to declining means of livelihood caused by environmental degradation. Even though the immediate cause of migration may be military violence, Myers claimed that the underlying cause was the environmental degradation of the local resource base. In a report from 1995, 200 million people are predicted to be put at risk of displacement due to sea-level rise and flooding of coastal communities, together with failed agricultural output due to degradation of the arable land (Myers and Kent 1995:1). These numbers are alleged to be conservative estimates.

2.3 Critique of the deterministic causal connection

While the empirical studies by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto school may be seen as early pioneers in this discourse, the scarcity-competition-conflict hypothesis came under critique in the mid-1990s and onwards (Schubert et al. 2008). There are four main points of critique of the causal attitudes concerning (i) the scientific evidence; (ii) the selection of case studies; (iii) the use of the term ‘scarcity’; and (iv) the sensationalizing of migration estimations:

\textit{i. Empirical evidence}

“There is little if any evidence to suggest that environmental problems do cause violent conflict; instead what is presented are theories that have intuitive appeal but empirically fail to convince” (Barnett 2001:50).

\textsuperscript{12}“Permanent or semi-permanent change of residence by an individual or group of people” (Johnston, et al. 2000:504).

\textsuperscript{13}Myers (2002:609) define “environmental refugees” as “people who can no longer gain a secure livelihood in their homelands because of drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation and other environmental problems, together with the associated problems of population pressures and profound poverty.”
Nils Petter Gleditsch of the Oslo Group’s quantitative studies, and Jon Barnett among others, see the empirical foundation for a general relationship between scarcity and conflict as indicative at best; evidences of environmental- and climate change leading to massive hazards to peace and security in the future remains vague (Barnett 2001, 2003; Benjaminsen 2008; Buhaug 2010; Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008; Gleditsch and Nordås 2009; Nordås and Gleditsch 2007). Military conflicts involving resources are not necessarily a struggle over resources (Elliott 2004).

The Oslo group’s models strengthen the weighting of political, economic and cultural variables in their models compared to the Toronto school (Hauge and Ellingsen 1998). They argue that all of the processes associated with global warming have occurred during a time when there has been a dramatic reduction in the frequency and severity of armed conflict according to their statistical argument (Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008).

In recent studies, Clionadh Raleigh (2010) indicates that while environmental problems can be catalysts for low-level conflicts, the critical factor is the extent of political and economic marginalization. In the case of African Sahel, Raleigh emphasizes political exclusion due to uneven representation and interests across time; Adaptive capacity of for example the Masai in Kenya are limited and inhibited by forces beyond their control. Raleigh (2010:76) further suggests that peripheral rural areas are last on the “political weight” as being perceived as less threatening to central government. Amsale Temesgen (2010:52) concludes in her report on Southern Ethiopia and Northern Kenya that “deterioration in the climate and environment alone does not lead to conflict, as local populations have learned to adapt to their environments.” Pastoralists do know how to handle a harsh climate, but when coupled with outside influences from for example the central government and private entrepreneurs, their traditional institutions and crucial coping strategies are weakened and conflicts become more likely.

### ii. Methods

On more methodological grounds Homer-Dixon’s research is criticized for choosing case studies in areas where both environmental decay and violent conflict already were occurring. Gleditsch (2010) as well as Benjaminsen (2008) stress the need for empirical studies in areas with no current violent struggle if one is to understand the possible linkages between environment and conflict.

The problem with the competition-conflict hypothesis is that despite weak scientific grounding it has initial, intuitive appeal to many Realists (Lipschutz 2004)\(^\text{14}\). For instance, the conflict in Darfur has been stated as one of the first climate change conflicts by General Secretary of the UN, Ban Kimoon (2007) who sees drought and scarcity of arable land and water as root causes of the conflict: The dilemma is “the fact that there’s no longer enough good land to go around”. On the other hand, Alex de Waal (2007) argues that while the hypothesis of climate change leading to conflict is sufficiently plausible to be attractive, it has not been proven in the case of Darfur. He claims Ban Kimoon’s explanation is too simplistic and insufficient to explain the complex picture of Darfur and Sudan. Also Urdal and Gleditsch (2010) warns that single case examples can easily give a simplistic understanding.

---

\(^{14}\) The Realist school of International Relations (see footnote 5, page 2).
iii. Scarcities?

A more fundamental point of critique, which existed even before Homer-Dixon’s research, is the very use of “scarcities” as “scarcity of natural resources cannot be regarded simply as a special feature of nature” (Brock 1991:410-411). Like Amartya Sen (2001), Brock argues that “there is no scarcity as such: It exists only in specific political, socio-economic and cultural contexts.”

Ullman (1983) had early on stressed that one should distinguish between scarcities that arise from expansion of demand and those arising from restrictions on supply. Even the Toronto school with their focus on environmental scarcities recognizes that “resource scarcity is, in part, subjective”, determined by preferences and not just absolute physical limits (Homer-Dixon 1994:9). Some thus advocate a resource-optimistic view in which increased pressure on resources may lead to more innovation and implementation of new technology which makes resource scarcity and dependence less likely (Simon 1989; Lomborg 2001 in Urdal 2008). On the other hand, Urdal (2008:610) argues that “the relationship between scarcity and conflict is highly conditional on the governance of natural resources.”

iv. Rural-to-urban migration

The migration estimates by Myers of over 200 million climate refugees by 2050, even although debatable in itself, does not have to be that severe according to Urdal and Gleditsch (2010), as already in the next ten years a similar amount of people will migrate from rural areas to cities all over the world. Urdal and Gleditsch (2010) see urbanization as representing larger movements of people. They also consider climate refugees to move slower due to slower environmental changes, which mean they do not necessarily constitute future security threats. It is also found in migration research that migrants rarely move far away from origin (Johnston, et al. 2000).

This section has shown that a causal relationship between environmental change and conflict is far from certain; a deterministic connection cannot be held as a fact or be used as a basis for policy making, if policy is to be grounded in reality. The construction of security issues arising from climate change may facilitate control by powerful actors (Bryant 1998), without the intention to address climate change seriously. To understand climate change as a security issue due to its potential to multiply threats is problematic because it is not necessarily true. A focus on the likelihood of violent conflicts may be misleading: It can redirect resources, money and attention away from addressing climate change directly, and instead strengthen the defence and national security capacities to only react to possible violent consequences. There is thus a risk of climate induced conflicts becoming a self-fulfilling prophesy.

---

15 Benjaminsen (2008:819) questions the whole use of the term “environmental scarcity” as resources can be scarce, but perhaps not environments?
2.4 Definitional arguments: Redefining (national) security

The definitional attitudes are concerned with what security is or ought to be. This section is called “definitional” as the conceptual debate was about broadening the definition of security. Keeping this in mind, the definitional arguments have functioned as instruments for national security establishments, in particular after the end of the Cold War, searching for “a new raison d’être” through a broadening of security concerns, thus the continued use of security means (Buckland 2007:2; Floyd 2008).

However, the definitional debate started as a critique of traditional and narrow definition of security; towards a more comprehensive security to include non-military areas (Schubert, et al. 2008). Rønnfeldt (1997) early described this as the “first generation” of environment and security research. This was primary a Realist agenda considering how environmental factors might present threats to national security or lead to violent conflict and war (Elliott 1996). In the late 1970s, Lester Brown (1978:15) wrote about the need to redefine national security as “present-day threats to national security may arise less from the relationship of nation to nation and more from the relationship of man to nature.” He saw ecological stresses translate into economic stresses and ultimately lead to social unrest and political instability. Brown concluded that governments would be forced into changing their priorities to protect their national security.

A later benchmark for this first generation was Richard Ullman’s (1983) “Redefining Security” concerned with the need to integrate environmental factors into the concept of security (Rønnfeldt 1997). Ullman (1983:129) found that defining national security merely or even primarily in military terms conveyed “a profoundly false image of reality”. He wanted to broaden and redefine national security to also include non-military threats like resource scarcity and migration into the national security thinking. Some year later, Norman Myers (1986:251) suggested that environmental factors should be ranked as crucial to a nation’s security as military approaches, stressing a need to “move beyond traditional thinking about security concepts, and to incorporate an environmental dimension.” The opposition of broadening the security concept came from more conservative sections of security studies who argued that a broadening of the definition would undermine the security concept and the integrity of security studies (Floyd 2008; Rønnfeldt 1997).

2.4.1 Security threat vacuum after the Cold War

In the late 1980s came the end of the Cold War which meant a need for rethinking world politics as the threats within the block-system were gone. This presented an opportunity to reconsider the whole concept of national security and to include environmental changes as potential threats (Floyd 2008; Matthew 1999a). This had instrumental effects as military organizations saw environmental missions as possible means to maintain their significance and financial support (Deudney 1999). Matthew (1999a) had earlier questioned whether the urgent and dramatic attitudes to an extent was fuelled by post-Cold War concerns about cuts in military and defence spending, maybe especially in the USA.
Many of the definitional attitudes did not come from academic sources: The former member of the U.S. National Security Council, Jessica T. Mathews’ article “Redefining Security” from 1989 (in Matthews 1999a) became widely cited. She endorsed a broadening of the national security definition to include resource, environmental and demographic issues in an interdependent and global understanding of environmental security. Her advocacy was of multilateral solutions away from the conventional unilateral conception of the need to protect national interests.

Five years later, with maybe opposite appeals, Robert Kaplan wrote an essay in the Atlantic Monthly called “The Coming of Anarchy” (Dalby 2009; Kaldor 2006; Matthew 1999a). Kaplan had looked to Malthus writings from the late 1700s for inspiration to what was to be the new security challenges in the post-Cold War world and found “environmental fears” (in Dalby 2009:25) to be a significant threat. His scenarios for the future were more apocalyptic than Mathews, describing displacement of populations, violence and conflicts related to widespread environmental degradation. This also presented dangers in the North due to spillovers and migration from the South. Kaplan was arguing that the environment needed to be understood as “the National security issue of the 21st century” (in Dalby 2009:25; Deudney 1999:189). Kaldor (2006) finds Kaplan’s scenario of a world where civil order has broken down as essentially deterministic, and Urdal (2008) see him of clearly overstating the significance of population and environmental factors. However, his essay in 1994 became very influential and instrumental, also reaching the political establishment in Washington D.C. (Dalby 2009).

Daniel Deudney (1990) was early opposed to the linking of climate change and security on the basis that traditional threats to national security, like interstate violence, were not analytically comparable to environmental threats or solutions. This not only because Deudney (1999:189-190) found it unlikely that environmental degradation would cause interstate wars, but also because he claimed that the effort to appeal to “the emotive power of nationalism to help mobilize environmental awareness and action may prove counterproductive by undermining globalist political sensibility.”

Maria Trombetta (2008:588) suggests, that the word security is a form of rationality; “a way of framing and dealing with an issue”, as it entails a specific logic “independent of the context or the intentions of the speakers.” According to for example Brock (1991) the term “environmental security” can lead to either a militarization of environmental politics or a demilitarization of security thinking. Militarization is when environmental threats are added on to a traditional geopolitical and national security agenda, while demilitarization is when environmental degradation is to be taken at least as seriously as traditional military threats, like organized violence (Elliott 1996:202).
The definitional attitudes (see figure 3 above) show that there is a debate on what security is and what can be considered as security threats. While this is an important debate which can broaden security to include considerations of not just national- and international-, but also individual security, it can also work as a justification for those who want to be able to continue using the same means as always or to legitimize the employment of extraordinary, military measures.

2.5 Instrumental arguments

While the definitional arguments can work instrumentally for the military and security organizations, the instrumental arguments in this section address how environmental activists can promote the perceived connection between climate change and conflict as a mean to motivate people and policy makers to address climate change. While one aim of redefining national security may be to analyse or understand the world better, Deudney (1999:194-195) early pointed out that another aim may be to persuade, motivate and inspire action since national security is taken seriously and people are willing to sacrifice even parts of their freedom to maintain it: “Despite the great differences between the issues of traditional national security and the environment, some environmentalists want to conflate or link them as part of a motivational strategy” (emphasis added). Establishing the term “environmental security” can thus be seen as a rhetorical and psychological strategy to redirect attention and efforts from the defence and military sectors towards addressing environmental concerns (Deudney 1999).

Some advocates of the environmental movement feel that “the message” is so obvious that it is only needed to be given for it to be acted upon, writes Andrew Dobson (2007): Its universal appeal is seen as implicit because environmental degradation and the social dislocation that follows are everybody's problem and therefore ought to be everybody's concern. However, this message is not simply obvious to all as it is difficult to realize universal problems as one’s own. Thus pointing to a linkage between climate change and its security implications can potentially be useful to get environment issues wide public attention and “universal appeal”:
There is little scientific dispute that if we do nothing, we will face more drought, more famine, more mass displacement – all of which will fuel more conflict for decades. For this reason, it is not merely scientists and environmental activists who call for swift and forceful action – it is military leaders in my own country and others who understand our common security hangs in the balance. (Obama 2009)

The environmental movement can see it as a victory in itself if prestigious circles mention environmental change as an issue of utmost importance, like Barack Obama did in his Nobel lecture in 2009. Presenting climate change as a security threat can be considered as a clever move to serve the environmental agenda as it invokes certain initial thoughts, with implicit urgency and severity attached. Arguments of the importance of environmental security may be seen as an opportunity to catch the attention of so-called climate sceptics, maybe especially in the USA: for example, journalist Bryan Walsh in Time Magazine tries to appeal to everyone by arguing that “to have a stronger America you need a greener America.” If military circles care, then the population will follow?

![Figure 4 - Overview of the instrumental arguments](image)

### 2.5.1 “Security first”?

Today, Geoffrey Dabelko argues that climate change and security has become a “hot topic”, but with too much focus on the perceived link between climate change and conflict. In the beginning “environmental security” seemed to be a good idea to environmentalists, as it increased the relevance and priority of environmental problems in international relations and also broadened the focus of traditional security analysts to consider values besides the ones of the nation state (Trombetta 2008). However, it is important to make a distinction between broadening the understanding of national security to include threats posed by environmental changes as any other traditional military challenge or as an equally important one (not necessarily within a traditional security approach). It may not be so easily distinguished in practice. Environmentalists may argue

---


“that one cannot solve the problems with the same means that created them”, as Einstein once said, while also argue for climate change to be considered as important as for example terrorism. This last argument may have an unintended effect of helping to justify for example militarization and the use of “old approaches” to the “new challenges” of climate change (Elliott 1996:202). Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) warn about militarization and securitization which they see as examples of failed politics. They argue for desecuritization as to address issues within the realm of normal (democratic) politics.

In the GEO4 Outlook, the UN Environmental Program (UNEP 2007:432) points to risks and opportunities in the future through four scenarios which promote Market-, Policy-, Security- and Sustainability. The “Security First” scenario, as shown in figure 5 below, scores high on “Securing access to and maintaining natural resource assets” and “Investing in technology for adaptation” but less on for example opportunities of “Building and bridging knowledge to enhance coping capacity” and “Integrating governance across levels and sectors” (UNEP 2007:434). The “Security First” scenario overshadows other values compared to “Sustainability First”, and predictions for 2050 shows large negative differences between these two scenarios (see UNEP 2007, pages 444-463). The scenarios by UNEP show that the pursuit of sustainability is best achieved when not prioritising security first.

Figure 5 - “Security First” compared to “Sustainability First” (UNEP 2007:434, modified from figure 9.1)
This section has revealed that environmentalists’ motivational strategy can work counterproductively to the environmental cause as environmental security can be understood and acted upon differently by different actors. If it is the apocalyptic aspects of security that some environmental activists find instrumental, it may be useful to remember what Richard Falk (1971, in Barnett 2001:37) wrote long time ago: “The great danger of an apocalyptic argument is that to the extent that it persuades, it also immobilizes.” Intentional mobilization to address climate change can actually immobilize.

It becomes problematic when environmentalists find the deterministic causality between climate change and conflict to security instrumentally useful as a motivational strategy and make use of it without concern to facts and reality. Scientific objectivity and validity matters, I argue, and at the same time the usefulness of this strategy can be questioned as I will come back to later in this thesis. Environmental movements should also consider the moral implications of using an argument that is not necessarily true.

2.6 Short sum-up

This chapter has discussed and argued against the linking of climate change and security on scientific and pragmatic grounds:

- The causal arguments section reveals that the perceived connection between environmental change/climate change and violent conflict is far from certain.

- The definitional arguments show that the conceptual debate of broadening the security concept can be instrumental for security establishments wishing to widen their influence and legitimacy.

- Last section argues that the instrumental arguments by environmentalists are not necessarily useful for the environmental agenda, as it may place security first, overshadowing sustainability opportunities.
3 The “Climate Change as a Security Threat” Frame

To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text. (Entman 1993:52)

After having identified the debate of connecting climate change with security and isolated three arguments for why this is, this chapter takes the third step in Chong and Druckman’s (2007) framing method of identifying initial frames.

According to Bryant (1998), environmental problems and crisis can be socially constructed; this is not to suggest that problems and crisis do not exist, but to highlight the political process of construction, selective identification and representation. The process of problem definition and resolution can in itself be considered as highly political acts which may or may not be grounded in scientific facts. Despite the lack of empirical evidence and an ongoing definitional debate on what security is or should be, the perceptions of environmental scarcity and potential migration being threat multipliers disturbing international security and peace are powerful threat constructions (Trombetta 2008). We make sense of events and issues through interpretive frames, as framing is the most basic process of managing meaning (Reber and Berger 2005). It is a process that evolves over time. A standard definition of framing is “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution” (Entman 2004:5).

Reber and Berger (2005) identify frames as playing strategic roles to for example mobilize action and influence perceptions and beliefs. Framing approaches can thus be attempted to define and construct climate change, highlighted as a security issue. This involves selecting a focus of climate change as a threat, representing it as a security issue, and making it salient by for example pointing to: the possibility of conflict and war (noticeable); the importance of the environment to human lives (meaningful); or historical events where humanity lost to nature as worst case possibilities (memorable) (Entman 1993). As a background to identify a security threat frame I have looked at the different arguments for connecting climate change with violent conflict and security in the previous chapter.
3.1 “Security threat” as an initial frame

A frame in communication “organizes everyday reality” by providing meaning and promoting a “particular definitions and interpretations of political issues” (Tuchman; Shah et al. in Chong and Druckman 2007:106). The causal, definitional and instrumental arguments as mentioned earlier can be said to form a shaky basis for understanding environmental change, and later also climate change, within a frame dominated by the notion of security and threats. Still this “security threat” framing occurs. To identify this frame I looked at various words that mark its presence: in the causal arguments it would be words like “conflict” and “scarcity”, while in the definitional arguments, “broadening” and “other threats”. “Security” and “threat” are obvious examples among the more instrumental arguments, where I also looked at words like “conflict (-multiplier)” and “crisis”. An example of this are the words used by Al Gore (2007) in his Nobel Lecture: “Now comes the threat of climate crisis – a threat that is real, rising, imminent, and universal.”

Climate change policy can be said to be constructed as a threat to security when for example stating that “our way of life” is not up for negotiation (Stripple 2002). Neil Adger (2010) writes that the reasons why climate change is considered a security issue is because mitigating greenhouse gas emissions threatens national economies and interests, and because the impacts of climate change will affect the availability and quality of ecosystem services upon which every economy in the world depends. He points out that framing climate change as a security threat can distorts decision making about climate change: security concerns about climate change have been framed in public and political debates as threats to nation states’ interests, economies and borders (traditional national security). On the other hand, some have seen the US withdrawal from the Kyoto process as indicative to a construction of climate policy as a question of American security, as American economy and “way of life” is considered “threatened” by attempts to limit the emission of greenhouse gases (Trombetta 2008).

3.2 The possibility of “securitization”

The theory of securitization was established by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde (1998), commonly referred to as the Copenhagen school of security studies. Securitization is a process of which an issue is constructed and presented as a security threat by a political community such as a state, where the explanation is accepted by the wider audience; the population. According to Rens van Munster (2009:5), “In the broadest sense, the concept of securitization implies that threats are not out there but constructed by social actors.” By securitising an issue it moves beyond the realm of “normal”, ”low” politics into “high” politics, which is not bound by democratic rules and decision-making procedures, thus raising the issue on the political agenda while also legitimizing various non-political means to deal with the issue (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998; Munster 2009; Trombetta 2008). The security problem is constructed with a specific agenda.
There is an important distinction to be made between calling something a security concern, and to securitize it. The former is how one understands the issue, as mentioned in the sections on definitional and instrumental arguments, while securitization moves an issue out of the realm of normal politics and opens up for the use of “extreme measures” to address it (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998). It legitimizes certain uses of power and thus is more than just drawing linkages between climate changes and conflict, or defining something as a security concern. It can be seen as an extreme result of understanding something a security threat. Securitization can be said to be a form of framing, thus dependent on the acceptance of the public/audience. Trombetta (2008:588) warns that the “security mindset”, once activated, is not up for negotiation: “[O]nce an issue is securitized the logic of security necessarily follows.”

Up to this point I have shown how there is no self-evident, not even a necessarily useful, connection to be drawn between climate changes and security, as agenda setting can come at certain costs: Pointing to possible security dimensions exemplifies how climate change potentially can affect also the wealthier countries of the world which may move emotions and attract attention to the environmental cause and raise climate change higher on the international political agenda. On the other hand, security concerns can also lead to possible securitization of climate change, thus moving it beyond normal politics and opening up for extreme measures and legitimize certain uses of power. A security threat frame can also be used as a “political escape” to avoid tackling difficult problems.

Despite this, climate change is still linked to conflict and security concerns through the effects of framing in communication: From laying in the periphery of international politics, climate change has become the issue on everyone’s lips maybe due to a successful transformation into a “new” issue of urgency trough “reframing” as a security threat (Chung and Druckman 2007:108). To identify this frame in communication as described in the methodological approach, this thesis has by now (a) identified climate change as being seen as a security issue; (b) isolated three arguments, and in this chapter (c) identified a “security threat” frame. This will be exemplified in the next chapter where (d) the Nobel Peace Prize Committee’s argumentation for giving the IPCC and Al Gore the Peace Prize in 2007 is selected as the unit of analysis, to explore how framing of climate change as a security issue has happened in practice.
4 Security Threat Framing: The Nobel Committee Example

In its awards to Wangari Maathai in 2004 and to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore in 2007, the Nobel Committee has indicated that its concept of peace now also embraces efforts to limit the harm done by man-made climate change and threats to the environment.18

The Nobel Peace Prize may be said to be one of the world’s most prestigious prizes. From being part of the will of Alfred Nobel, the Peace Prize has surpassed the other Nobel prizes in popularity, and the hand-out in Oslo each year receives massive international publicity. The Nobel Committee operate with a wide understanding of peace. This has been criticized by for example Urdal and Gleditsch (2010) who question how much the concept of peace can handle before becoming too diluted and suggest a new ”Nobel Environmental Prize”. I have chosen to focus on the arguments used in 2007 when appointing the Peace Prize to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and former US Vice-president Al Gore, considering the framing of climate change as a “security threat”19.

In the announcement on 12 October 2007 the Nobel Committee expressed their concern about the future of the earth and the need for having a precautionary principle in mind (Nobel Committee 2007a)20. By awarding the IPCC and Al Gore they hoped to raise the urgency of protecting the future climate, and to sharpen the focus on the decisions that need to be made in order to reduce the threat to the security of humankind. How does the Nobel Committee succeed or fail at creating a salient message? By going through the presentation speech given by the Chairman, Professor Ole Danbolt Mjøs at the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony on December 10, 2007 (2007b)(to read the complete speech see Appendix I, page iv). I want to identify a presence of a security frame to climate change. My hypothesis is that the announcement of the Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore has contributed to legitimize a connection between climate change and conflict; establishment of truth and a security threat frame of climate change.

---

19 The Peace Prize in 2007 was more explicitly linked to a connection of climate change and conflict than in 2004 when Wangari Maathai from Kenya was the first to get the Peace Prize for environmental work (her pursuit of sustainable development): http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2004/ (Accessed 25 April 2011)
20 See the announcement by Mjøs from 2007: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=82RFtLcLDSQ (Accessed 15 May 2011)
4.1 The presentation speech rhetoric

Claim, ground and warrant are common and often crucial terms in rhetoric theory on practical argumentation and useful for evaluating an argument (Toulmin in Kjeldsen 2006:177). Early in the presentation speech, Mjøs establishes the legitimacy of the Nobel Committee by referring to the Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History, where the Nobel Peace Prize is described as the most prestigious prize in the world. This claim shows that Mjøs wants us to recognize that the Peace Prize is important. What follows is grounding of the Committee’s announcement in the present, stating that besides some controversy, “[t]his year’s award decision was not especially difficult. For it is rare for the world to be so concerned with a particular phenomenon or for that phenomenon to have such a decisive impact on our existence on earth. This year a great deal is hinging on global warming.”

This connection to a wider, world concern helps ground the Nobel Peace Prize announcement in a larger context of current importance: “this year it was planet earth that got the Peace Prize”. What follows is warrant information and examples of the severity of global warming and climate change; how climate-related issues are becoming more important on the political agenda with “the greatest credit for this development” to the IPCC and Al Gore. Following is a description of the Prize winners’ respectively scientific and communicative work.

For the argumentation to be rationally legitimate and effective it has to be based on certain general premises that the speaker share with the receiver (Kjeldsen 2006). Here the receiver has to acknowledge and agree with the severity of global warming, and/or the scientific knowledge and certainty of climate change. If not, the presentation speech does little more than convince the already convinced. It is therefore important that Mjøs emphasizes the grounding accuracy of the claim; what Toulmin calls a “qualifier” like the verb “presumable” (in Kjeldsen 2006:179). Mjøs pursues this after the presentation of the winners by securing the agreement with qualifier words and bringing up a central question (emphasis added):

There was for a long time great doubt about whether global warming was man-made. Thanks to the IPCC there is very little such doubt today. Then there are those who doubt that there is any connection between the environment and the climate on the one hand and war and conflict on the other. Why have the IPCC and Al Gore been awarded a Nobel Prize for peace?

He moves the question away from the polarized debate of whether global warming is happening or not, almost rejecting it and moves more into its details by bringing up the question of a connection between environmental and peace. Here references are made to two earlier laureates, Muhammad Yunus and Desmond Tutu, as well as to high political spheres, the UN Security Council and “a committee of prominent American military officers”. I will return to the two last ones later.
4.2 Connecting the environment with conflict, peace, and security

The Nobel Committee employs a broad understanding of peace, arguing “that there are many different paths to peace”. In the presentation speech Mjøs also claims that the Nobel Committee has in the past (rightfully?) established the connections between for example democracy and peace, and while in the beginning it was contested by scholars, now it is praised as among the most robust connections in modern political science. This seems to come as a justification for why the Peace Prize in 2007 is given to the IPCC and Al Gore: The Nobel Committee has a legacy of being ahead of scholars’ research and studies. Already when the first Peace Prize was given for environmental work in 2004, this argument and connection were implicitly referred to (Nobel Committee 2004).

To exemplify how “Environmental problems certainly affect human security in this broad sense”, the Nobel Committee show to millions of Bangladeshi refugees already are “creating social and political tensions in India”. This follows the arguments by Norman Myers presented in the early 1980s of migration leading to conflict. People in Bangladesh are forced to flee their low lying country as the Himalayan glaciers melt, creating floods and then droughts which cause “dramatic changes in people’s everyday lives” as these glacier rivers “supply half of the fresh water needed by 40 per cent of the world’s population”. Another example is how cities in South America also are affected by the melting glaciers in the Andes Mountains, and how desertification threatening vast land areas in China and Africa. Even though they also mention that some parts of the world may experience beneficial change due to global warming they conclude that “The overall effect is negative”, and that those already vulnerable in the south will bear the costs of a problem caused by the wealthy parts of the north.

Where the security threat frame becomes more apparent is when the Nobel Committee states that “Unfortunately we can already establish that global warming not only has negative consequences for "human security", but can also fuel violence and conflict within and between states.” Here the Committee make distinctions between different types of security, human security and more international security as they see conflict as a likely outcome of environmental degradation, which lies at the basis of linking environment with security. The Committee puts forward similar points to what I classified causal, definitional and instrumental arguments, arguing for example that new, edgy sovereignty claims can be made as the Arctic ice disappears, and that “climate wars” are already present in Darfur and large parts of the Sahel. Here the scarcity leading to competition and conflict, causal arguments by Homer-Dixon and the Toronto school are apparent. This last argument is very disputed due to lack of empirical evidence of climatic factors playing a major conflict in the Darfur conflict and as data from desertification conflicts are missing (Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008). Halvard Buhaug (2010) argues explicitly that climate is not to blame for African civil wars.

---

21 Urdal and Gleditsch (2010) criticise this claim that the Nobel Committee “discovered something the scientists didn’t see”; the thought of a connection between democracy and peace was formulated in political theory long before the Nobel Prize even existed.

22 In the presentation speech from 2004 the Nobel Committee “has evidently broadened its definition of peace still further. Environmental protection has become yet another path to peace.” They refer to resource scarcity, exemplifying with the conflict in Darfur (Nobel Committee 2004).
The Nobel Committee also expect different groupings of people will clash in to series of conflict between “nomads and peasants, Arabs and Africans, Christians and Muslims”, similar to the wording of Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clashes of civilization” (in Kaldor 2006). Desertification is presented as an increasingly obvious central underlying factor of the conflicts. Ole Mjøs concluded the speech by calling for immediate action as “Climate changes are already moving beyond human control.” This last quote calls for urgency, but also portrays climate change as a threat, something unstoppable. Opposing this one might say that humans have never been fully in control of nature, while we often perceive ourselves to be.

4.3 References to others: the CNA Corporation and the UNSC

While the Peace Prize in 2007 seems to result from the Norwegian Nobel Committee’s independent understanding of connections between climate change and violent conflict, the presentation speech do refer to two other supporting sources from April the same year to argue that they are not the only ones seeing interrelations between environment and conflict. The first is a report by the CNA Corporation and the second is a hearing on climate change in the UN Security Council.

On April 1st 2007 the Military Advisory Board of the CNA Corporation published a report on “National Security and the Threat of Climate change” with the purpose of informing US policymakers (CNA Corporation 2007). The eleven retired generals in the board were briefed by experts in several fields but also contributed with their “voice of experience”. In the report there are arguments about resource scarcity leading to stress, even collapse, and displacement and migration, followed by internal conflicts and possible extremism and authoritarianism. These arguments are similar to those reviewed in chapter 2. The report mentions the same geographic examples as used in the Nobel speech, for example the famine and conflict in Darfur and the Bangladesh flooding and the migration to India.

This study was primarily concerned with how global climate change can become a serious threat to US national security as it will disrupt the American “way of life” and act as a "a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world” (CNA Corporation 2007:6). While they mention that “Whether resource scarcity proves to be the impetus for peaceful cooperation or an instigator of conflict in the future remains to be seen” (CNA Corporation 2007:18), they however, emphasize the possibility of resource scarcity contributing to insecurity and instability, and regional fighting spreading. Tensions in Africa and Latin-America due to climate change will reach the USA, the EU and the wealthier, more stable parts of the world due to pressure to accept large numbers of refugees. Faced with uncertainty the Military Advisory Board argues for precautionary

---

23 For an interesting article on the robustness of the desertification narrative to for example explain violent conflicts in the African Sahel, see Tor A. Benjaminsen (2008).
24 “[T]he CNA Corporation, a non-profit national security analysis organization, convened a panel of retired senior military officers and national security experts and conducted an assessment of the national security implications of global climate change” (CNA Corporation 2007:9).
25 This sentence is also quoted in the Nobel presentation speech.
action; “we cannot wait for certainty”, and recommend that national security implications by climate change must be added to the US national security- and defence strategies (CNA Corporation 2007:18). This inclusion argument is similar to Norman Myers’ (1986) definitional argument of environmental threats being considered as important as traditional military threats.

A couple of weeks after the report from the CNA Corporation was released the United Kingdom brought up the issue of climate change in the UN Security Council. The hearing on April 17th 2007 was the first-ever time the Council held a debate about the impacts of climate change on peace and security (UNSC 2007)[selected quotes from the meeting in UNSC 2007; see Appendix II, page x]. Whether climate change lay under the Security Council’s mandate was rightfully debated, as its primary responsibility under the UN Charter is the maintenance of international peace and security. China’s representative said that “The issue could have certain security implications, but, generally speaking, it was, in essence, an issue of sustainable development.” 26 Others welcomed the debate, in particular the small island states: “The impact of climate change on small islands was no less threatening than the dangers guns and bombs posed to large nations.” 27

Margaret Beckett, the British Foreign Secretary who chaired the meeting, warned about intensified competition for resources due to drought and crop failure and that flooding, disease and famine could cause unprecedented scales of migration (UNSC 2007). She stated explicitly that climate change was both a “threat multiplier” and a security issue, but emphasized that she saw security not in narrow national understanding but in a wider, collective security in an interdependent world (see Appendix II, page xi). Representatives from Germany, Denmark, Belgium, United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Norway found it appropriate and necessary to broaden the scope and include “less obvious and more distant drivers of conflict” like climate change.

Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated that fighting over natural resources has occurred throughout human history, as war has been a tool for securing possession of scarce resources (UNSC 2007). He warned about climate change driving migration and that resource scarcity could transform peaceful competition to violence. Climate change thus has impacts on peace and security:

\[
\text{[W]hen resources are scarce - whether energy, water or arable land - our fragile ecosystems become strained, as do the coping mechanisms of groups and individuals, (...) This can lead to a breakdown of established codes of conduct, and even outright conflict.}
\]

Ban Ki-moon’s words are also quoted in the Nobel speech and indicate that the Nobel Peace Prize Committee regards this as an establishment of climate change as a threat to security by the UN Security Council. The hearing notes, however, reveal that the issue was disputed. Many delegates recognized a need for incorporating climate change within the Council’s responsibilities but there was also those opposed this idea: the representative from Brazil warned about trying to trace conflicts back to a single cause and “advocated extreme caution in establishing links between

26 Pakistan, on behalf of G77 and China, argued that the increasing encroachment of the roles and responsibilities of the other main UN organs was a distortion of the Council’s primary principles and purposes under the Charter, and infringed on the authority of the other UN bodies (UNSC 2007). A similar statement came from Sudan. Margaret Beckett rejected this intension and emphasized that the debate was not seeking to pre-empt the authority of other bodies.

27 Representative from Papua New Guinea speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum.
conflicts and the utilization of natural resources or the evolution of climate on our planet” (UNSC 2007). He pointed out that it remained a very complex task to determine whether any particular environmental factor represented a threat to international peace and security and concluded that “There was a more relevant link between climate change and development, as opposed to security.”

This section indicates that there was an upsurge of the security threat framing in 2007. If it started with the CNA report is unknown, but it did get attention even in the climate-sceptic Bush administration (Dalby 2009). By going through the UNSC hearing notes I have also showed that there were disparities within the UNSC on whether it was within the Council’s mandate to discuss climate change as a security concern. Despite this, the Nobel Committee has used Ban Ki-moons words to argue that the UN Security Council has established climate change as a threat to international peace and security.

4.4 A security threat understanding of climate change

Through the appointment of the Peace Prize to Wangari Maathai in 2004 and especially to the IPCC and Al Gore in 2007, Halvard Buhaug (informal conversation 25 February 2011) finds the Norwegian Nobel Committee quite explicitly stating arguments for linking climate change with violent conflict, while this being weakly grounded in existing research. Since the Nobel Peace Prize is such a prestigious prize, the Nobel Committee is an important actor in international agenda setting: It has the potential of contributing to establish truths, like the connection between climate change and violent conflict. The three agents, the UN Security Council, the CNA Corporation and the Nobel Committee can all be said to push the agenda, using what this thesis has classified as causal, definitional and instrumental arguments for inclusion of something that might be termed “environmental security”. However, as Brock (1991) early stated, this term has various meanings and can lead to either a militarization of environmental politics or a demilitarization of security thinking, with one incorporating the other into the existing establishment, while the other pointing out the severity of the issue. I will not speculate in the intentions of the three agents but stress their different bases of legitimization and authority.

What I find particularly interesting about the presentation speech is the statement that the Nobel Committee hints at having been ahead of “quarrelling scientists” in the matter of linking democracy and peace in the past, as this connection now is “regarded among the most “robust” in modern political science”, thus they possibly are ahead also now of connecting peace with environmental concerns (Nobel Committee 2007b).

Although this chapter is about the presentation speech, I find it interesting to mention the reactions from the recipients of the Peace Prize in 2007: the IPCC lets the Nobel Committee get away with their claims of connecting peace and environment, stating in their Nobel Lecture that: “Peace can be defined as security and the secure access to resources that are essential for living. A disruption in such access could prove disruptive of peace” (IPCC 2007b). Without concluding whether or not climate change leads to increased likelihood of conflict the IPCC refer to research currently being
done in the field of climate and security, also pointing to examples of “lessons in human history” where people destroyed their natural basis and thus themselves (IPCC 2007b). They see particularly migration and movement of people as sources of potential conflict. It almost seems like the IPCC felt obliged to mention security and conflict scenarios to help justify why they have been appointed the Peace Prize. In contrast to the linkages drawn by the Nobel Committee, they suggest in their concluding paragraph that “How climate change will affect peace is for others to determine, but we have provided scientific assessment of what could become a basis for conflict” (IPCC 2007b). Have the IPCC let the Nobel Committee be the judge of this?

In his Nobel Lecture, Al Gore (2007) points to “climate refugees” potentially causing conflict in already inhabited areas with people of different cultures, religions and traditions. He also said (emphasis added): “Indeed, without realizing it, we have begun to wage war on the earth itself.” - “It is time to make peace with the planet.” – “We must quickly mobilize our civilization with the urgency and resolve that has previously been seen only when nations mobilized for war.” The rhetoric of this speech is for another study to investigate, but I find it interesting how he used words like “war” and “peace” to describe the relationship between humans and the earth.

It is not just the rhetoric and what is said in the speech that is generally interesting in the framing analysis. As important are the words that are left out. Framing is all about selecting aspects of the reality; to present some while leaving out other information (Entman 1993). The Norwegian Nobel Committee has by appointing the IPCC and Al Gore the Peace Prize made a powerful selection; in similar words used by Carvalho (2007:223) to describe the news media ideology, they have contributed to decide “what the relevant “facts” are, and who are the authorized “agents of definition” of science matters.” The Peace Prize can be said to play a part in shaping public and political opinions, trying to establish that the IPCC and Al Gore deserves the Prize because climate change potentially leads to war and is a threat to international security and peace.

While the intentions of the Nobel Committee is to bring the matter of climate change up and about, their argumentation to serve this purpose may emphasize the framing of climate change as a security threat, which, as shown in earlier chapters, is neither an objective understanding nor a particularly useful strategy.
5 Appraising the Overall Security Framing of Climate Change

I have argued that the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore in 2007 and its justification in the presentation speech have contributed to establish a frame where climate change is seen as contributing to increasing conflicts in the world, thus being of national security concern. Frames in communication matters as they affect the attitudes of their audiences and it is common that politicians for example adopt frames used by other politicians, the media or others, like the Nobel Committee, and vice versa (Chong and Druckman 2007). In 2008 the European Commission presented a white paper to the European Council on “Climate change and International Security”, using the similar words as the Nobel Committee, representatives in the UNSC and in the CNA Military board: “Climate change is best viewed as a threat multiplier which exacerbates existing trends, tensions and instability” (Solana 2008:2, emphasis added). This paper focused on international security threats created by climate change, for example conflict over resources; border disputes; environmentally-induced migration, and pressure on international governance, with emphasis on the (negative) impacts on Europe’s security and the suited response by the European Union.

A more recent example of a similar security threat frame can be found in Jakob von Uexkull’s opening speech at the 2010 Right Livelihood Awards28: “In a competitive world of growing resource scarcities, violent conflicts will multiply. Wealthy societies have so far experienced only a tiny fraction of the unstoppable immigration they will face” (Uexkull 2010, emphasis added). This and the EU example, with similar language use and understanding of climate change as threat multiplier, indicate a continuation of a security threat framing.

5.1 Problems with a security threat framing

Urdal and Gleditsch (2010) find it not helpful to prioritise an adaptation which is based in a wrongly perceived causality between climate change and conflict, and they argue that: “An exaggerated focus on the security aspects of environmental degradation is unlikely to contribute to increase our ability to prevent and overcome the scarcity of natural resources or to make the world safer and more peaceful” (Urdal and Gleditsch 2010:621). Why is it unlikely and disadvantageous?

---

28 The Right Livelihood Award is often referred to as the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize.
International Alert\textsuperscript{29} see established interlinkages between climate change and conflict, which they consider to be “among the most compelling arguments for rich states to take action against climate change” (Smith and Vivekanada 2009:7). However, they also acknowledge the need for using these arguments carefully. International Alert warns:

- Fuelling fears of wars and mass-immigration, and over-stating the conflict dimension of climate change will lead to oversimplified and inaccurate understandings of the security aspects.
- Securitising runs the risk of giving costly, probably ineffective military options priority over sustainable, cost-effective options.

These two points can possibly result from the use of the instrumental arguments of attention seeking and a military, security approach to climate change. Unfortunately, the warnings are not discussed further in the International Alert Report.

Instrumental arguments are trying to frame climate change as a security threat, though with different, possibly conflicting objectives. Pointing to powerful perceptions of security, threats, possible wars and hordes of migrants can fuel fears. This may be a useful way of attracting attention and action towards climate change as “emotional reactions to risky situations often drive behaviour” (Kenzie 2010:10). A previous LUMES-thesis by Erin Kenzie\textsuperscript{30} shows that when confronted with risk we act on how we feel rather than making weighted judgements for action. Because the consequences climate change yet is difficult to feel directly, particularly in the wealthier parts of the world, the security threat framing may have been a strategy to appeal to our negative emotions.

Interestingly the actors mentioned as contributing to a security threat frame mostly represent or come from the Western world; the CNA Corporation and the EU representatives in the UNSC. Also the Norwegian Nobel Committee finds itself seemingly, at least for the present, far away up north from sea-level rise and desertification; with low vulnerability and a high adaptive capacity. Pointing to possible security threats to people also in the wealthier countries, as well as the threats to their national security, may seem as a good strategy. For example, the connection between environmental degradation and migration I see as a possible way of linking environmentally induced conflicts in, often, developing countries, to possible implications on an international scale, thus also affecting industrial countries. However, Deudney (1999:190) early warned that while appealing to nationalistic and individualistic notions could potentially help mobilize awareness and action towards for example climate change, this emotive appeal could prove counterproductive: Climate change is a global issue, and even though we might not sit in the same type of boat, focus on nationalism and nations may undermine “globalist political sensibility”.

Fearful message framing can be effective in attracting attention, but this can also heighten the impression of climate change being distant in both time and space, making people feel unable to do something (Manzo 2010). It can make people desensitized, as playing on people’s emotions by using scare tactics and threatening scenarios make climate change negatively charged in people’s

\textsuperscript{29} International Alert is an independent peacebuilding organization, see www.international-alert.org

\textsuperscript{30} Erin Kenzie (2010) addresses the role of positive emotions and how practitioners could engage people’s positive emotions to promote behaviour change. Her LUMES master thesis is available at www.lumes.lu.se.
minds (Kenzie 2010). It can also make it unclear how to delimit what is the right and wrong way to promote change. Thus the practical advantages of deploying threat tactics are limited. Kenzie (2010) also sees it morally questionable to intentionally try to affect people's negative emotions, as it seen as intentionally inflicting pain. Her suggestion is to look at the role of using positive emotions in promoting behaviour change, as the risks of climate change is difficult to feel and to create a salient message is tricky. Positive emotions appeal to people's desire for well-being and might be better to motivate long-term change in behaviour. This may lead to more fundamental and not just situational changes (Moser 2010).

The use and exaggeration of a threat and crisis narrative serves certain purposes, argues Benjaminsen (2008): somebody wins from its usage while others lose. Amsale Temesgen at Fafo\(^{31}\) (Informal conversation, 1 March 2011) points out that climate change can become an argument that diverts attention from other more pressing problems. From her experience in Southern Ethiopia she found local politicians too often blaming climate change for causing conflicts. Even though drought can lead to tensions between ethnic groups competing for scarce water and land, the deterministic relationship is problematic: Other, more complicated and hidden causes may be justifiably overseen. Local politicians in Southern Ethiopia may be happy to have “climate change” as a “cover” to ignore sensitive social, political, ethnic and economic realities.

5.2 The possibility of floating into militarization and securitization

The usefulness of a security threat framing to climate change certainly depends on what one wants to achieve. While creating a salient message for mobilizing the masses may be better executed by appealing to positive rather than negative emotions, it may be other motives driving framing of climate change as a security threat to nations globally, and as mentioned maybe especially in the wealthier parts of the world, while for example in the debate in the UN Security Council several developing countries expressed their concern about the inclusion of climate change in the Council’s mandate.

By uttering the danger of climate change in terms of security and threats actors can intentionally or not contribute to a process of securitization; to make climate change a security issue: “‘Security’ is the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frame the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998:23). In framing climate change as a security threat, climate change becomes a security issue according to the Copenhagen school, as the practice of “security” is self-referential, “not necessarily because a real threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998:24). So, while the Nobel Committee’s intention is to raise the importance and priority of

\(^{31}\) Fafo is an independent and multidisciplinary research foundation focusing on transnational security and development issues among others, within both a domestic Norwegian and larger international context. See: http://www.fafo.no/indexenglish.htm (Accessed 2 May 2011)
climate change on the political agenda, their use of a security threat frame can be considered as a securitization attempt by a non-traditional-security actor.

To present something as an existential threat to the public does not by itself make something securitized; the Nobel Peace Prize to the IPCC and Al Gore in 2007, with the argumentations that followed, can only be seen as a “securitising move” (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998:25). Climate change is only securitized if and when the public accepts it as such. However, the examples from the EU and the Right Livelihood Awards, and the clever move understanding by the environmental movement, may indicate that such an acceptance is possible, though it may be difficult to point to a wider acceptance for the current being. “Environmental security”, “resource wars” and other threat understandings of climate change are securitization moves, and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) emphasize that there are always problematic side effects to applying a mind-set of security which has to be weigh against the possible advantages of priority, attention and mobilization: More security is not necessarily for the better. Trombetta (2008) argues that once activated, a security threat frame is difficult to undo. The Nobel Committee wants to draw attention to climate change by using the initial appeal of “security” but they risk playing in the hands of those who want to securitize the issue to for example make use of military means or strategies, and move the climate change beyond the realm of normal, democratic politics, far away from considering the environmental agenda. Prioritising security has shown to be disadvantageous compared to investing in sustainability in achieving less vulnerable human-environment systems (UNEP 2007).

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998:29) also warns us that security claims, especially “national security”, can work to silence opposition and give those in power opportunities to exploit the security threat frame “to claim a right to handle something with less democratic control and constraint.” If climate change is securitized because its’ possible connection to violent conflict has been established as a truth, this can work to promote inaction and provide a cover for governments not to deal with more complex social and economic reasons for existing tension. This cover is problematic because it suggests “a near deterministic relation between the environment and armed conflict, thereby relieving the main actors of their own responsibility” (Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008:29). Inability to resolve for example the violent conflict in Darfur can be excused by pointing to this deterministic explanation and by framing climate change as an inevitable threat multiplier, arguing that “no single country is to blame for the adverse environmental developments and no country can be expected to mitigate these problems single-handedly” (Buhaug, Gleditsch and Theisen 2008:28). Climate change can by these arguments influence how conflicts are perceived and work as a political escape for struggling, illiberal regimes, like the one in Sudan.
6 Alternative Framings of Climate Change

Ideas are never innocent but ‘either reinforce or challenge existing social and economic arrangements’. (Schmink and Wood, in Bryant 1998:87)

6.1 Sustainability first

Andrew Dobson (2007) points to the tension between the radical nature of the social and political change the environmental movement seek, and the reliance on traditional liberal democratic means of bringing it about. The use of apocalyptic frames in the environmental movement is problematic as the reliance on “gloomy prognostications” can overshadow seriously thinking about actually realizing the change they propose (Dobson 2007:16). There is the danger that instead of being a revolutionary tool for change, environmental politics becomes limited to a reactionary defence of status quo (Matthew 1999a).

The understanding of security, concerned with safety and certainty, is by implication concerned with the maintenance of the status quo (Barnett 2001); therefore, framing climate change as a “security threat” can at best raise the issue’s attention and priority. The pit-fall is that it will at the same time strengthen the legitimacy of dealing with climate change using traditional means of security. Now is the time to think new, not in terms of nation state legitimacy and national security but more in terms of social and global security. To relate climate change to traditional security concerns of military implications does not open up for seeing environmental harm to small communities and individuals as major security concerns, despite its existential dimensions.

Even though climate change represents a global concern; we are all in the same boat, “ecological interdependence still goes hand in hand with massive economic disparities between societies” (Brock 1991:410). While trying to motivate, maybe especially the population in the wealthier countries to take climate change seriously, by pointing to security implications may not make a difference to the overall pursuit of addressing the challenges of climate change: the scarcity-induced conflict hypothesis and environmental migration may trigger fear and urgency which can lead to an increased “us” versus “them” mentality. As Deudney (1999:189-190) early on claimed, this could be counterproductive because it appeals to “the emotive power of nationalism” which undermines “globalist political sensibility.” Elliott (2004) reminds us that environmental
degradation does not follow national borders, and a reliance on unilateral action to maintain security is useless. This will also hamper the possibilities for environmental cooperation and peaceful negotiation on climate change, as advocated by Conca (2002).

The GEO4 Outlook (UNEP 2007) also argues that we should invest in sustainability first to have opportunities to reduce vulnerability to climate change and to improve human well-being. The strength of investing in ‘Security first’ is much lower on building a culture of responsibility and institutions for equity; improve health; strengthening local rights; environmental cooperation and integration of governance across levels and sectors. It is also low on bridging knowledge to enhance coping capacity and capacity building for implementation. This indicates that knowledge from for example sustainability science is better employed within a ‘Sustainability first’ scenario, thus a cooperation framing is more applicable to sustainability science than a conflict and security threat framing.

6.2 Addressing the environmental movement

This thesis has argued that the initially perceived “clever move” to support a security threat frame of climate change as this message reaches authoritarian spheres like the Nobel Committee, the UNSC, former US military generals, Ban Ki-moon and Barack Obama, can work counterproductive to the environmental agenda. These actors seemingly want to draw attention to the severity and urgency of climate change, but it is difficult to know the exact motivation and the scientific knowledge for example the retired U.S. generals base their arguments on. The continued domination of a national security and the possibility of securitization and militarization can be damaging to the environmental agenda of addressing climate change, and are not compatible with the pursuit of sustainability as shown by the UNEP’s GEO4 Outlook.

I hope this thesis helps the environmental movement to see that the truth of their messages matters. The movement should be more self-critical and question if, for example, environmental protection is worthy of a Peace Prize, not just praise any publicity as good publicity. One can be an environmentalist while also be critical to seemingly established truths and approaches of how to communicate climate change. Instead of “hoping for the best, but prepare for the worst” like a good soldier, an environmental activist should have a more positive outlook on the future. Precaution does not mean giving in to determinism: As Mary Kaldor aptly said: “To steer toward a more optimistic future depends ultimately on our own behaviour” (2006: 194).

It is also important to be an informed activist. Buhaug (2010) emphasizes that the research on security implications of climate change still is in its infancy. Both conflict and cooperation are equally possible; my point is that one is not more likely than the other. The uncertainty, and the immobilising and ethical implications of a security threat motivational strategy, I argue are reasons for the environmental movement to emphasize the possibilities of climate change providing a basis for cooperation rather than competition and conflict. This nourishes positive emotions and is a more useful approach for the environmental movement (and the peace movement).
6.3 Concluding remarks

This exploratory study set out to problematize the basis of how we think and act about climate change: to motivate people and politicians to seriously address climate change by arguing conflict and "security threats" scenarios, are arguments not grounded in truth. At the same time, this “clever move” of grabbing the attention for the environmental agenda is in fact not clever after all. A framing of climate change as a “security threat” can shift focus and resources away from environmental concerns onto security agendas. Putting security first also undermines sustainability efforts. Additionally, playing on negative emotions of fear and using threats as a motivational strategy has proven futile. Not only is it unhelpful in changing people’s attitudes and behaviour in the long run, it also has ethical implications. The problem with the argument “preparing for the worst” is that it involves measures which do not necessarily have the best environmental intentions in mind. My findings will hopefully invite environmental activists to be more self-reflective of their messages which will ultimately strengthen the environmental movement. Instead of immobilising determinism, I argue that one should rather “acknowledge the worst, whilst prepare and plan for the better”.
References


Hulme, Mike (2009). Why We Disagree About Climate Change. Understanding controversy, inaction and opportunity: Cambridge University Press.


Appendix I: Presentation speech

Speech given by the Chairman of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Ole Danbolt Mjøs

(Accessed 29 March 2011)

Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Laureates, Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Norwegian Nobel Committee’s announcement on the 12th of October of this year’s Peace Prize award opened with the following words: "The Norwegian Nobel Committee has decided that the Nobel Peace Prize for 2007 is to be shared, in two equal parts, between the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Albert Arnold (Al) Gore Jr. for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made climate change, and to lay the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract such change."

I congratulate the IPCC and Al Gore on this year’s Peace Prize!

The Oxford Dictionary of Contemporary World History describes the Nobel Peace Prize as "the world’s most prestigious prize". The Norwegian Nobel Committee feels a heavy sense of responsibility in selecting a winner for such an honourable prize. The steady increase in the number of nominees also makes the decision harder. Besides, some controversy attaches to this year’s Laureates. Nevertheless, this year's award decision was not especially difficult. For it is rare for the world to be so concerned with a particular phenomenon or for that phenomenon to have such a decisive impact on our existence on earth. This year a great deal is hinging on global warming. Processes that have been going on for a long time are accelerating. The ice is melting more rapidly in the Arctic, the desert is spreading more quickly in Africa, the glaciers are shrinking in the Himalayas.

In country after country, climate-related issues are moving up the political agenda. The two who, in the opinion of the Nobel Committee, should be given the greatest credit for this development are this year’s Laureates, the IPCC and Al Gore. The IPCC, the United Nations’ climate panel, is a unique body, as its name alone indicates. The climate panel was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). This was a follow-up on the so-called Brundtland Report Our Common Future, which had been submitted the year before and which gave rise to the first wave of discussion of the environment and the climate. On a day like today, Gro Harlem Brundtland also deserves her share of the credit for the advances we have in fact made in our understanding of environmental problems.

Whereas the Brundtland Report was wide-ranging, the IPCC was given a more delimited mandate. The world’s scientists were invited to participate in a continuous process aimed at assessing global climate change with regard to its degree, causes, and consequences, and to counter-measures. Currently over 130 countries are taking part, with 450 authors and 800 contributors, while 2,500 scientific experts take part in...
the hearings. Governments also take part in the reviews of the reports. The climate panel is, in other words, a quite extraordinary global project.

The U.N. climate panel has arrived at its conclusions through a form of work that is fundamentally innovative. Previous mobilizations of the scientific community have often had moral foundations, for instance in the campaigns against nuclear weapons or for human rights. In the case of the IPCC, it is the United Nations and the nations of the world that have initiated a large-scale and continuous mobilization of the scientific community’s knowledge concerning climate change. Similar procedures to the IPCC’s should be considered as ways of approaching problems also in other fields. Biological diversity, desertification, and over-fishing of the seas have been mentioned.

The IPCC’s very first report, presented in 1990, was to prove very influential, principally in that it became one of the basic documents at the U.N. Conference on Environment and Climate in 1992. The second report, in 1995, laid much of the foundation for the Kyoto Agreement of 1997, which has played such a significant part in the international debate on global warming. For the first time, extensive and coordinated international steps were carried out to counteract global warming. The third report, in 2001, further consolidated the scientific base. Now we have just received the fourth report. When the Nobel Days are over, the Laureates are travelling to Bali, to join the representatives of more than 180 countries in preparing the ground for the agreement which is to replace the Kyoto Agreement with effect from 2012. We wish them good luck. What happens, or does not happen, at Bali will determine our common future.

Some say that the world’s scientists do not all agree in their analyses of human-induced global warming. Things which all the world’s scientists are fully agreed on are few and far between. That is in the nature of research. But there is little doubt about the main trends: more and more scientists have reached ever closer agreement concerning the increasingly dramatic consequences that will follow from global warming. Whereas in the 1980s global warming might be viewed as an interesting hypothesis, the 1990s produced firmer evidence of the real situation. In the last few years, the connections have become much clearer and the consequences still more apparent.

We thank the IPCC for its outstanding scientific work!

While the IPCC has laid the scientific foundations for our knowledge about climate change, Al Gore is in the opinion of the Norwegian Nobel Committee the single individual who has done most to prepare the ground for the political action that is needed to counteract climate change. He is the great communicator. He reaches people all over the world with his message. As early as in the 1970s, as a young member of the House of Representatives, Al Gore organized hearings on emissions of greenhouse gases, then seen as a relatively exotic subject. Many derogatory terms were applied to his commitment, not least in the USA. In 1992, Gore published the book Earth in the Balance, which wound up with a proposal for a global Marshall Plan to save the biosphere. The book became a best-seller in the USA. It showed impressive insight, built on a broad scientific platform, and spoke in a distinctly political and activist tone of voice. Gore was into his stride.

As Vice President, Al Gore signed the Kyoto Agreement, but the Senate opposed United States ratification. After his defeat in the presidential election in 2000, he laid the foundations for a completely new career, as the world’s leading political spokesman on the environment. We know of all his achievements in the last few years, from book, film and concert to distinctions, honour and prizes. Political defeats can also bring good results!

Again and again, Gore has hammered in his message, not least to Americans. The USA is, along with China, the great polluter. But that also entails a responsibility for becoming the leader in emission reduction. No one can
charge Gore with lacking concrete guidelines for what individuals can do. An Inconvenient Truth contains sixteen tightly-packed pages of advice on "what you personally can do to help solve the climate crisis". We all have a responsibility, small countries and large, all mankind, but the heaviest responsibility rests on the rich nations, which to a large extent created global warming. Behind Gore's total commitment there is unquenchable optimism. He watched the world take up arms against tobacco and achieve a high degree of success, at least in many rich countries. Cancer took his sister's life. Where tobacco was concerned, too, strong interests had claimed that there was insufficient evidence. No one is in any doubt any longer.

We thank Al Gore for his great courage and unremitting struggle!

There was for a long time great doubt about whether global warming was man-made. Thanks to the IPCC there is very little such doubt today. Then there are those who doubt that there is any connection between the environment and the climate on the one hand and war and conflict on the other. Why have the IPCC and Al Gore been awarded a Nobel Prize for peace?

The Norwegian Nobel Committee has always had a broad approach to peace. Its opinion has been that there are many different paths to peace. A number of these paths have been contentious, not so much among ordinary people, who are inclined to believe that any good cause deserves the Peace Prize, as among scholars, whose task it is to study interrelations between phenomena. When the Nobel Committee handed out human rights prizes, scholars queried the connection between democracy and peace. Today they no longer ask. The connection is now regarded as among the most "robust" in modern political science.

The traditional concept of peace and security emphasises war between states. In order to protect all the individuals of which states consist, it is of course important to prevent any attack from outside. But wars between states have become increasingly rare. Wars within states, on the other hand, have grown more frequent. Many more people are killed today in civil wars than in wars between states.

Those who attach importance to "human security" argue that the main thing is to protect individuals. The chief threats may be direct violence, but deaths may also have less direct sources in starvation, disease, or natural disasters. A goal in our modern world must be to maintain "human security" in the broadest sense.

Environmental problems certainly affect human security in this broad sense. When low-lying areas are flooded, their inhabitants will no longer have any form of security. In the words of last year's Laureate, Muhammad Yunus, "My country Bangladesh is already paying a very high price for global warming and stands to face even greater challenges in the future. As natural calamities intensify year on year, climate change has already become a question of survival". We can already see how millions of refugees from Bangladesh are creating social and political tensions in India. Melting glaciers, and rivers which first overflow and then have their rate of flow reduced or dry out, mean dramatic changes in people's everyday lives. In many places, such events are coinciding with rapid increases in population. Such cities as Quito, La Paz and Lima are affected by the melting of glaciers in the Andes; the rivers from the glaciers in the Himalayas supply half of the fresh water needed by 40 per cent of the world's population. Desertification in China and Africa is threatening vast land areas.

In some parts of the world global warming can be beneficial. We see farming being undertaken in northern regions where it has hitherto been difficult or impossible. Nevertheless, Inuit and Sami people are worried. Sheila Watt-Cloutier has said that this year it was planet earth that got the Peace Prize. The overall effect is negative. In the south the picture is even clearer. The effect will be particularly damaging for those who are already in the greatest difficulty, the weak states and vulnerable people who are least well-equipped to meet
the new challenges. They are paying a high price for a problem largely brought about by the wealthy countries to the north.

Unfortunately we can already establish that global warming not only has negative consequences for "human security", but can also fuel violence and conflict within and between states. It can be argued that the meltdown in the Arctic is giving a sharper edge to the new series of sovereignty claims that we are seeing in this northernmost part of the world. The consequences are most obvious, however, among the poorest of the poor, in Darfur and in large sectors of the Sahel belt, where we have already had the first "climate war". The wind that blows the sand off the Sahara sets people and camels moving towards more fertile areas. The outcome is that nomads and peasants, Arabs and Africans, Christians and Muslims from many different tribes clash in a series of conflicts. There are many dimensions to this, but it is growing increasingly obvious that desertification is a central underlying factor. The pattern from Darfur has now spread to Chad and the Central African Republic. Large parts of the Sahel belt, from the Sudan to Senegal, are coming under threat.

It is not only the Norwegian Nobel Committee that sees interrelations between nature and the environment, war and conflict. So does the UN Security Council. In April this year, on Britain's initiative, the Security Council held its first debate on the effect of climate on war and conflict. The UN Secretary-General, Ban Ki-Moon, said in his careful way that "when resources are scarce - whether energy, water or arable land - our fragile ecosystems become strained, as do the coping mechanisms of groups and individuals. This can lead to a breakdown of established codes of conduct, and even outright conflict'. Climate and the environment have thus become one of the threats "to international peace and security" which the UN Security Council is meant to deal with. A committee of prominent American military officers recently stated that climate changes are "a threat multiplier for instability in some of the most volatile regions of the world".

The Norwegian Nobel Committee rarely raises its voice. Our style is largely sober. But it is a long time since the committee was concerned with such fundamental questions as this year. Desmond Tutu, Peace Prize Laureate in 1984, put it as follows in Tromsø's Arctic Cathedral in connection with World Environment Day on the 5th of June: "To ignore the challenge of global warming may be criminal. It certainly is disobeying God. It is sin. The future of our fragile, beautiful planet is in our hands. We are stewards of God's creation".

We congratulate the IPCC and Al Gore on receiving this year's Peace Prize. We thank you for what you have done for mother earth, and wish you further success in a task that is so vital to us all. Action is needed now. Climate changes are already moving beyond human control.

Thank you for your attention.
Appendix II: UNSC 2007


The original document of the hearing is almost 50 pages long, without page numbers, which is the reason quotes are selected out and put in this appendix (in chronological order).

- **The President of the Security Council, MARGARET BECKETT, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom** (welcoming statement):
  
  “The international community needed to recognize that there was a security impact from climate change, and begin to build a shared understanding of the relationship between energy, security and climate.”

- **VITTORIO CRAXI, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Italy**:
  
  “Environmental degradation related to climate change might drive entire populations away from areas such as sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South-East Asia and small islands – indeed, it had been estimated that, by 2010, such “population shifts” might number 50 million people. Those conflicts and mass exoduses would then contribute to an increase in poverty, which, in turn, would increase pockets of discontent and recruitment by rebels or terrorists.”

- **JOHAN VERBEKE, Belgium**:
  
  “It was clear that climate change and global warming raised the risks of non-military threats, including, among others, sea-level rise, degradation of biodiversity, displacement of populations and crop depletion. They also increased the risk that fragile States would relapse into conflict or civil war.”

- **BASILE IKOUEBE, Congo**:
  
  “Congo was already facing the challenges of climate change. For the first time in history, men and women would fight for food, energy and water, but, this time, at a larger scale and with disastrous effects that would dwarf the conflicts of the past.”

  “It was useful that the main body of the United Nations in charge of security sought to galvanize universal awareness of the issues involved, he continued. He expected the Council to sound an alarm bell, but details and strategies needed to be elaborated elsewhere.”

- **JEAN-MARC DE LA SABIÈRE, France**:
  
  “...the Council could not ignore the threats to peace and security caused by climate change. Everyone had a role to play. All the climate change threats were real and would affect security among nations.”

  “The Council, in its efforts to resolve conflicts, must also integrate the depletion of resources dimension. That was already an important factor for conflict in Africa. Conflict prevention meant mobilization of all instruments in support of the efforts of developing countries. The Council might promote integration of the security, environmental, social and other dimensions of the issue, since poverty and environmental degradation could no longer be considered isolated threats.”
BAN KI-MOON, United Nations Secretary-General:

"...said that, throughout human history, people and countries had fought over natural resources. From livestock, watering holes and fertile land, to trade routes, fish stocks, spices, sugar, oil, gold and other precious commodities. War had too often been the means to secure possession of scarce resources. Even today, the uninterrupted supply of fuel and minerals was a key element of geopolitical considerations."

"Things were easier at times of plenty, when all could share in the abundance, even if to different degrees. "But, when resources are scarce -- whether energy, water or arable land -- our fragile ecosystems become strained, as do the coping mechanisms of groups and individuals," he said, adding: “This can lead to a breakdown of established codes of conduct, and even outright conflict.”

"In a series of reports on conflict prevention, he said that former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan had pointed to the threats emanating from environmental degradation and resource scarcity. Quoting from the latest of the reports, he said: “Environmental degradation has the potential to destabilize already conflict-prone regions, especially when compounded by inequitable access or politicization of access to scarce resources. I urge Member States to renew their efforts to agree on ways that allow all of us to live sustainably within the planet's means.”

"By example, he asked the Council members to consider some scenarios - "all alarming, though not alarmist" - among others, the adverse effects of changing weather patterns, such as floods and droughts, and related economic costs, including compensation for lost land, could risk polarizing society and marginalizing communities. That, in turn, could weaken the institutional capacity of States to resolve conflict through peaceful and democratic means, to ensure social cohesion and to safeguard human rights.”

"Offering another sobering scenario, he asked the Council to consider that migration, driven by factors such as climate change, could deepen tensions and conflicts, particularly in regions with large numbers of internally displaced persons and refugees. Further, scarce resources, especially water and food, could help transform peaceful competition into violence. "Limited or threatened access to energy is already known to be a powerful driver of conflict. Our changing planet risks making it more so,” he said.”

Council President, MARGARET BECKETT, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom:

"...speaking in her national capacity, said that climate change was transforming the way the international community thought about security.”

"Charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, she continued, the Security Council could go a long way towards building a shared understanding of what the effects of climate change would mean to international peace and security, now and in the future. Climate change was a threat multiplier. The United Kingdom agreed that a full account of climate risks should be undertaken when examining the root causes of conflict. The fact that so many delegations without membership in the Council had chosen to speak was proof of the bitter truth that instability was first visited upon those that were already struggling with other development and security concerns.”

"She stressed that, for the United Kingdom, climate change was a security issue, but not of "narrow national security". It was about collective security in an increasingly fragile world for all.” “She said that climate change was not just of grave concern, but of common concern. It was important for everyone to enjoy better prospects for security. To that end, "climate change can bring us together, if we have the wisdom to prevent it from driving us apart”, she declared.”

HEIDEMARIE WIECZOREK-ZEUL, Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development of Germany:

"...speaking on behalf of the European Union and associated States, said that the security implications of climate change should receive more attention and she, therefore, welcomed today's opportunity to convey the Union's perspective on that matter. The Council usually dealt with more imminent threats to international peace and security, but less obvious and more distant drivers of conflict should not be neglected. The Security Council was committed to a culture of prevention, as incorporated in resolution 1625, and there was a clear link between climate change and the need for conflict prevention.”

BERT KOENDERS, Minister for Development Cooperation of the Netherlands:

"...said that, while the Council’s primary responsibility was to maintain international peace and security, and it tended to deal with current conflicts, there were times when "we need to look beyond the horizon of current conflicts to explore the challenges and threats the future may bring”."
“He said that new sources of conflict might emerge and disasters might occur more frequently, with more devastating effects. The United Nations estimated that, by 2010, the world would host some 50 million “environmental refugees”, without even taking the effects of climate change into account.”

- ABDULLA SHAHID, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the Maldives:
  “...recalled that, some 20 years ago, his country’s President had said that for his country, a mean sea-level rise of 2 metres would suffice to virtually submerge the entire country of 1,190 small islands. That would be the death of a nation.”

- ROBERT G. AISI, Papua New Guinea (speaking on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum):
  “He said that the impact of climate change on small islands was no less threatening than the dangers guns and bombs posed to large nations. Pacific Island nations were likely to face massive dislocations of people, similar to population flows sparked by conflict. The impact on identity and social cohesion were likely to cause as much resentment, hatred and alienation as any refugee crisis.”

- ROSEMARY BANKS, New Zealand:
  “Today, Governments were becoming more aware that the effects of climate change were much more than threats to the environment alone. They also threatened some of the most fundamental needs of their citizens: a safe place to live; access to water; health; food; and the ability to earn a living. When those needs were threatened, whole societies were at risk of instability. So it was entirely appropriate that the Council was discussing the security dimensions of climate change.”

- AFELEE F. PITA, Tuvalu:
  “He said the world had moved from the cold war to the “warming war”, in which chimney stacks and exhaust pipes were the weapons, and it was a “chemical war of immense proportions”. The world needed a mix of energy sources easily accessible to all countries, since it was clear from ongoing world crises that there were security dimensions to prohibitive access to and use of energy. Imported fossil fuel was one of the greatest drains on Tuvalu’s economy, and the high costs of energy threatened the country’s security. The Security Council was called on to understand and respond to such new concepts of security and conflict.”

- MUHAMMAD ALI SORCAR, Bangladesh:
  “He said that projects for Bangladesh were ominous. The Country was basically a vast river delta -- split nearly in half by two mighty rivers, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra -- that was home to some 147 million people. With climate warming, experts had posited that the Himalayan snows would melt and torrential waters would stream down from the mountains and flood the alluvial plains. At the same time, with sea-level rise, saline water would flow up from the south and meet the melting mountain ice. Millions of people would be caught in between with nowhere to go. While what might come next would take some imagination, the mere thought of the impact of those joint phenomena was sufficient reason to look seriously for ways to “prevent a future which none of us will be able to handle”, he said.”

- PUI LEONG, Venezuela:
  “…supported the position of the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement and said that her country was aware of the seriousness of the climate change situation. However, the Security Council was not the appropriate body to deal with that subject. The Council should adjust its actions to the spirit and letter of the Charter of the United Nations. Venezuela considered that each State was sovereign in determining its priorities in that area, as had been recognized by various international instruments. Energy was a matter of sovereignty, and every country had the authority to decide on the use of its natural resources and on its environmental and energy policy. Interference by the Council could have adverse effects in that regard. To bring to the Council the matters that were not within its purview could lead to an illusion that the body was democratic, while that was far from the case.”

- ABDALMAHMOOD ABDALHALEEM, Sudan:
  “…speaking on behalf of the African Group, expressed concern regarding the Council’s decision to hold an open debate on issues not falling within its mandate. The Charter had made clear that issues related to social and economic development remained the domain of the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly. The Council’s increasing and alarming encroachment on the mandates of other United Nations bodies, which the Council was trying to justify by linking all issues to the question of security, was compromising the principles and purposes of the Charter and undermining the relevant bodies.”
  “He said the African Group cautioned against attempts to shift the agenda of interest of all Member States to an institution that had vested final decisions to few members of the Organization. Energy and climate change were
development issues, which should be tackled within the parameters of development and the impediments to its achievement. If concerns and challenges arising from climate change and energy were more profound than ever before, particularly in Africa, the fundamental reason was the lack of fulfillment of commitments and the absence of concrete action, particularly from developed countries, to tackle the adverse effects related to those issues.

- **CARSTEN STAUR, Denmark:**
  
  "...aligning himself with the European Union, said resource shortages were powerful conflict drivers -- the situation in Darfur was one example. There was also a growing realization that climate change threatened security and stability, and the Security Council should be commended for taking on the responsibility of discussing that concept early on. But, the debate should not preclude discussion in a wide range of forums outside the Council.
  
  "He said climate change must be treated in line with other major global threats, since it might undermine the carrying capacity of many developing countries, exacerbate tension over scarce water resources and fertile land, lead to environmental refugees, drive conflict over strategic trade routes and newly accessible resources, and lead to territorial losses. There was no silver bullet to fix the complex issue of climate change. There was both a need to mitigate climate changes, as well as to adapt to it. Developing countries, especially, needed help to deal with security threats arising from climate-induced degradation and potential tension over scarce resources."

- **HJALMAR W. HANNESSON, Iceland:**
  
  "If the international community acted quickly and effectively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it would have taken significant steps towards savings millions from suffering and conflict in the future."

- **PIRAGIBE TARRAGO, Brazil:**
  
  "...acknowledged the United Kingdom's initiative, but advocated extreme caution in establishing links between conflicts and the utilization of natural resources or the evolution of climate on our planet. To determine whether any particular environmental phenomenon represented a threat to international peace and security remained a very complex task. Not only should conflicts not be traced back to a single cause, but the matter was also invariably loaded with many political connotations, which might impair an objective analysis. There was a more relevant link between climate change and development, as opposed to security."

- **NIRUPAN SEN, India:**
  
  "...said the catastrophic scenarios posited by the Stern report -- which presented political argument as the outcome of an objective scientific modelling process regarding climate change and its fallout -- could hardly be discussed in any meaningful manner. In marked contrast, a more immediate and quantifiable threat was from possible conflicts arising out of inadequate resource development and poverty eradication, competition for energy."

  "In turn, by mitigating the potential for conflict, poverty eradication had positive implications for global peace and security. To tackle the problems that might lead to conflict, action was required on resource flow, adaptation and technology."

- **JOHAN LØVALD, Norway:**
  
  "Climate change as part of the peace and security agenda should and must be addressed by the Security Council, which would run the risk of becoming less effective in preventing and resolving conflicts by ignoring the environmental dimension in the underlying causes of conflict."

- **DANIEL CARMON, Israel:**
  
  "There was no doubt that the security of certain regions related directly to, among other things, the availability of energy resources. History had shown that competition between States seeking to satisfy their energy needs could instigate conflict, particularly in places where tensions already existed.

  "He stressed that it was not only the potential scarcity of oil and gas that could be drivers of conflict, but access to water, food and fertile soil. Further, recent scientific research had shown that all those factors were exacerbated by climate change."